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Characteristics of Rural Water Systems 
Farmers Home Administration (FmHA) defines a rural water system as one 
which supplies water to a rural community with a population of 10,000 persons 
or less (Lawrence, 1980). It is a legal state entity created to serve consumers 
within its district boundaries (Oklahoma Water Resources Board, 1975). Rural 
water systems provide potable water to many rural areas and small 
communities. In 1982 such systems accounted for more than 95 percent of the 
nation's water systems but supplied water to less than 25 percent of the 
population (Stevie and Clark, 1982). In 1984-85 the Oklahoma Rural Water 
Association (ORWA) had about 460 systems as members (ORWA, 1984). 
However, there are more rural water systems than there are members of ORW A. 
They are operated as units of local government or as private corporations. In 
1984-85, 83 percent of the rural water systems in Oklahoma were operated as 
units of local government while 17 percent were private corporations (ORWA, 
1984). 
The major beneficiaries of rural water systems are the household 
customers supplied with water. The households are heterogeneous in income 
level, occupation of household head, settlement motivation, type of residence, 
and other characteristics. According to a recent survey for a random sample of 
ORWA members (Dellenbarger, 1985), 36 percent of the households 
1 
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responding to the survey had annual household income less than $15,000 and 
11 percent had annual income over $50,000. In the same survey professional 
and retired heads of household accounted for 38 percent of the total whilf3 the 
rest were farmers, laborers, and others. Farmers and farm laborers accounted 
for 11.5 percent. About 87 percent of the households resided in traditional one-
family housing and 12 percent resided in mobile homes and other categories. 
The survey results showed that about 44 percent of the customers were 
motivated to live within the boundary of the system because of a desire for rural 
living. 
The economic structure of rural water systems can be characterized as a 
natural monopoly generally with a public interest. A pure monopoly is said to 
exist if there is one, and only one, seller in a well defined market (Gould and 
Ferguson, 1980). Neither rivalry nor competition exists in the pure monopoly. 
Gould and Ferguson (1980) list four major circumstances that give rise to pure 
monopolies. (1) Pure monopolies can arise when raw material supplies are 
controlled or (2) when patent laws guarantee exclusive rights to produce certain 
commodities. (3) Monopolies arise when the minimum average cost of 
production occurs at a rate of output more than sufficient to supply the entire 
market at a price covering full costs. The monopoly situation in this case is 
called a natural monopoly. (4) Monopolies are created when government 
grants businesses the exclusive right to sell goods or services and in turn, the 
businesses agree to certain controls of market conduct. Such agreements are 
called market franchises. 
A rural water system can be said to operate as a natural monopoly, a 
market franchise permitted by government, and partly as the controller of raw 
material supplies (for example, owning a lake). The pure monopoly condition of 
a rural water system is reinforced by the fact that there is no substitute for water. 
3 
Of course, indirect competition may come from wells or ponds owned by 
consumers but this is generally negligible in the market as a whole. In the 
Dellenbarger survey (1985), about two percent of household water and about 
25 percent of nonhousehold water came from alternative sources. 
A rural water system is generally characterized as a decreasing cost 
enterprise (Myoung, 1982; Myoung and Schreiner, 1984; and Fox and Hoffler, 
1986). The supply of water meets its demand at the point where average cost is 
higher than marginal cost. Pricing is then generally done monopolistically by 
individual water system but no profit is allowed under government regulation. A 
second degree price discrimination is practiced by the overwhelming majority of 
rural water systems due to its unique cost characteristics. That is, the 
monopolistic rural water systems are selling blocks of water, charging the 
highest price for the initial block and selling additional blocks at successively 
lower prices. 
Rural water systems, as public utility industries, are generally "affected with 
a public interest." Garfield and Lovejoy (1964) distinguish public utilities from 
other businesses also affected with a public interest in that they are: 
(1) free from business competition to a substantial degree, and are often 
pure monopolies; 
(2) required to charge only reasonable rates that are not unjustly 
discriminatory; 
(3) allowed to earn but are not guaranteed a reasonable profit; 
(4) obligated to provide adequate service to the entire public on demand; 
and, 
(5) closely associated with the processes of transportation and 
distribution. 
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In addition to the general characteristics of public utilities, rural water 
systems have more features than those stated above, as described by Fletcher 
(1979) and include: 
(1) Demand elasticities that differ among the various groups of customers 
of the company, making it highly profitable for the company to 
discriminate in setting prices or rates; 
(2) Wide swings in the demand for the service provided; 
(3) Customers connected physically to the suppliers; and, 
(4) A vital need by the customer for the output from the supplier. 
Since rural water systems are affected with public interest they are 
frequently regulated and financially supported by the government. In 
Oklahoma, rural water systems are regulated by "Rural Water Districts Acts"1 
enacted in 1963, and by subsequent amendments. 
Problem Statement 
The Consolidated Farm and Rural Development Act2 authorizes FmHA to 
provide grants and long-term, low interest loans for the installation, repair, 
improvement, or expansion of a rural facility.3 The FmHA provides grant and 
loan funding up to 75 percent of an eligible project's cost. The grant and loan 
funds also can be used for the costs of distribution lines, wells, pumps, and 
related facilities, and under specified conditions can be used to purchase 
1House Bill No. 837, 12 June, 1963, Oklahoma Session Laws, pp. 359-
365. . 
2PL 92-419, 30 Aug. 1972, United States Statutes at Large 86, pp. 657-
677. 
3Public programs for subsidy to rural households in water consumption 
through rural water systems is hereafter called STRWS (Subsidy to Rural Water 
Systems). 
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existing systems or to pay renovation costs of existing systems. 
The median family income level of the people residing in an area served 
by a rural water system is used in determining the amount of grant funds made 
available and the interest rate charged. A poverty line interest rate of five 
percent is used if median income for the system is less than the poverty level of 
income as prescribed by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). An 
intermediate rate is used if median family income is greater than poverty level 
income but not more than 85 percent of the nonmetropolitan median household 
income of the State. The market interest rate will be applied to all loans that do 
not qualify for poverty line rate and intermediate rate. In addition to programs of 
the FmHA, the Oklahoma public has recently approved a plan to provide loan 
guarantees for cities and rural water systems to obtain bond financing at the 
most favorable rate consistent with backing of the State of Oklahoma. 
Since the initiation of public subsidy for rural water systems, the subsidized 
amounts have been substantial. The cumulative amounts provided by FmHA 
nationally through September, 1986 amounted to $2,896 million for 13,327 
applications in grants and $9,132 million for 27,957 applications in subsidized 
loans (FmHA, 1987). Average size grant and subsidized loan per application 
was about $217,000 and $327,000, respectively. 
The above data indicate a substantial public interest in rural water 
systems. The major benefactors are the 25 percent of household customers 
living in rural places. However, because of grants and loans provided by 
federal and state agencies, the entire nation and state has a public interest in 
seeing whether such funding is used to meet the goals of public subsidy to rural 
water systems. 
The beneficiaries of rural water systems are quite heterogeneous but can 
easily be grouped by their economic characteristics and settlement motivation. 
6 
The recent survey by Dellenbarger (1985) for Oklahoma indicates that the 
average income of rural water system households sampled in 1983 was 
$22,500 which was only slightly lower than household income for all of 
Oklahoma at $24,250 for the same year. It was also revealed that 11 percent of 
the rural water system households sampled had annual incomes of over 
$50,000, and 36 percent had incomes less than$15,000. This may raise a 
question from the public whether all rural water system households need to be 
subsidized since many such households have annual incomes close to or 
higher than the typical taxpayer providing such subsidies. 
About half of the rural water system households were motivated in location 
choice by a desire for rural living. This motivation could be due to locational 
benefits such as low rent, low land prices, and/or high psychic satisfaction from 
rural environments, which outweigh the costs of commuting, transportation, 
increased probability of traffic accidents, higher fire insurance rates, etc. These 
groups may also be subsidized from the public for their water consumption. 
Another question from the public could be whether the provision of public 
subsidies to these groups benefiting from locational preference is efficient, 
resulting in improved social welfare. 
Thus, the policy makers need to know the current performance of public 
subsidy programs to rural water systems and other economic information to 
establish strategies for possible improvement of such programs. Little attempt 
has been made to evaluate the efficiency of such public programs. 
Purpose and Objectives 
The purpose of this research is to provide policy makers with information 
about the performance of public subsidies to rural water systems in meeting 
7 
specified social goals. The primary objectives are to: (1) measure the 
distribution of benefits generated from the subsidy programs among major 
socio-economic groups within rural water systems; (2) evaluate social benefits 
and costs of the subsidy programs; and, (3) provide economic strategies for 
bringing about improved efficiency in the use of such public subsidies. 
Specific objectives include: 
(1) examine government statutes and documents associated with public 
goals, policies, and forms of public subsidies to rural water systems; 
(2) review concepts and economic theories of public subsidy and relate 
to rural water systems; 
(3) formulate theoretical models to evaluate efficiency of public subsidies 
to rural water systems; 
(4) empirically estimate and evaluate results of models for efficiency of 
public subsidy programs; 
(5) provide economic strategies for the improved efficiency of public 
subsidy programs to rural water systems; 
(6) examine policy implications of the above analytical and empirical 
results for government policy makers. 
Plan of Presentation 
Chapter II examines economic rationale of public subsidy and subsidy 
policy for rural water systems in the U.S. and Oklahoma. The concept and 
history of cost-benefit analysis (CBA)4 are discussed. Finally, rationale for the 
use of CBA in this study is presented. Chapter Ill outlines a theoretical 
4There is no general agreement in the use of this terminology. Benefit-cost 
analysis is also used. This study uses cost-benefit analysis simply because it is 
familiar to the author. 
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framework for analysis of the subsidy program. Chapter IV provides 
specification of rural water demand models and empirical results of demand 
estimation. Chapter V presents results of measurements of the benefits and 
costs to society under the Subsidy to Rural Water Systems (STRWS). Chapter 
VI provides economic strategies for the improved efficiency of the STRWS 
program. Chapter VII presents a summary of the research, conclusions, and 
policy implications. Limitations of this research, and suggestions for further 
work are discussed. 
CHAPTER II 
ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC SUBSIDY FOR RURAL 
WATER SYSTEMS 
This chapter discusses the economic rationale for public subsidies to rural 
water systems. A review of public policies governing rural water systems is 
provided. The use of cost-benefit analysis (CBA) in evaluation of government 
programs is reviewed. Finally, the use of CBA in this study is briefly outlined. 
Economic Rationale for Public Subsidy 
Definition of Public Subsidy 
A public subsidy is defined as "a transfer payment; a payment other than 
one made in consideration of services rendered or factors or goods supplied at 
the order of payer, to a firm, factor owner, or household that is conditioned on 
some actions by the recipient and is designed to induce a change in relative 
prices (market prices, or price to seller or to buyer) of a good, or service, or a 
factor, or a group of goods or services or factors" (Shoup, 1972, p. 55). Subsidy 
is distinguished from welfare payment which is not conditioned on desired 
action by the recipient household, firm, or owner of a factor of production. 
A subsidy may be provided in different ways. It may be provided in cash or 
in kind. It may be a tax subsidy, credit subsidy, or lump sum subsidy depending 
on its financial supportive form. It may be provided to producers or to 
consumers depending on the policy objectives of society. It could be provided 
9 
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for purposes of activity increasing or activity decreasing depending on 
externalities generated by the economic units. 
Allocation of Resources in Competitive Markets 
A resource allocation may be described as specific consumption levels for 
each consumer, and specific input and output levels for each producer 
(Henderson and Quandt, 1980). A resource allocation is said to be Pareto 
optimal when resources are allocated such that production and consumption 
can not be reorganized to increase utility of some individuals without 
decreasing the utility of others. In competitive markets resource allocation is 
consistent with Pareto optimality which defines economic efficiency of resource 
allocation that serves as the basis for much of welfare analysis. Following 
Henderson and Quandt (1980), this can be illustrated as below. 
First, consider Pareto optimality for consumption where reallocation of 
goods that increases the utility of one or more consumers would result in a utility 
reduction for at least one other consumer. Thus Pareto optimality will be 
obtained if each consumer's utility is at a maximum given the utility levels of 
other consumers. Suppose there are only two consumers, A and B, and two 
goods, Q1 and Q2. The utility functions of the two consumers are denoted as 
0 0 
UA(qA1· qA2) and Us(qs1. qs2) where qA1 + q91 = q1 and qA2 + qs2 = q2. 
Assume that consumer B enjoys the constant utility level, qg. Then the 
Lagrangian objective function for utility maximization of consumer A is formed 
as: 
(2.1) 




Solving (2.2) and (2.3) gives 






This result shows that marginal rates of substitution must be equal 
between the consumers to achieve Pareto optimality in consumption. The 
condition (2.5) also holds when the utility of 8 is maximized given a constant 
level for A's utility. 
Next, consider Pareto optimality for production. If consumers are insatiate 
and each individual's utility level is independent of the quantities of goods 
consumed by others, an increase of any consumer good without a decrease of 
any other consumer good can lead to a utility increase for at least one 
consumer without utility decrease for others. Thus, Pareto optimality for 
production will be obtained when the output level of each consumer good is at a 
maximum given the output levels of all other consumer goods. Suppose there 
are only two producers, A and 8, producing goods, qA and qs respectively, 
using two inputs, x1 and x2. The production functions for the producers are 
specified as: 
(2.6) 
qg = fg (XB1, XB2) (2. 7) 
where XA1 + xs1 = x~ and XA2 + xs2 = x~ are the input quantities available. 
Assume that producer 8 is at the constant level of output, qg. Then the 
12 
Lagrangian objective function for output maximization of producer A is formed 
as: 




Solving (2.9) and (2.1 0) gives: 






This result shows that rates of technical substitution of producers needs to 
be equal to achieve Pareto optimality in production. 
Finally, a similar approach can be used to derive the condition that allows 
Pareto optimality for product-mix. The condition is: 
(2.13) 
where the left hand side is the marginal rate of substitution for consumer A and 
the right hand side is the marginal rate of transformation for producer B in the 
economy of two goods, q1 and q2 (Just, Hueth and Schmitz, 1982). 
Economic theory shows that under competitive market equilibrium each 
utility maximizing consumer equates marginal rate of substitution of good i for 
another good j to the price ratio of the goods, while each profit maximizing 
producer equates marginal rate of transformation of a good i for another good j 
to the price ratio of the goods. Since all consumers and producers face the 
same set of prices for the same set of goods in competitive markets, the 
following conditions are obtained: 
i n i m 
MRSij = ... = MRSjj = Pj/Pj = MRTij = ... = MRij (2.14) 
13 
where MRSij denotes marginal rate of substitution of good i for j with individual 
n; Pi and Pj are market prices of i and j; and MRTij represents marginal rate of 
transformation of good i for j with producer m. 
Comparison of (2.5), (2.12) and (2.13) with (2.14) shows that the conditions 
for Pareto optimality are fulfilled in competitive markets. Thus resource 
allocations in competitive markets are consistent with maximum welfare in the 
sense that the requirements of Pareto optimality are met. 
However, perfectly competitive markets rarely exist in reality. Market 
failures are quite common. Market failure exists in an economy because of the 
existence of public goods and externalities, the presence of decreasing cost 
industry, incomplete information, and uncertainty (Brown and Jackson, 1982). 
In addition, competitive markets may fail to provide equity and "merit wants" 
(Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980). The merit wants as called by Musgrave (1959) 
are goods whose "goodness" or "badness" are judged by the government, and 
the goods are encouraged or discouraged by the government depending on its 
judgement. 
In the event of market failure, government frequently intervenes to improve 
the performance of the market system. The government may play an allocative 
role as well as a distributive role (Musgrave, 1959). The government may 
intervene in the market to correct market failure in its allocative function. It may 
intervene in the market to bring about a distribution of incomes considered more 
socially desirable. However, it is possible that government intervention itself 
may be inefficient if the problems which beset the market mechanism and 
prevent it from allocating resources efficiently also beset government. 
In general, the rationale for government intervention based on market 
failure rests on the basic acceptance of an individualistic view of society's goals 
14 
(Boadway and Wildasin, 1984). That is, the intervention may be intended to 
achieve the efficiency of resource allocation which is to be judged ultimately by 
the Pareto optimality principle having reference to social preferences of all the 
individuals that make up the society. 
Intervention may take place in several forms such as taxation, regulation, 
government production, and subsidization through government expenditure. 
Specifically, subsidization is called for when external economies exist but 
where excludability is possible, or where scale economies appear to exist 
(Cohn, 1972). 
Potential for Market Failure with Rural Water Markets 
Potential for market failure with rural water markets stems from the 
characteristics of a natural monopoly. That is, the technology associated with 
water supplying firms makes the minimum efficient size of a single firm so large 
relative to market size that it would not be economically feasible for additional 
water supplying firms to enter, thus eventually leading to the existence of only 
one monopolistic water supplying firm in a given market area. This situation 
occurs when (1) the size of market is small relative to the most efficient size of a 
firm in that market; (2) the firm's production function shows increasing returns to 
size or decreasing cost to size; and, (3) the firm's long-run average cost curve 
shows economies of size throughout all economically feasible output levels 
(Leftwich and Eckert, 1985). 
When there exists only one water supplying firm in a given rural market as 
a form of natural monopoly, the profit maximizing firm restricts quantity of water 
supplied to the point where marginal revenue intersects marginal cost and 
prices where demand meets the restricted water supply. The firm may 
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discriminate among groups of rural consumers and may exclude or deny hook-
ups to consumers if it is to the profit interests of the firm. Equity or benefit 
distribution among consumers may not be important to the firm and thus 
ignored. There may also exist uncertainty in the supply of (raw water) water 
resources to the firm. Water supply to a customer or group of customers may be 
cut off for purposes of efficiency of water management. These market situations 
may not be consistent with Pareto optimality due to violation of competitive 
market conditions and negligence of distributional equity among consumers. 
Rural household water markets are frequently intervened through 
government regulation, taxation, direct production, and/or subsidization. 
Regulations require that rural water systems make no profits, reasonably price 
the product, and have no unjust discrimination among customers. Government 
frequently allows monopoly of water supply by allowing only one rural water 
system in a given rural market area. Rural water systems are generally 
exempted from taxation. Some local governments operate water systems 
directly. Subsidization is provided to many rural water systems. 
The economic rationale for these forms of intervention may be intended to 
correct market failure and to bring results of rural household water markets 
closer to Pareto optimality having reference to social preferences. 
This study concerns the welfare evaluation of government intervention in 
rural household water markets in the form of subsidization. The Consolidated 
Farm and Rural Development Act1 Section 306 allows FmHA to provide 
subsidies in the form of grants and low interest loans to rural water systems. 
The new state of rural household water markets after the public subsidy may 
1 PL 92-419, 30 Aug. 1972, United States Statutes at Large 86, pp. 657-
677. 
16 
cause change of resource allocation and distribution of market benefits. This 
needs to be evaluated since it may be important for the decision makers or the 
public to know whether the subsidy brings the rural household water markets 
closer to Pareto optimality. The evaluation is carried out with the use of social 
cost-benefit analysis (CBA) which is commonly used as an efficiency criterion in 
policy analysis (Tweeten, 1979). The concept and history of CBA is discussed 
in the last part of this Chapter. 
Policies Governing Rural Water Systems 
Federal Policy (FmHA. 1985) 
In 1937 the Water Facilities Act (WFA) was enacted to provide loans to 
individuals and associations of farm water systems in 17 western states where 
drought and water shortage was a constant hardship. This Act was the 
beginning of rural water programs now administered by FmHA. 
In 1940 the first loan was made to a small group of Idaho farmers for 
$1 ,600. The WFA was amended in 1954 to be applied nationwide, rather than 
to be limited to the 17 western states. The amendment also let farm area water 
systems take on nonfarm customers in rural communities. 
In 1961 WFA was incorporated into the newly enacted Consolidated 
Farmers Home Administration Act, which opened the water system program to 
the general rural population, including incorporated towns of up to 2,500 
population. The limit per loan was raised from $250,000 to $500,000 for a 
direct FmHA loan and to $1 ,000,000 for an insured loan. 
In 1965 the loan limit was raised again to $4,000,000 per project. At the 
same time, the loan program was transformed into a loan-and-grant program for 
both water and waste disposal systems. Population size for loan eligibility was 
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increased form 2,500 to 5,500. In 1968 Congress raised the national total 
authorization for water and waste disposal grants from $50 million to $100 
million a year. 
In 1970 legislation removed technical barriers in the use of FmHA insured 
funds, rather than direct appropriated funds, for loans to tax-exempt public 
bodies such as municipalities and public service districts. This amendment 
marked the beginning of a period for increased service to small towns. 
In 1972 the Rural Development Act (RDA) abolished the loan limit of $4 
million per project on FmHA financed water and waste disposal systems. The 
RDA increased the national grants authorization to $300 million a year. It also 
raised the population limit on towns eligible for FmHA financed systems to 
10,000. In 1978 the Agricultural Credit Act (ACT) increased the maximum 
allowable grant for water and waste disposal projects from 50 percent to 75 
percent. 
In 1980 the Rural Development Policy Act increased FmHA's annual 
authorization for planning grants which had been authorized by the Rural 
Development Act of 1972. Since 1980, Federal Policy on rural water systems 
has appeared stable. 
Oklahoma Policy (Oklahoma Water Resources Board. 1980) 
The Oklahoma Rural Water District Act (ORWDA)2 enacted in 1963 was the 
first Oklahoma legislation allowing organization, formation, and operation of 
public non-profit rural water districts. The purpose of the Act was to develop 
and provide rural water supply facilities adequate to serve the needs of rural 
2Senate Bill No. 837, 12 June, 1963, Oklahoma Session Laws, pp. 359-
365. 
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residents. Boards of county commissioners were given the authority to 
incorporate and organize rural water districts. The districts were empowered to 
borrow money and accept grants from the Federal government and to secure 
the payment thereof by mortgage, pledge or deed of trust of property, assets, 
franchise, rights, privileges, licenses, rights-of-way, easements, revenues or 
incomes. 
Rural Water District No. 2 in Nowata County was organized in 1963 as the 
first non-profit rural water district in Oklahoma. The district was funded by a 
$65,760 loan at 3.8 percent interest from FmHA. 
The ORWDA has expanded rural water district purposes over time to 
include water and sewage in 1965, solid waste management in 1972, and gas 
distribution in 1975. The current Oklahoma legislation under which rural water 
utility districts may be formed and operated as public non-profit organizations is 
known as the "Rural Water, Sewer, Gas and Solid Waste Management District 
Act."3 
The Act requires the following four conditions for the formation of rural 
water districts: 
(1) rural residents within the proposed district are without an adequate 
water supply to meet their needs; 
(2) construction, installation, improvement, maintenance or operation of 
the water project is necessary to provide an adequate water supply to 
the rural residents; 
(3) improvements or works will be conducive to and will promote the 
public health, convenience, and welfare; and, 
3Senate Bill No. 145, 14 May, 1975, Oklahoma Session Laws, pp. 262-
270. 
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(4) there is sufficient water available for purchase or available for 
appropriation by the Oklahoma Water Resources Board to serve the 
needs of the district. 
Every district incorporated under the Act has perpetual existence, subject 
to dissolution as provided within the Act. Certain operative obligations are 
imposed on the districts: (1) each district must operate without profit; (2) the 
revenues of the district should be devoted first to the payment of operation and 
maintenance expenses, then to the principal and interest on outstanding 
obligations, and thereafter to such revenues for improvement, new construction, 
and related expenses as the Board of Directors in the districts may prescribe; 
and, (3) revenues left over after the above purposes should be returned to the 
customers on a pro rata basis. 
Some privileges are also awarded to rural water districts: (1) water rate 
charges are exempted from the jurisdiction and control of the Oklahoma 
Corporation Commission; (2) the district is also exempted from all taxing levied 
upon the property of the district, whether real, personal or mixed; and, (3) 
securities and evidences of indebtedness issued by a district, and the income 
interest and capital gains thereon are not subject to income tax laws of the state 
and persons owning or holding securities and evidences of indebtedness or 
their heirs, devisees, successors, or assignees shall not be required to pay 
income tax upon the profits and capital gains upon such securities and 
evidences of indebtedness. 
The largest rural water district in Oklahoma in 1986 served about 4,300 
customers via a 2,000 mile distribution network. The smallest district served 
about 45 people via a 1.5 mile distribution network. 4 
4This information was obtained from Oklahoma Water Resources Board. 
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Allocation of Public Subsidy to Rural Water Systems 
Major external sources of financing the construction and expansion of rural 
water systems are government agency loans, commercial loans, government 
agency grants, and municipal bonds. The federal agencies that provide loans 
are FmHA, the Housing and Urban Development Department (HUD), and the 
Economic Development Administration (EDA). Federal agencies providing 
grants are FmHA, HUD, EDA, Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 
Department of Defense (DOD), and the Ozark Regional Commission (ORC). 
A national survey (Francis, 1980) in 1978 showed that FmHA accounted 
for 93 percent of total government agency loans and 50 percent of total 
government agency grants. The average size loan in the survey from FmHA 
was $288,000 and the maximum was $4.9 million. The average size grant 
provided to a system was $231 ,000 with the maximum of $1.1 million in 1978 
value. Federal agency loans accounted for 95.7 percent and state agency 
loans accounted for 0.6 percent while federal agency grants accounted for 69 
percent, and state/regional grants accounted for 22 percent. Average 
repayment periods on loans from federal sources were 40 years and 
standardized interest ratess ranged from 4.0 percent to 15.4 percent. Average 
amounts of loans obtained from private financial institutions were $76,000 with 
average interest rates of 9.8 percent. The FmHA loans provided to rural water 
systems through September 1986 reached $9,132 million for 27,957 loan 
applications and $2,896 million for 13,327 grant applications. 
State financing is also available in Oklahoma (Oklahoma Water Resources 
Board, 1980). Rural water districts may generate funds by issuing tax-exempt 
5Standardized Interest Rate = [Actual Interest Rate (t)/long-term 
government bond yield (t)] x 7.89]. This interest rate reflects the rates FmHA 
would have charged if all loans were made in 1978. 
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municipal bonds or notes. A portion of sales taxes can be earmarked for 
financing or can be applied to retire general obligation bonds or revenue bonds 
or notes. A state loan program is available through Title 82 O.S. 1979, Section 
1085.31, et. seq. s The Oklahoma Water Resources Board (OWRB) is 
authorized to administer the loans for constructing water storage projects, 
distribution systems, and water treatment facilities, as well as sewage treatment 
facilities. Grants are also available under S.B. 2157 with the passage of H.B. 
1710. a This Bill authorizes OWRB to make grants up to $50,000 for eligible 
projects. The Oklahoma office of FmHA provided $271.1 million for 1 ,345 loan 
· applications and $74.9 million for 514 grant applications from 1963-1986.9 This 
implies an average of $201,561 per loan and an average of $145,720 grant 
during the period. A cumulative total of 533,725 families were served through 
the FmHA loans and grants during the period. 
Evaluating Public Programs Using 
Cost-Benefit Analysis 
Concept and History of CBA 
The definitions of cost-benefit analysis (CBA) are many. CBA is a 
technique for assessing the economic utility of a public investment (Burkhead 
6Senate Bill No. 215, 31 May, 1979, Oklahoma Session Laws, pp. 627-
630. 
7Senate Bill No. 215, 31 May, 1979, Oklahoma Session Laws, pp. 627-
630. 
8House Bill No. 1710, 7 April, 1980, Oklahoma Session Laws, pp. 308-
311. 
9This information was obtained from documents of the FmHA State Office. 
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and Miner, 1971 ). CBA refers to the measurement of the net economic benefits 
from any change in resource allocation (Boadway and Wildasin, 1984). CBA is 
a practical way of assessing the desirability of projects (Brown and Jackson, 
1982). CBA is an estimation and evaluation of net benefits associated with 
alternatives for achieving defined public goods (Sassone and Schaffer, 1978). 
Evidence shows CBA is a broad concept and with wide applications in practice. 
In the most general sense CBA includes all techniques for program or 
project evaluation that involves systematic comparison of benefits and costs in 
the context of an implicit or explicit objective function (Burkhead and Miner, 
1971 ). Thus CBA can be applied to public programs as well as to private 
business. However, it is common to refer to CBA in private investment 
decisions as capital budgeting and to public programs as cost-benefit analysis. 
CBA is usually confined to public projects because it weighs up social gains 
and losses (Dasgupta and Pearce, 1972). From these concepts the following 
interpretations and applications of CBA are delineated. 
(1) CBA is not confined only to evaluation of alternatives. It is also 
applied to whether a program should be implemented or not, that is, 
"go or not go" decision. 
(2) CBA is not confined only to investment projects. It is applied to broad 
policy areas such as public expenditure, taxation, and regulation. 
(3) CBA is also used to evaluate current on-going programs to determine 
whether the capacity of existing programs should be extended or cut 
and by how much (Mishan, 1976). 
(4) CBA is an aid for decision makers in policy issues. It may inform the 
decision makers as to which one from a series of alternatives is 
socially preferred or whether a policy should be implemented or not. 
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CBA can thus be defined as an analytical technique to aid policy makers in 
decision making for public policy in terms of social benefits and costs, which 
have implicit and explicit social objectives. 
The concept of CBA was initiated in 1844 by Dupuit (Sassone and 
Schaffer, 1978) when he pointed out that the· output of a project multiplied by 
the price is equal to the minimum social benefit. But it is generally considered 
that general application of CBA started with enactment of the United States 
Flood Control Act in 1936. This Act suggests the principle that flood-control 
projects should be deemed desirable if the benefits, "to whomever they may 
accrue", exceed the estimated costs. However, the Act provided no consistent 
analytical method to examine costs and benefits (Sassone and Schaffer, 1978). 
In 1950 the U.S. Federal Inter-Agency River Basin Committee issued 
"Proposed Practices for Economic Analysis of River Basin Projects," 
subsequently called the "Green Book". This Book attempted to lay down 
guidance on the use of CBA (Pearce and Nash, 1981 ). 
In 1952 the Bureau of the Budget in the U.S. issued its Budget Circular A-
47, which would guide the Bureau in the assessment of proposed programs. 
The Circular was criticized for its emphasis on gains and losses as measured 
by changes in GNP and for ignoring income distribution issues· (Sassone and 
Schaffer, 1978). Circular A-47 remained the official guide for project evaluation 
into the 1960's. 
Budget Circular A-47 was replaced by Senate Document 97 in 1962 which 
again was replaced in 1973 by "Principles and Standards for Planning Water 
and Related Land Resources," which mainly updated policies, standards, 
procedures relating to cost allocation, reimbursement, and cost sharing. In 
1983, the above Principles and Standards were repealed and replaced by 
"Economic and Environmental Principles and Guidelines for Water and Related 
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Land Resources Studies" which contains currently available methods for 
calculating the costs and benefits of water resources development alternatives 
to ensure proper and consistent planning by Federal agencies in the 
formulation and evaluation of water and related land resources implementation 
studies. In the 1960's the emphasis was on the principle of allocative efficiency. 
In the 1970's, due regard was paid, in theory and practice, to the fact that social 
objectives as well as pure allocation efficiency are legitimate goals (Pearce and 
Nash, 1981 ). 
CBA and Welfare Economics 
Welfare economics focuses on using resources optimally so as to achieve 
the maximum well-being for individuals in society (Just, Hueth and Schmitz, 
1982). CBA is based on welfare economics. Welfare economics involves two 
major issues: (1) measurement of social welfare change due to new 
government policies; and, (2) identification of social objectives or preferences to 
be satisfied by the policies. These two issues are also core areas of CBA. 
The concept of social welfare and its measurement has a long history. 
Ricardo (1829) introduced the concept of economic rent when discussing the 
effects of England's "Corn Laws" passed by British Parliament in 1815. Then, 
Dupuit (1844) coined the notion of consumer surplus in the analysis of the 
effects of building a bridge. In Dupuit's way price is placed on the horizontal 
axis and quantity on the vertical axis as shown in Figure 1. Suppose P1, P2 
and P3 represent various prices for a commodity, and q1, q2 and P3 represent 
quantities of the commodity consumed corresponding to the prices. Then, a 
curve connecting s1s2sa is constructed. This is called a consumption curve 










the total area under the demand curve represents the total utility produced by 
the commodity. At the price P1 the area under the demand curve and above the 
price P1 is "utility remaining to consumers". The area which represents the total 
payment made by the consumer or firms receipts at price P3 and quantity q3 is 
called "producers' surplus" or "producers' rents". This theory was original in 
linking the demand curve with utility. 
Marshall (1930, p. 124) developed these concepts more fully and named 
the concepts as consumer surplus. He described consumer's surplus as 
follows: 
The price which a person pays for a thing can never exceed, and 
seldom comes up to that which he would be willing to pay rather than 
go without it: so that the satisfaction which he gets from its purchase 
generally exceeds that which he gives up in paying away its price; 
and he thus derives from the purchase a surplus of satisfaction. The 
excess of the price which he would be willing to pay rather than go 
without the thing, over that which he actually does pay, is the 
economic measure of his surplus satisfaction. It may be called 
consumer's surplus. 
This concept of consumer surplus has since formed the economic basis for 
empirical welfare studies. However, these concepts have been criticized by 
economists associated with the so called "new welfare economics". Samuelson 
(1942) showed that the basic welfare measure of consumer surplus is not well 
defined. He argued that consumer surplus is not generally a unique measure of 
utility of the individual, and that its uniqueness depends on the use of empirical 
data. Since this criticism, economists have been reluctant to use the concept of 
consumer surplus in welfare analysis without imposing restrictive assumptions 
until Willig (1976) demonstrated its economic reasonableness. 
Social objectives or preferences in cost-benefit analysis are identified by 
three approaches: potential Pareto improvement, Pareto improvement 
incorporating distributional weighting system, and social welfare function. 
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Conventional CBA adopts potential Pareto improvement. Non-conventional 
CBA adopts Pareto improvement incorporating distributional weighting system. 
Social welfare function approach is theoretically accepted but is seldom used in 
practice. 
Some theoretical and empirical aspects of the above two issues remain 
unresolved. A detailed discussion of the issues is provided in Chapter Ill. 
Criticisms of CBA 
Criticisms of CBA are centered on the problems of securing information, 
the immorality of valuing unique assets such as human life, and the ease of 
manipulation for political purposes (Pearse and Nash, 1981 ). Four systematic 
criticisms against the underlying philosophy of CBA are summarized by Pearce 
and Nash (1981) and discussed below: the liberal attack, the political science 
attack, the radical critique, and the management science approach. 
Two major criticisms are distinguished from the liberal thought. The first is 
that the Paretian criterion is not consistent with liberal values based on the 
preservation of "negative freedoms" (Sen, 1970). The second is that Paretian 
welfare economics is not compatible with liberal welfare economics which is 
unwilling to pursue income redistribution objectives that involve the 
suppression or the destruction of markets (Peacock and Rowley, 1972). 
Political science criticism of CBA stems from replacing political decision-
making with a "mechanistic calculus" that is frequently incompatible with 
political philosophies. The political system must not only deal with the 
allocative CBA but also with the distributional impacts (Wildavsky, 1966; and 
Self, 1977). 
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Criticism from the radical thought stems from the use of market prices as an 
appropriate expression of individual values (Hunt and Schwartz, 1972). Hunt 
and Schwartz criticize CBA because it proceeded from welfare economics and 
unresolved issues such as the Scitovsky reversal test; second best theory which 
seeks pricing rules for the controllable sectors of an economy, but given market 
distortion elsewhere; absence of risk and uncertainty; Arrow's impossibility 
theorem which states no social welfare function exists under certain conditions; 
and so on. Another criticism from the radicals is that CBA assumes that the 
prevailing income distribution is optimal. 
The suggestion from management science is that the basic value 
judgement concerning individual preference should be reconsidered. If 
decision-makers themselves provide the valuations for costs and benefits then 
the gap between CBA and political decision-making would be largely removed. 
These criticisms as summarized by Pearce and Nash (1981) deal mostly 
with an underlying philosophy of CBA. How the criticisms can be accomodated 
are debatable and beyond the scope of this study. 
Use of CBA in This Study 
Public subsidy to rural water systems (STRWS) is one form of government 
intervention in the rural household water market. Intervention is justified for the 
correction of market failure in a society where perfectly competitive market norm 
is considered to maximize social welfare. Policy makers want to know whether 
the subsidy policy to rural water systems actually increases social welfare and, 
if so, by how much. 
CBA is frequently used in ex-post evaluation of on-going programs to 
determine whether such programs should be extended, contracted, replaced, or 
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redesigned. CBA is used in this study to evaluate on-going subsidy programs 
for rural water systems and to investigate to what extent the programs achieve 
social objectives as defined in welfare economics. Information generated from 
the CBA should suggest improved strategies for subsidizing rural water systems 
in attaining defined social objectives. 
CHAPTER Ill 
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC SUBSIDY 
This Chapter presents the theoretical framework for cost-benefit analysis 
(CBA) and subsidy benefit distributions among groups of individuals in rural 
areas. Major theoretical components of CBA are outlined. Models for 
estimating costs and benefits are proposed. Finally, methods for subsidy 
benefit distribution measurement are presented. 
Major Components of CBA 
Determination of Social Preferences 
CBA has social preferences as its objective function. CBA generates 
economic information that aids the decision-makers in determining which 
policies are consistent with social preferences. The question is, how are social 
preferences defined and identified. Three possible approaches are discussed. 
Conventional Aggroach (Dasgugta and Pearce. 1972) 
In CBA each individual is assumed to weigh the advantages and 
disadvantages of a particular policy, whether the individual is a selfish 
rationalist or a pure altruist (Pearce and Nash, 1981 ). After weighing the 
advantages and disadvantages, the individual may show his preferences 
between alternative states facing him. Suppose he has two alternative states, A 
and B. He may prefer A to B, or B to A, or he may be indifferent between them. 
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The individual may obtain different levels of utility at each alternative state. 
Then, his preferences are revealed in a form of utility function as follows: 
A p B ====> U(A) > U(B) 
A i B ====> U(A) = U(B) (3.1) 
A w 8 ====> U(A) ~ U(B) 
where A and B are alternative states, and p, i, and w represent preferred, 
indifferent, and at least indifferent with possible preference for A, respectively. 
U(A) and U(B) represent utility derived from state A and state B. 
The individual ranks several states in terms of his preferences which are 
incorporated in his utility function. That is, his utility function or utility level would 
dictate his choice of preferred state. 
Measurement of utility is controversial. However, two approaches to the 
utility measurement are widely recognized: the cardinal measure and the 
ordinal measure. The cardinal measure of utility assumes that each individual 
is capable of assigning to every good or combination of goods a specific 
number representing the amount or degree of utility to be generated from it. 
Although there exist cardinalists, the dominant view is on the side of the ordinal 
measurement which states that utility is greater or lesser in one situation than in 
another. Thus ordinal utility is measurable in markets which eventually is linked 
to "benefits" in CBA. 
Consider a two commodity space, x and y, and indifference curves U and 
U1 for an individual in Figure 2. His budget is represented with MM1. Then, the 
utility maximizing individual will move to the highest indifference curve tangent 
to his budget line which is at Z and choose y* and x* for his consumption 
bundle. At utility maximizing point Z the slope of U is dUy/dUx = MUy/MUx. 
However, the slope of the budget line, MM1, is Py/Px which is the relative prices 








Figure 2. Price and Utility 
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MUy/MUx = Py/Px. By rearrangement, MUy/Py = MUx/Px. If we set MUx/Px = 2 for 
convenience, MUx = 2Px. This indicates that prices reflect the worth or utility of 
the commodities for the individual. If the individual pays Px for x* then he must 
be "willing to pay" this price for utility generated from x*, which defines "benefit" 
in CBA. Thus, a relationship is obtained as follows: 
marginal utility = price = willingness to pay = benefit (3.2) 
However, CBA is concerned with social preferences. Simple aggregation 
of individual preferences does not necessarily represent preferences of society 
as a whole. Suppose there are three individuals, 1, 2, and 3, and two 
situations, A and B. One set of individual preferences could be: 
A P1 B 
A P2 B 
B p3A 
(3.3) 
The majority prefer situation A to B. Then, the social preference would 
generate social welfare, SW, in a three person society, which can be expressed 
as SW = sw[R1 (A), R2 (A), R3 (A)], where R(·) indicates individual preference 
rankings. However each individual may have a different level of preference 
intensity thus generating different utility levels. If the preference intensity of 
individual 3 is more than the aggregate of preference intensity of individuals 1 
and 2, then society could prefer B to A since 1 -U3 (A) 1 > 1 U1 (A) + U2 (A)I or 
U3(B) > U1 (A) + U2(A). This approach weighs individual preferences and adds 
them up. Thus, SW is expressed as SW = sw [(a1 x R1 (A) + a2 x R2(A) + a3 x 
R3(A)] where the a's represent weights. This approach is based on the 
assumption of interpersonal comparison of utility. A difficulty arises, however, 
that there exists no single definitive unit of utility measurement. Thus, it is 
necessary to transform utility into willingness to pay. Then, from (3.1 ), (3.2) and 
(3.3): 
A P1 8 ===> U1(A) > U1(8) ===> WTP1(A) > WTP1(8) 
A P2 8 ===> U2(A) > U2(8) ===> WTP2(A) > WTP2(8) 
8 P3 A ===> U3(8) > U3(A) ===> WTP3(8) > WTP3(A) 
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(3.4) 
The aggregation of the WTP may give social preferences of A over 8 or 8 
over A, depending on the magnitudes of WTP for each individual. However, 
WTP does not fully reflect individual intensities of preferences since WTP 
depends partially on individual income. 
In this approach some individuals may lose while others gain from a 
situation preferred by society. This approach contains the concept of 
compensation, which originated from Pareto welfare criteria. The Pareto criteria 
in determining social preferences of public policies states that policy should be 
made such that some people are made better off and no one is made worse off. 
Pareto argues that policy could be made if everybody prefers it on the 
"unanimity" basis. However, this criteria has been criticized because it is 
doubtful there is any policy that satisfies the unanimity rule. To overcome this 
problem Kaldor (1939) and Hicks (1939) suggested the "compensation 
principle" by which a policy is socially preferred if those who gain can 
compensate those who lose and still have some gains left over. This 
compensation principle revives the Pareto principle since it leaves the losers no 
worse off and others better off. This compensation principle suffers, however, 
from the case where two policies are preferable under the same criteria 
(Scitovsky, 1941 ). 
This case can be illustrated with price lines on two commodity space as in 
Figure 3 (Dasgupta and Pearce, 1972) rather than with the Edgeworth diagram 
as done by Scitovsky. The Scitovsky paradox arises because the change in 
income distribution between situations alters the set of relative prices at different 





SOURCE: Dasgupta, Ajit K. and D. W. Pearce. 
Cost-Benefit Analysis. Harper & 
Row Publishers, Inc., Britain, 1972. 
Figure 3. The Scitovsky Paradox 
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respectively. The real income M1 represents situation 2 quantity valued at 
situation 1 price and real income M2 represents situation 1 quantity valued at 
situation 2 price. 
Suppose quantity moves from 01 to 02. Then, change in real income 
valued at situation 1 price is P102- P101 < 0, resulting in the preference of 01 
over 02. However, if the move is valued at situation 2 price, the real income 
change is P202 - P201 > 0, resulting in preference of 02 over 01. This reversal 
leads to the double criterion suggested by Scitovsky, which states one policy is 
preferred to another policy only if the gainers from the change can compensate 
the losers and the losers can not bribe the gainers for not making the policy 
change. Arrow (1963) criticized that Scitovsky's double criterion contradicted 
the collective rationality, and restated that society is indifferent to two policies if 
reverses are possible. At any rate, this double criterion preserves the Pareto 
principle in that some people are made better off and nobody is worse off when 
compensation is made to losers. 
The discussion so far has been based on the value judgement that 
individual preferences should be counted in identifying social preferences in an 
objective function. This implies that social preference is an aggregation of 
individual preferences. And the social preference is identified with Pareto 
principle (or potential Pareto improvement) regardless of whether actual 
compensation is made to losers or not. This approach has been the position of 
the "conventional" CBA. 
Non-Conventional Approach 
Conventional CBA has ignored the distributional effects of policy change in 
identifying social preferences and simply measured all gains and losses to 
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society regardless of to whom they accrue. This approach has been justified by 
the use of the potential compensation test as a welfare criterion. 
Some arguments are offered against this approach. If losers are not 
actually compensated then income will be redistributed, which destabilizes the 
link between the CBA maximand and social maximization (Dasgupta and 
Pearce, 1972). Another problem is that the aggregate of monetary gains and 
losses is not an accurate indicator of the satisfaction of compensation test 
(Boadway, 1976). And validity of the compensation test depends on whether 
ordinal utility curves before and after the policy intersect or not (Pearce and 
Nash, 1981 ). Due to political and economic structural reasons actual 
compensation can not be made in many developing countries, which may be 
inconsistent with Pareto optimality principle (Squire and van der Tak, 1984). 
To complement the conventional approach, three options are possible 
(Dasgupta and Pearce, 1972). The first option is to prove that the income 
redistribution effect of a policy is not significant, thus ignoring the welfare effect 
of redistribution (Kurtillia, 1961; Eckstein, 1958). This argument ignores 
cumulative effects of policy and implicitly assumes optimality of existing income 
distribution. Furthermore, public policies in reality seldom have no distributional 
effects. The second option is to argue that the incorporation of income 
distribution would involve value judgement. The argument against this option 
would be that CBA itself involves one major value judgement, the count of 
individual preferences. The third option is to develop ways to allow for the 
distributional consequences of a policy either by trying to observe social 
preferences concerning distribution, or by other means. This third option is the 
non-conventional approach. 
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Social Welfare Function Approach 
The concept of a social welfare function is the result of the continuous 
search for a rule that ranks all the alternatives and thus determines which first-
best alternative represents the social optimum or preference (Just, Hueth and 
Schmitz, 1982). The social welfare function was first introduced by Bergson 
(1938). The sergsonian social welfare function in a society of n individuals may 
be defined as SW = sw (U1, U2, U3, ... , Un), where Un denotes the utility index 
of the nth individual. The function simply means that the social welfare function 
is a function of the utility levels of all individuals in a society such that a higher 
value of the function is preferred to a lower one. 
The concept of a social welfare function was criticized by Arrow (1963). 
Arrow specified five axioms required for a meaningful and valid social welfare 
function: the free triple condition, independence of irrelevant alternatives, non-
negative association, non-imposition, and non-dictatorship. Then, he argued 
that no social welfare function which simultaneously satisfies the five axioms 
can exist, which is called Arrow's Impossibility Theorem. He concluded that 
there exists no general rule that can rank social states based only on the way 
these states are ranked by individual preferences and which satisfies some 
intuitively plausible criterion of reasonableness for social choice. 
The social welfare function has been regarded illusory in its practicality for 
identifying social preferences, although the concept is theoretically desirable 
(Just, Heuth, and Schmitz, 1982). 
Measurements of Change in Social Welfare 
Decision makers must figure out the impact of certain policies on social 
welfare. In welfare economics measures of individual welfare are money 
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measures where money reflects willingness to pay on the part of individuals, 
which in turn is related to the utility function of the individuals. Thus, when 
measuring individual welfare changes individual utility serves as a criterion. 
Since utility is not observable and thus can not be measured, it is measured 
indirectly by estimating a revealed willingness to pay in terms of money. In this 
regard three measures are discussed in the literature. 
In the context of willingness to pay two measures have been suggested by 
Hicks (1943); compensating variation (CV) and equivalent variation (EV). The 
third measure is the Marshallian consumer surplus which is shown to be a good 
approximation of CV and EV under certain conditions. 
Compensating Variation 
Compensating variation (CV) is generally defined as the maximum amount 
of money an individual is willing to pay and still be no worse off compared with 
the welfare situation that would have prevailed without the price change. This 
concept can be explicitly illustrated as in Figure 4. Consider an individual 
having preference for good Q at price P, and the good Y (a composite of all 
other commodities) with a price of 1. Suppose he is faced with budget 
constraint, M1 = P1 Q + Y, where M1 is initial income. The utility maximizing 
individual chooses the optimum consumption point A with commodity bundle of 
q1 and Y1. He enjoys utility level, U1. Now, suppose the price of Q decreases 
from P1 to P2. Then, the individual increases consumption of Q from q1 to q2, 
and decreases Y from Y1 to Y2, hence moving to consumption point B. He is 
now on the higher utility level, U2. The CV associated with the price fall of Q 
uses new price as a basis and measures what income change would be 




Figure 4. Compensating Variation 
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individual's original welfare level. To find the measure of CV the budget line M1 
through point 8 is shifted downward until it is tangent to the original utility level, 
U1. Then the amount M1 - M2 is the measure of compensating variation which 
is the amount of money that needs to be taken away from the consumer to leave 
him as well off as before. 
Equivalent Variation 
Equivalent variation is defined as the amount of money that must be given 
to an individual in place of price and income changes to leave him as well off as 
if the change had occurred. This is illustrated in Figure 5. Due to the price fall 
of Q the consumer is at consumption point 8 on utility level, U2. EV uses current 
price as the base and measures what income change would be equivalent to 
the new price change. Thus, the budget line M1 passing through A is shifted 
upward until it is tangent to the utility level, U2. Then, the equivalent variation is 
the amount M3 - M1, which is the amount of money that needs to be given to the 
individual to leave him just as well off as if the price change had occurred. 
Consumer Surplus 
Consumer surplus is commonly defined as the area under the demand 
curve and above the price line. This concept was coined by Dupuit (1884) who 
postulated that the price associated with any quantity on a consumer's demand 
curve is the maximum price the consumer is willing to pay for the last unit 
consumed. This concept was developed later by Marshall (1930). 
Consider a consumer in initial equilibrium consuming qo at price Po on the 
demand curve in Figure 6. Over the quantity range of Q from 0 to qo he pays 













Figure 6. ·Consumer Surplus 
44 
forego its consumption. Then the consumer surplus is measured as the area 
Lpok =a. 
Suppose the price of Q decreases to P1, moving to consumption point k'. 
Due to the price change consumer welfare is influenced. He pays only P1 
which is again less for the good Q than the maximum amount that he would pay 
rather than forego its consumption. Now the consumer surplus is measured as 
the area Lp1k' =a+ b +c. Thus the change in consumer surplus caused by the 
price fall is Lp1k' - Lpok = a+ b + c- a= b + c. Thus the consumer gains in 
consumer surplus with lower price. 
However, this approach to the measurement of consumer welfare change 
has several problems which are discussed below (Just, Hueth, and Schmitz, 
1982). 
Path Dependence. The change in consumer surplus is not defined 
uniquely when several prices change simultaneously or when income changes 
together with price. The change in consumer surplus in these situations 
depends on the order in which price or income changes are considered. This is 
called the path-dependence problem. 
Consider a case where price and income change simultaneously. In 
Figure 7 a consumer with initial income Mo is in equilibrium consuming qo at 
price Po on the demand function D(Mo). Suppose price and income change to 
P1 and M1, respectively. The change in consumer surplus may be evaluated in 
two different path adjustments; price adjustment followed by income adjustment 
or income adjustment followed by price adjustment. When the former case is 
considered the change in consumer surplus is M1 - Mo + c. When the latter 
case is considered the change in consumer surplus is M1- Mo + c +d. With the 
same amount of income and price change the change in consumer surplus 
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D(M1) 
SOURCE: Just, Richard E., DarrelL. Hueth and Andrew W. Schmitz. 
Applied Welfare Economics and Public Policy. Prentice-
Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1982. 
Figure 7. Path Dependence of Consumer Surplus 
(Price and Income Change) 
Q 
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is quite different as the path of adjustment is considered differently. The same 
path dependence problem arises in the case of simultaneous multiple price 
changes. 
Consider a case where two prices change simultaneously with income 
held constant as in Figure 8. Suppose initial· prices of q1 and q2 are P1o and 
P2o, and initial demand curves for q1 and q2 are D1 (p20) and D2 (P1 O) 
respectively. Two path adjustments are illustrated; change of P1 followed by 
change of P2. and change of P2 followed by change of P1· In the former case, 
gain in consumer surplus is a+ c + d and in the latter case the gain in consumer 
surplus is c + a + b. The two areas will not be equal in general except in some 
special cases. 
Uniqueness of Consumer Surplus. In Figure 7 the same change in 
consumer surplus is obtained for any price change regardless of path 
adjustment if and only if the two demand curves, D(Mo) and D(M1) coincide. 
Such coincidence can happen when the demand curve is not influenced by 
income changes. Thus, when both price and income change simultaneously, 
the consumer surplus change is unique if and only if the income effect (i\q/i\M) 
is zero or income elasticity is zero. 
In Figure 8 the same change in consumer surplus is obtained regardless of 
path orders if and only if area b is equal to area d. When price changes from 
P1o to P1 1 and P2o to P21 are very small then the shapes of b and d become 
parallelograms. Then each area is calculated by the product of dp1 x dq1 and 
dp2 x dq2. For path independence 
dp1 x dq1 = dp2 x dq2 or dq1/dq2 = dp2/dp1 (3.5) 
Suppose that all prices change by the same proportion so that P1 1 = ap10 
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SOURCE: Just, Richard E., Darrell L. Hueth, and Andrew W. Schmitz. 
Applied Welfare Economics and Public Policy. Prentice-
Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1982. 
Figure 8. Path Dependence of Consumer Surplus 
(Multiple Price Changes) 
dp2/dp1 =(a- 1) P20/(a- 1) P1o 
From (3.5) and (3.6) 




This equation implies that for path independence the ratio of quantity 
adjustments of q1 and q2 corresponding to an·y proportional changes in prices 
needs to be constant. Since the proportional change in prices are equivalent to 
an inversely proportional change in income under homogeneity of demand, the 
ratio of consumption adjustments in response to an income adjustment is a 
constant determined completely by prices regardless of income level. This 
result indicates consumer's indifference curves are tangent to the budget line, 
on which point straight-line income - consumption path emanating from the 
origin passes through. This is the case with homothetic utility indifference 
curves where any percentage change in income leads to an equal percentage 
change in all quantities consumed, hence all income elasticities of demand 
must be equal to one. Now it can be concluded that when all prices change 
simultaneously, the consumer surplus change is uniquely defined if and only if 
the consumer's indifference map is homothetic, which occurs if and only if all 
income elasticities of demand are unity. These uniqueness conditions are quite 
restrictive in empirical work. 
Constancy of Marginal Utility of Income. Another difficulty in the use of 
consumer surplus for measuring consumer welfare change lies in the question 
whether the consumer surplus change provides a reasonable money measure 
of utility change. This problem is illustrated in Figure 9. 
When a consumer has a utility curve U1 the utility change ~U 
corresponding to income change ~m is constant over any range since the 
marginal utility with U1 is constant. However, when a consumer has a utility 
SOURCE: Just, Richard E., Darrell L. Hueth, and Andrew W. Schmitz. 
Applied Welfare Economics and Public Policy. Prentice-
Hall, Inc., Englewood, N.J. 1982. 




curve U2 the utility changes due to the same income change is different 
depending on the initial income. This result implies that consumer surplus 
measures utility change when the marginal utility of income is constant. 
In summary, to obtain the unique measure of utility change consumer 
surplus must meet certain conditions: (1) income elasticities must be the same 
and equal to one for all goods for which prices change, and income elasticities 
must be zero if income changes and (2) marginal utility of income must be 
constant with respect to prices and/or income changes. 
Willig's Approximation. Compensating and equivalent variation have been 
discussed as theoretical measures of the welfare impact of changes in prices 
and income for an individual. However, it is difficult to determine the variations 
empirically since actual utility levels are not observable. It also has been 
discussed that Marshallian consumer surplus does not provide unique measure 
of utility except under restrictive conditions. 
Willig (1976), however, validated the use of consumer surplus in welfare 
analysis and thus allows measurable estimates of the unobservable 
compensating and equivalent variations. 
Consider three measurements of welfare changes as illustrated in Figure 
10. Suppose a consumer faces choice of two goods, X with price P, and the 
composite of all other goods, Y, with a price of 1 subject to initial income 
constraint, Mo. Then, the consumer having an initial utility curve U1 maximizes 
his utility at point A at the initial price Po in Figure 1 0 (a). This would give one 
consumption point C at Po in price-quantity space of Figure 10 (b). Now 
suppose the price of X has decreased from Po to P1· With no change in income 
the new utility maximum point for the consumer would move to B for a normal 
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SOURCE: Just, Richard E., Darrell L. Hueth and Andrew W. Schmitz. 
Applied Economics and Public Policy. Prentice-Hall, 
Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1982. 
Figure 10. Measurements of Welfare Change 
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Figure 10 (b). By varying the price with income constant the Marshallian 
demand curve could be derived as D (Mo) =X (P, Mo) in Figure 10 (b). Then the 
change of consumer surplus is represented as the area of poCFp1. 
With the same price change, if the consumer wants to stay on the initial 
utility level before the price change then his consumption amount should be 
determined at B' with income being adjusted to M1 in Figure 10 (a) and point E 
in Figure 10 (b). Then the Hicksian compensated demand curve is derived as 
H1(U1) = x (P, U(P/p1, Mo). Thus, by definition, compensating variation is Mo-
M1 in Figure 1 0 (a) and the area PoCEp1. 
However, when there was no price· reduction and if he wants to stay on the 
higher utility curve U2 as if there had been a price reduction he would select 
point A' with income adjustments to M2 at the consumption of X at X4, which 
would give one consumption point D in Figure 10 (b). At the same price 
reduction from Po and P1 he would select B to attain higher utility level U2 in 
Figure 10 (a). This would give a consumption point F in Figure 10 (b), which is 
the same point on the Marshallian curve. By varying prices and adjusting 
income the Hicksian demand curve is derived as H2(U2) =X (P, U(P/po, Mo)). 
By definition, the equivalent variation is represented as M2- Mo in Figure 10 (a) 
and the area Po DFp1. 
When price increases the reverse is true. For example, if the initial price is 
P1, and increases to po, then Marshallian consumer surplus is poCFp1, 
compensating variation is poDFp1 and equivalent variation is Po CEp1 . 
As shown above there exist some differences in values among the three 
welfare measures. When price increases the relationship among the three is 
C;;::A;;::E, and Cs:As:E in reverse change in price where C = compensating 
variation, A= consumer surplus, and E = equivalent variation. Thus, employing 
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consumer surplus as the relevant measure of change in social welfare may not 
be justified. 
However, Willig (1976) removed doubt in its use by proving that consumer 
surplus is a good approximation of the variations in welfare analysis. He 
derived the relationships between the three welfare measurements as the 
following: 
C = A + 11A2f2Mo and (3.8) 
E = A - 11A2f2Mo (3-9) 
Thus, (C- A)/A= 11A/2Mo and (A- E)/A= 11A/2Mo where 11 denotes income 
elasticity. These equations show the percentage error of approximating C and 
E with A. Then he proved that if 11AI2Mo ~ 0.05 no more than a five percent error 
is made by using consumer surplus as a measure of either compensating or 
equivalent variation. Consequently, he argued that Marshallian consumer 
surplus can be used "unapologetically" in approximating compensating or 
equivalent variation in welfare analysis regardless of whether the marginal 
utility of income is constant or not. 
Attempts to Measure Hicksian Welfare Changes 
There have been some attempts to measure the unobservable 
compensating and equivalent variations. Hurwicz and Uzawa (1971) showed 
that the Hicksian variations can be obtained using information from the ordinary 
demand functions. However, complex calculations and the lack of an 
operational algorithm have made the necessary computations impossible in 
most practical applications (Bergson, 1975; Chipman and Moore, 1980; and 
Just, Hueth and Schmitz, 1982). Hausman (1981) and Bowden (1984) showed 
the procedure to solve the Hurwicz-Uzawa systems for the two good case in 
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differential equations. Utilizing the duality relationship between direct and 
indirect utility functions, Vartia (1983) presented an algorithm in the form of an 
ordinary first-order differential equation for calculating expenditure function and 
the Hicksian variations. Bergland (1985) suggested an algorithm with the use 
of optimal control approach for calculating Hicksian welfare change, which 
included changes in income and prices. 
Shadow Pricing 
The term shadow price originates from mathematical programming, where 
it means a marginal valuation imputed to an input or an output at the location of 
the optimum (Pearce and Nash, 1981 ). However, it has been extended to 
estimates of social benefits or social losses in CBA. 
A shadow or accounting price, which is used interchangably in CBA, is 
defined as the price the economist attributes to a good or factor on the argument 
that it is more appropriate for the purpose of economic calculation than its 
existing market price (Mishan, 1976). 
In CBA the analyst faces valuing inputs and outputs as results of certain 
policies and programs. In a perfectly competitive economy market prices are 
regarded to reflect the values of inputs and outputs where the output prices are 
equated with marginal costs, and input prices are equated with marginal value. 
Two major difficulties arise in valuing inputs and outputs which are required to 
be consistent with shadow prices implicit in Pareto optimality: (1) when market 
prices are inappropriate, and (2) when no market exists for the inputs and 
outputs. 
The first difficulty comes from situations where market prices are not equal 
to marginal cost, and marginal cost does not reflect the true social cost of 
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relevant resources. These situations are due to imperfect competition in the 
input and output markets, unemployment of resources, increasing returns to 
scale, subsidy and taxation, the existence of externality and public goods, and 
non-marginal change in price. The second difficulty comes when the inputs and 
outputs are characterized by intangibles such as human lives, noise, pollution, 
good health, good education, recreation, etc. These difficulties require shadow 
pricing of inputs and outputs in CBA. The technique of shadow pricing may 
depend on the characteristics of inputs and outputs to be valued. It may be 
noted that in general equilibrium the shadow pricing with respect to social 
marginal cost or social marginal benefit could face "second-best" problem in 
achieving Pareto optimality (Lipsey and Lancaster, 1956). That is, where prices 
are not equal to marginal costs elsewhere in an economy ma"rginal cost pricing 
in the controllable sector may not guarantee Pareto optimality. 
Social Discount Rate (Social Time Preference) 
An individual may have time preference in consumption, a preference of 
present benefits over future benefits. Society as an integrate of individuals may 
have social time preference, a preference society exhibits for present benefits 
over future benefits. Public expenditure and investment programs involve the 
sacrifice of present benefits for future benefits. To society the sacrifice of 
present benefits would not be worth while unless the future gains are greater. 
Thus, the social discount rate can be defined as an accounting price which 
reflects society's "trade-off" of present benefits against future benefits (Dasgupta 
and Pearce, 1972). 
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Several concepts or approaches are outlined in the determination of a 
social discount rate for public expenditure or investment programs (Pearce and 
Nash, 1981 ). The problem lies in operationalizing the discount rate. 
First is the social opportunity cost (SOC) approach. The social discount 
rate is determined where a return from the program is equal to and/or greater 
than what could have been achieved if the sacrificed expenditure for the 
program had been used in other best alternatives. The difficulties lie in the fact 
that the return from other best alternative is not observable and empirical 
estimation is not easy. 
Second is the utilitarian approach or social time preference rate (STPR) 
which is based on diminishing marginal utility of consumption. The rate is 
determined by the formula, S = (1 + c)-b - 1 where S represents the social 
discount rate, c and b represent the rate of growth of consumption per person 
and the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption per person, respectively. 
However, there exists no concensus on the measurability of the utility function. 
Third is an approach proposed by Scott (1977) which attempts to avoid the 
problems caused by the discrepancies between STPR and SOC. The formula 
is W = 'Jl(b'/b) + d where W = the social discount rate, 11 =the elasticity of the 
marginal utility of income, b = base level of income, b' = change in income over 
time, and d = pure time preference rate. This approach looks at the balance 
between investment and consumption in the public sector only. 
Fourth is a synthetic discount rate approach which operates as an average 
of the STPR and SOC rates. This approach differentiates the sources of finance 
for a program and types of benefits. It operates with the STPR. 
In determining social discount rate no single approach has obtained 
general concensus from economists. The selection of a discount rate may 
depend on specific economic circumstances of programs to be analyzed. 
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However, it may be important to consider what alternatives are foregone and 
what reinvestment possibilities still exist in the world where the first-best 
conditions do not prevail (Pearce and Nash, 1981 ). 
Distributional Weights 
Distributional weights are used in the non-conventional approach in CBA 
where incorporation of income distribution is believed to be more consistent 
with Pareto optimality. In this approach CBA is carried out in two stages. The 
first stage involves evaluation of the gains and losses in money units accruing 
to or borne by each of the individuals affected by a policy. Then, the analyst 
combines these gains and losses into a single measure of change in social 
welfare. In this second stage distributional judgements are injected into 
assessing the gains and losses in welfare. For example, when net money gains 
to each individual in a society are G1, G2, ... , Gn then the net gain to society in 
money terms only is represented as SG = G1 + G2 + ... Gn where SG is total 
social gain and n is number of individuals. When distributional judgement is 
considered SG = d1G1 + d2G2 + ... + dnGn where the d's are distributional 
weights. 
In distributional weighting four approaches are offered (qasgupta and 
Pearce, 1972). First is where the CBA analysis indicates the consequences of 
distribution but allows the decision maker to apply his own weights to the gains 
and losses of the various groups in society. 
Second is where the CBA analyst observes weights implicit in past 
government decisions and uses those weights in the distributional analysis, 
assuming the weights reflect the decision makers current value judgements for 
society. 
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Third is where an explicit value judgement is imposed on the social utility 
function, such as scaling down higher incomes and scaling up lower incomes. 
Finally, weights are determined by estimating the likely shape and 
elasticity of a marginal utility of income function. 
Decision Criteria 
A policy or project is regarded socially worth while in CBA if the benefits 
exceed the costs it generates. The appropriate formula expressing the social 
worth of a policy or project to aid the decision making is the decision criteria. 
The decision makers frequently face decision choices such as accept or reject. 
Major decision criteria are briefly summarized below. 
Net Present Value (NPV) discounts costs and benefits occurring over time 
and express them all in a single common value at any one point of time. When 
the discounted value of the benefits exceeds the discounted value of the costs, 
that is, net present value generated from a program is positive, it is accepted. If 
the reverse is true, the project or policy is rejected. 
Internal Rate of Return (IRR) is the discount rate that makes the NPV of a 
program equal to zero. The IRR is the maximum interest rate that the program 
can pay for the resources used if the program is to recover its costs and still just 
break even (Gittinger, 1982). If the IRR for a program is greater than some 
predetermined level which is generally the social opportunity cost, the program 
is considered acceptable. 
Benefit-Cost Ratio (B/C Ratio) compares benefits with costs discounted at 
social opportunity cost. If the ratio of the two is greater than one a program or a 
project is considered acceptable. This rule frequently serves as an efficient 
criterion in public policy or program analysis. If the benefit-cost ratio is greater 
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or equal to one then the policy or program is considered efficient and 
recommendable. 
Other decision rules include annual value, cut-off period, pay-back period, 
net average rate of return, terminal value, optimal time-phasing, maximum 
average cost, net benefit investment ratio, etc. (See Sassone and Schaffer, 
1978; Gittinger, 1982). 
Model Formulation 
General Framework 
This study analyzes the impact of public subsidy programs to rural 
residents in water consumption (STRWS) on social welfare in Oklahoma. 
Following the discussion on the major components of CBA in public policy or 
program the general framework is set as follows. 
The welfare foundation of STRWS is identified by improvement in 
economic efficiency and equity. Economic efficiency in STRWS is whether 
social benefits exceed social resource costs. Equity concerns finding how 
STRWS benefits are distributed to target groups of rural residents. That is, the 
value judgement recognizes it is desirable when subsidy benefits are provided 
to groups whose average income is lower than average income of taxpayers 
and whose settlement motivation in rural areas is dependent upon employment. 
Although there have been some attempts in calculating the Hicksian 
welfare measure (Hurwicz and Uzawa, 1971; Hausman, 1981; Bowden, 1984; 
Varita, 1983; and Bergland, 1985), the social benefit or welfare changes will be 
measured with the use of Marshallian consumer surplus. It is justified in the 
current application for several reasons. 
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First, it is reasonable to assume that STRWS falls within the framework of 
Willig's justification for using Marshallian consumer surplus as an 
approximation of compensating and equivalent variations with less than a five 
percent error. This assumption is based on the result that the product of change 
in consumer surplus and income elasticity of water demand is small since the 
income share of water consumption costs is low and the income elasticity is less 
than one (Dellenbarger, 1985). 
Second, there would be no path dependence problem associated with 
multiple price changes since only one price (water) changes and water is 
assumed to be a final consumption good,. 
Third, the concept of Marshallian consumer surplus is easily understood, 
simply calculated, and widely accepted under certain conditions in welfare 
analysis. 
Shadow pricing through willingness to pay by rural households is 
assumed to reflect the value of water to society. The social discount rate is 
approximated by the social opportunity cost of the subsidy and assumed equal 
to long-term U.S. Treasury bond rates. Subsidy benefit distribution will be 
analyzed between recipient groups in rural areas, not between rural residents 
and the rest of the society. Cost allocation among groups in a society as a 
whole is not considered. 
Two types of distributional weights are considered. The first is based on 
- -
income and is expressed as Wi = Y/Yi , where Y denotes national reference 
level household income and Yi represents income of household i in STRWS. 
The second is based on water consumption and is expressed as ei = (C/Ci)r 
where C denotes national reference level of household water consumption, Ci 
represents water consumption of household i in STRWS, and r is a parameter of 
the household utility function. The subsidy benefit distribution between different 
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groups of rural households will be measured with the use of consumer surplus 
under separate demand functions. 
The decision rule or efficient criterion is marginal social benefit cost ratio 
(MSBCR) with STRWS. 
Analytical Models 
Scoge of Costs and Benefits 
Subsidies are provided indirectly to rural households through lump sum 
grants and low interest long-term loans to rural water systems. Social costs and 
benefits are generated to society which may change social welfare in the form 
of economic efficiency and equity. 
Some costs incurred in STRWS are intangible and unobservable. There 
may be negative externality in the form of displeasure to some taxpayers who 
do not agree with STRWS, say, low income urban households. Measurement 
of this displeasure is technically infeasible, thus not considered in this study. 
Observable costs are classified into two major categories, public or 
government costs and private or recipient costs. Public costs consist of lump 
sum grants, long-term low interest loans, and administrative costs. Recipient 
costs are increased water bills due to higher consumption encouraged by lower 
water prices under subsidy. 
Benefits to society of STRWS are in two major forms, direct benefits and 
indirect benefits. The direct benefits are decrease in water price and increased 
water consumption by rural households. These benefits are summarized by the 
change in consumer surplus. Indirect benefits may be in different forms. 
Benefits could be a reduction in health risks of rural residents due to increased 
safe water consumption under STRWS. Some altruistic or paternalistic 
62 
taxpayers may obtain psychic satisfaction or positive utility by providing subsidy 
to rural residents. These indirect benefits are generally unobservable and 
difficult, if not impossible, to measure. Thus, in this study, only direct benefits to 
rural households are considered, that is, changes in consumer surplus. 
Measurement of Social Costs and Benefits 
The analytical model is based on the "with" and "without" concept. Social 
benefits and costs "without STRWS" in rural water consumption are measured 
and social benefits and costs "with STRWS" are measured. Change in social 
benefits and costs between the two states give the marginal social benefits and 
costs. 
Consider a representative rural water system characterized as a 
decreasing cost firm in Figure 11 (a). The system has long-run marginal cost 
(LMC), long-run average cost (LAC), and faces aggregate water demand (DA). 
It is assumed that the monopolistic rural water system does marginal cost 
pricing and adopts second degree price discrimination or decreasing block rate 
schedules to maintain financial feasibility through equating total revenue with 
total cost. It is also assumed that the rural water system is operating at its 
maximum technical efficiency. 
In Figure 11 (b), D1 represents an individual household water demand 
function. Since potable water is not an inferior good, price and quantity will vary 
inversely and thus have a negatively sloped demand (Dellenbarger, Kang, and 
Schreiner, 1986). 
Since water price is affected by the rural water system cost structure it is 
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expansion of rural water system facilities requires fixed capital investment. To 
recover costs, capital investment is annualized and incorporated into water 
pricing or monthly water bills. Let C = f [ K(q), M(q), W(q) ] where C is annual 
total cost, K(q) is annualized fixed capital investment, M(q) is annual operation 
and maintenance cost of water distribution facilities, and W(q) is annual water 
purchase or annual cost of water source at the water supply of q. Then 
marginal cost is represented as LMC = f [ K(q), M(q), W(q) ]. When lump sum 
subsidy is provided to rural water system then the new cost function is given as 
Cs = fs [ K(q) - S(q), M(q), W(q) ] where S(q) is annualized amount of subsidy. 
Even though the subsidy is a lump sum it generally varies by size of system 
(number of households). Small systems receive small lump sum subsidies, 
large systems receive large lump sum subsidies. The new marginal cost under 
subsidy is represented as LMCs = f's [K(q)- S(q), M(q), W(q) ]. 
Suppose the rural water system is provided a lump sum subsidy in the 
amount of S(q). According to the above results the public subsidy decreases 
LMC and LAC by spreading the subsidy over the supply of water and thus 
giving the LMCs and LACs as shown in Figure 11 (a). Marginal cost pricing 
with no profit sets the marginal price for the last unit of water consumed at P2 
and determines water system supply at 02 where DA intersects LMCs. The 
marginal price for an individual household within the system is P2 in Figure 
11 (b). With this pricing the rural water system will lose (M2- P2)02 and public 
cost will be (M3- L2)02. Social loss because of too many resources delivering 
too much water under STRWS is equal to the area K1 K2J2J1. To compensate 
for lost revenue, management will resort to block rate schedule and thus extract 
some consumer surplus. Thus, a water rate schedule similar to R2 is set up as 
shown in Figure 11 (b). 
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Suppose no public subsidy is provided to the rural water system. Then for 
marginal cost pricing with no profit the marginal price for the last unit of water 
consumed would be set at P1 and with water supply at 01. Marginal price for an 
individual household within the system is also P1 in Figure 11 (b). At this pricing 
the rural water system will lose revenue equal to (M1 - P1)01. To compensate 
for lost revenue, management will use a block rate schedule similar to R1 which 
will be above the rate schedule R2 under STRWS. 
These situations of "with STRWS" and "without STRWS" give different 
social benefits and costs. Social costs consist of private and public costs and 
social benefits consist of private and public benefits. 
First, consider the social benefits and costs without STRWS. Private 
benefits are represented by the area under the individual demand curve, Zaq10 
in Figure 11 (b). Public benefits are assumed zero. Private costs are 
represented by Z1aq10 and equals the household water bill. Public costs are 
not incurred in this situation. Then social benefits equal Zaq10 and social costs 
equal Z1aq10, resulting in net social benefits of Zaq10- Z1aq10= ZaZ1. 
Now consider the social benefits and costs with STRWS. Private benefits 
have changed to the area represented by Zcq20. Public benefits are assumed 
zero. Private costs are the area represented by Z2cq20, which is the household 
water bill. Public costs are the amount of public subsidies represented by 
Z1bcZ2. Then the social benefits are Zcq20 and social costs are Z2cq20 + 
Z1bcZ2 = Z1bq20, resulting in net social benefits of Zcq20- Z1bq20 = ZaZ1 -
abc1. 
Now the marginal social benefit-cost ratio (MSBCR) is the ratio between 
the added social benefits and the added social costs with public subsidy. The 
1Because of a declining LMC, social costs are slightly less than the area 
abc for any individual household. 
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added social benefits are Zcq20- Zaq10 = acq2q1. The added social costs are 
Z1bq20- Z1aq10 = abq2q1. Then MSBCR is given by acq2q1/abq2q1 which will 
always be less than one. 
Two problems arise in empirical measurements with this approach. First, 
only R2,q2, D1 and DA are known but R1 and· q1 are not. Second, block rate 
schedules can be set in numerous forms with various block lengths. These two 
problems make the measurement of social welfare change difficult. To 
overcome the problems a modified approach is considered using average price 
as surrogate for rate schedule. Water bill under a decreasing block rate 
schedule is defined as WB = p1q1 + 2:: Pi (qi- qi _ 1) where WB denotes water bill, 
i 
and P1 and q1 are the price and quantity consumed at the first block 
respectively, and Pi and qi represent the price and quantity consumed at the ith 
block. Then the average price per unit of water consumption becomes AP = 
WB/qn = [ P1q1 +~Pi (qi- qi- 1)]/qn. Conversely, WB is obtained from AP x qn. 
I 
Since WB = AP x qn the consumer surplus when calculated with WB is equal to 
the consumer surplus when calculated with AP x qn. 
Measurement of social welfare change with the use of average price is 
illustrated in Figure 12. D1 is the same household demand curve as in Figure 
11 (b). Price P2a is the average price when the system, with STRWS, sets the 
marginal price at P2 and gives water supply of 02 in Figure 11 (a). This in turn 
gives the individual household within the system a marginal price of P2 and rate 
schedule similar to R2 in Figure 11 (b). The water bill for the individual 
household under R2 is the area represented by Z2cq20 in Figure 11 (b). Then 









Figure 12. Price Change and Social Welfare. 
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by the quantity demanded, q2, in Figure 11 (b). Similarly, P1a at q1 in Figure 12 
is the average price when the system, without public STRWS, sets the marginal 
price at P1 for the water supply of 01 in Figure 11 (a). This in turn gives the 
individual household within the system marginal price of P1 with rate schedule 
R1 in Figure 11 (b). The water bill for the individual household under R1 is the 
area represented by Z1aq10 in Figure 11 (b). Then the average price P1a at q1 
in Figure 12 is given by the water bill Z1aq10 divided by the quantity demanded, 
q1 in Figure 11 (b). 
Social benefits and costs without STRWS are simply private benefits and 
costs. With STRWS the social benefits are private benefits, KBq20 and social 
costs are private costs P2aBq20 plus public costs P1 aDBP2a in Figure 12. 
MSBCR is the change in social benefits, KBq20 - KAq10 = ABq2q1, over the 
change in social costs, P1aDq20- P1aAq10 = ADq2q1. 
However, unresolved is the problem of no observable information on P1a 
and q1, the average price and quantity without STRWS. Thus, computation of 
P1 a and q1 is necessary. Price P1 a can be obtained by adding the subsidy 
amount per thousand gallons to P2a· The subsidy amount is calculated by 
dividing the annualized subsidy amount by annual water supply of the system. 
Then, q1 is obtained by substituting P1 a into individual household water 
demand functions. The size of q1 will depend on the subsidy and the price 
elasticity of water demand. 
The change in social benefits resulting from STRWS is calculated by 
integrating the individual household demand function D1 at the interval between 
q1 and q2 in Figure 12, that is, 
q2 




where MSB denotes change in social benefits. The change in social costs from 
STRWS is calculated as 
(3-11) 
where MSC denotes change in social costs. Then the marginal social benefit 
cost ratio (MSBCR) is measured by 
q2 
MSB/MSC = f DI(p)dq/p1 a(q2 - q1) 
q1 
(3-12) 
This process can be completed for the average household in the sample of rural 
water systems and for the average household belonging to a socio-economic 
group. Then for the average household in each socio-economic group in the 
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Where: 
(3-13) 
MSBi = marginal benefit to society from STRWS for the average 
household belonging to socio-economic group i. 
Di(P) = monthly water demand function for the average household 
belonging to socio-economic group i. 
MSCi= marginal cost to society incurred from STRWS for the average 
household belonging to socio-economic group i. 
qi1 = monthly water consumption for the average household belonging 
to socio-economic group i without STRWS. 
qi2 = monthly water consumption for the average household belonging 
to socio-economic group i under STRWS. 
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Pi1 = price of water per thousand gallons at the monthly water 
consumption qi1 for the average household belonging to socio-
economic group i. 
Since the MSBCR will always be less than one, STRWS will be considered 
inefficient under the conventional approach. However, MSBCRs by socio-
economic group will allow comparisons of relative efficiencies of STRWS. 
Social Costs and Benefits Under Distributional Weights 
The value judgements of decision makers in providing public subsidy to 
rural water systems are explicitly and implicitly contained in government 
documents (FmHA, 1982; and FmHA, 1985). Priority of public subsidy is given 
to "rural water systems serving low-income communities". The subsidies are 
provided "to reduce (water) user costs". These statements imply that STRWS 
has low income residents as a target group and it is designed to serve water 
needs. Thus it would be important for the decision makers to know how the 
benefits are distributed to targeted groups of people and whether the subsidies 
are used to serve water needs. 
To incorporate decision maker's value judgements non-conventional 
approach or decision maker's approach in CBA uses distributional weighting 
systems. Two types of weighting systems are considered here: income 
distribution weights and consumption distribution weights. 
Income Distribution Weights. Weights in this system, following Foster 
(1966), are derived from the ratio of· a reference household income in the 
economy to the income of the consumer concerned, that is Wi = (Y /Yi) where Wi 
is the distributional weight for household i, Y is the national mean income, and 
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Yi is the income level of household i in the area surveyed by the rural water 
system. Then the weighted marginal social benefit of the average household 
belonging to socio-economic group i, MSBwi. becomes Wi*MSBi or (YNi)*MSBi 
where MSBi is the unweighted marginal social benefit for the average 
household belonging to socio-economic group i from STRWS. The value 
judgement with this weighting system is that equal weights are given to 
preferences for all consumers. This weighting adjusts benefits to the value 
households would place on water if they had mean income and devoted the 





where Wi denotes distributional weight for the average household belonging to 
socio-economic group i and other notations are the same as specified in the 
conventional approach. If MSBCR is greater or equal to one then the subsidy 
program is considered efficient. If MSBCR is less than one then the subsidy 
program is considered inefficient. 
Consumption Distribution Weights. This weighting system is based on the 
assumption that the marginal utility of consumption to a consumer decreases as 
the level of consumption increases (Squire and van der Tak, 1984). One form 
of the marginal utility function that represents this characteristic is formed as Uc 
= c-r where Uc is marginal utility of water consumption, C is the level of water 
consumption and r is a parameter of the utility function. Thus the distributional 
weights that distinguish the value of consumption to different households is 
- -
derived as Si = Ui/U = (Ci/C)-r = (C/Ci)r where Si is a consumption distribution 
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weight for the average household belonging to socio-economic group i; Ui and 
U are marginal utility of water consumption for the average household and 
marginal utility at national reference level of water consumption for the average 
household, respectively; and C and Ci are national reference level of water 
consumption and water consumption level of the average household belonging 
to socio-economic group i. Squire and van der Tak (1984) suggest that in most 
cases r would center around 1. The weighted benefits for the average 
household belonging to socio-economic group i becomes MSBwi = Si * MSBi = 
(C/Ci)r *MSBi where MSBi is the unweighted marginal social benefit for the 
average household belonging to socio-economic group i. When expecting 
difficulties in deriving values for r one can parametrically evaluate results. 
The MSBCR is expressed as: 
qi2 
Si * f Di(p) dq 
qi1 
(3-15) 
where Si denotes distributional weight for the average household belonging to 
socio-economic group i and other notations are the same as specified in the 
conventional approach. If MSBCR is greater than or equal to one the subsidy 
program is considered efficient. If the ratio is less than one the subsidy program 
is considered inefficient. 
Subsidy Distribution by Socio-economic Group 
This approach is based on the assumption that a decision maker wishes to 
classify recipients of public policy by socio-economic characteristics and 
measure subsidy distribution between the interested groups. 
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There exist two typical motivations for settlement in rural areas. The one is 
for purposes of employment or making a living. Farmers, people in rural 
employment, or small businessmen in rural areas belong to this category. They 
may not have any locational alternatives. The other is for purposes of exploiting 
locational advantages. They may be part of a low income group who prefer 
rural living for exploiting low rent while working at some other location. They 
may be part of a high income group who prefer rural living because of psychic 
earning from a rural environment despite time and transportation costs in 
commuting to the work place. Taxpayers may not wish to subsidize the high 
income group for psychic satisfaction of rural living. 
Rural residents can also be grouped by income level. Some farmers and 
local businessmen have higher incomes than the average taxpayer. The 
average taxpayer may not want to subsidize any group of rural residents who 
have higher incomes than they do. Thus policy makers may want to know how 
subsidy benefits are distributed to income groups and to socio-economic 
groups seeking psychic satisfaction. 
Measurement of subsidy distribution between groups is illustrated in 
Figure 13. Suppose there exist household groups A and B within a rural water 
system. Let the household monthly water demand be DA for group A and Ds 
for group B. Suppose the water rate schedule without subsidy is R1. Then the 
consumer surplus for group A is the area bounded by DA, R1 and price axis, 
and for group B is the area bounded by Ds, R1 and price axis. Suppose also 
the rate schedule with subsidy is R2. Then, the consumer surplus for group A is 
the area bounded by DA, R2 and price axis, and the consumer surplus for Group 
B is the area bounded by Ds, R2 and price axis. The net change in consumer 
surplus (equal to subsidy amount) for groups A and Bare the areas bounded by 




Figure 13. Distribution of Benefits Under Subsidy for 
Alternative Socio-Economic Groups 




Calculation of Subsidy Costs 
The subsidy costs are divided into three categories: lump sum grants, low 
interest long-term loans, and administrative costs. All costs are calculated on 
an annual basis and converted to cost per thousand gallons of water supplied. 
Lump Sum Grant (LSG). LSG is provided to rural water systems at the 
time of construction, capacity expansion, or purchase of water facilities. Grant 
amount is a resource cost to society in that it represents foregone funds for 
alternative uses. If we assume that facilities constructed or purchased from 
grants are in use for n years and the opportunity cost or social discount rate is i 
then the annual subsidy cost equals the amount of the grant times the capital 
recovery factor where this factor is defined as: 
~ = i(1 +i)"l(1 +i)n - 1 (3-16) 
Then annualized subsidy grant cost per thousand gallons of water 
(AGCwj), supplied by rural water system j is equal to: 
AGCwj = ~ (LSGj I Oj) (3-17) 
where LSGj is the amount of lump sum grant and Oj is the amount of water 
supplied annually by rural water system j. 
Similarly, the annualized subsidy grant cost per household within rural 
water system j (AGCnj) is estimated as: 
AGCnj = ~ (LSGj I Nj) (3-18) 
where Nj represents total number of households within rural water system j. 
Low Interest Loan (LIL). Cost to society of low interest loans is the 
difference between the opportunity cost represented by the social discount rate 
and the subsidized interest rate over the loan period. The annualized subsidy 
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cost of the low interest loan per thousand gallons of water to rural water system j 
(ALCj) is the following: 
ALCwj = LILj (~-a )/Oj (3-19) 
where ~ and a are capital recovery factors at i social discount rate and r 
subsidized interest rate, respectively; Lllj is the amount of low interest loan; and 
Oj is the amount of water supplied annually. 
Similarly, the annualized subsidy cost of low interest loans per household 
within rural water system j (ALCnj) is the following: 
ALCnj = Lllj (~-a )/Nj (3-20) 
where Nj denotes number of households within rural water system j and other 
notations are the same as in equation (3-18). 
Administrative Costs. Lump sum grants and low interest loans are 
administered by FmHA or other special federal agencies. Loan guarantees 
through bond issues are administered by State government. These 
administrative costs are indirect subsidy costs since they are borne by the 
public through taxpayer money. These costs could be obtained by identifying 
the budgets allocated for administering the STRWS. However, because these 
costs are presumed minor compared to the AGC and ALC costs, and due to 
expected difficulties in obtaining data on these costs, administrative costs are 
not considered in this study. 
Summary 
The theoretical foundation of cost-benefit analysis of public subsidy was 
outlined in this Chapter. Methods for measuring benefits and costs of public 
subsidy to rural water systems were presented. Distributional weighting 
systems were introduced to incorporate the decision-maker's value judgements 
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in the objectives of public subsidy programs. Models for measuring subsidy 
distributions between groups of rural households from STRWS were suggested. 
Finally, methods for calculating subsidy costs of STRWS were outlined. 
CHAPTER IV 
RURAL COMMUNITY WATER DEMAND 
This Chapter provides the basis for estimating water demand for rural 
communities in Oklahoma. The theoretical and practical issues associated with 
rural water demand estimation are discussed. Then a rural water demand 
model is proposed. Empirical results of water demand estimation follow. 
Major Issues in Water Demand Estimation 
A well defined rural water demand function is important for investment 
planning of rural water systems, water systems management, and welfare 
analysis of public subsidy to water systems. A large body of literature on water 
demand has developed over the last two decades. However, major issues still 
remain with respect to specification of the price variable and to the appropriate 
estimation technique. A further issue for rural water systems is that of locational 
preference. To what extent is the demand for rural water a reflection also of the 
demand for rural living? These issues are discussed below. 
Water demand is defined as the various quantities of water a consumer is 
willing and able to buy as the water rate (price) varies, ceteris paribus 
(Dellenbarger, Kang, and Schreiner, 1986). The major problem in modelling 
water demand lies in the fact that consumers do not face a single price but a 
multipart price schedule set by monopolistic water systems. Houthakker (1951) 
discussed economic implications of the presence of a price schedule, focusing 
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on which price, marginal or average, should be included in the demand 
function. 
The conventional view for commodity demand functions under multipart 
rate schedules focuses on the marginal price. This view argues that consumers 
respond to the price represented by the marginal step on the rate structure 
where the consumer is observed to be. Howe and Linaweaver (1967) used 
marginal price in estimating residential water demand for the U.S. Since then, 
however, the economic theory of consumer behavior in the face of multipart rate 
structure has advanced considerably (Howe, 1982). 
Taylor (1975) pointed out that marginal price alone does not represent the 
effects of the rate structure on consumer response. He argued that a single 
marginal price governs consumer behavior while the consumer is in that block, 
but it does not explain why consumption occurs in that block as opposed to 
some other block. He then showed that both block marginal and average price 
are the correct specification of consumer behavior for multipart rate schedules 
of a commodity (electricity) and account for differences in intramarginal rate 
steps. 
Nordin (1976) modified Taylor's demand analysis and demonstrated that 
the theoretically correct specification of demand under block rate schedule is to 
include, in addition to marginal price, "a variable equivalent to a lump-sum 
payment the consumer must make before buying as many units as he wants at 
the marginal price." This lump-sum payment represents the difference between 
what a consumer actually pays and what would have been paid if all units were 
purchased at the marginal price. This payment is known as the difference 
variable or the rate structure premium. Billings and Agthe (1980) theoretically 
reinforced Nordin's modified specification of demand and empirically estimated 
residential water demand for Tucson, Arizona. Howe (1982) also applied 
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Nordin's specification to estimate residential water demand with statistically 
reasonable results. 
However, other studies have used average price for residential water 
demand under block rate schedules (Gottlieb, 1963; Wong, 1972; Young, 1973; 
Foster and Beatie, 1979; and Cochran and Cotton, 1985). Specifically, Foster 
and Beatie (1981 a, 1981 b) advocated the use of average price as a proper 
specification of demand under block rate schedule. They questioned the 
perfect knowledge postulate implicit in the marginal price model, that is, the 
likelihood that consumers are aware of the detailed block pricing rate structure. 
Thus, they believed that consumers may not respond to marginal price or the 
change in lump-sum p·ayment but are more likely to respond to their total water 
expenditure and thus perceive average price as a proxy for the unknown 
marginal block price. However, they conceded that the price to which 
consumers actually respond is an empirical question (Foster and Beatie, 
1981 a). Their empirical study showed that parameter estimates from the Nordin 
specification were not significantly different from an average price specification 
(Foster and Beatie, 1981 b). Based on statistical criteria, comparisons of 
empirical performance between Nordin's specification and average price 
specification favor the average price model for water and electricity demand 
(Stevens and Kesisoglou, 1984; and Adams, Stevens, and Wills, 1985). 
Opaluch (1982) proposed two hypothesis tests to determine whether 
consumers respond to average price or Nordin's modification of Taylor's model. 
For the consumer on the second block in a two block rate schedule average 
price can be expressed as [P1 01 + P2 (0 - 01 )]/0 where 0 represents total 
purchase of a good subject to block rate schedule, P2 represents the price of 0 
in the second block or marginal price, 01 represents quantity of the initial block, 
and P1 represents the price corresponding to 01 . Then the average price can 
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be expressed as P2 + (P1 - P2) 01 which implies AP- MP + D/Q where AP Q -
and MP represent average price and marginal price respectively, and D 
represents Nordin's difference variable. This measure of average price may be 
defined in the demand function as follows: 
where Px represents a price index for other relevant goods, Y represents total 
income of the consumer, and the Bs are coefficients. 
If well informed consumers respond to marginal price, then B3 = 0. Thus 
the demand function is given by: 
(4-2) 
That is, equation (4-1) reduces to Nordin's specification. 
If consumers respond to average price, then B2 = B3 -:f:. 0. Thus the demand 
function is given as: 
where P A represents average price. 
The hypotheses to be tested are the following: 
Test 1 
Ho: B3 = 0 
HA: B3 -:f:. 0 
Test 2 
Ho: B2 = B3 
HA: B2 -:f:. B3 
(4-3) 
If the null hypothesis of both tests are rejected then the data are 
inconsistent with the demand functions (4-2) and (4-3). If the null hypothesis of 
test 1 fails to be rejected while that of test 2 is rejected, then the demand 
function is specified as (4-2). If the null hypothesis of test 1 is rejected while that 
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of test 2 fails to be rejected then the demand function is specified as (4-3). If 
both null hypotheses fail to be rejected then (1) B2 = B3 = 0, or (2) B2 '* 0 with B3 
= 0, or B2 '* 0 with B2 = B3. Results of (1) indicate that consumers do not 
respond to price at all and results of (2) may indicate data weakness or different 
responsiveness of consumers, some to marginal and others to average price. 
The Opaluch test was applied in an empirical study under a declining 
block rate schedule by Chicoine, Deller and Ramamurthy (1986). Results 
indicated that the decomposed variables of average price were determined as 
the appropriate price specification. 
The issue associated with estimation technique focuses on the 
appropriateness of ordinary least squares (OLS) in the presence of block rate 
schedules. This issue is due to 1) nonlinear nature of the pricing structure 
where price depends on discontinuous quantities consumed; 2) measurement 
error in water consumption near the boundary of the discrete rate schedule 
which assigns wrong marginal price and thus introduces errors in the price 
variables; and 3) quantity dependent price and thus simultaneity bias (Chicoine, 
Deller, and Ramamurthy, 1986). Nonlinearity in quantities consumed may 
cause biased estimates of the demand parameters; measurement errors may 
result in both biased and inconsistent estimates; and simultaneity may give both 
biased and inconsistent estimates. 
For the first problem there is little theoretical knowledge (Chicoine, Deller, 
and Ramamurthy, 1986). Kelejian (1971) theoretically demonstrates that two-
stage least squares can be used to estimate the parameters of a nonlinear 
model. Terza and Welch (1982) propose a two-stage Probit approach that is 
applicable only for increasing block rate schedules. For the second problem, 
an instrumental variable approach has been applied in several studies (Billings, 
1982; Hensen, 1984; Jones and Morris, 1984; Deller, Chicoine, and 
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Ramamurthy, 1986). For the third problem, simultaneous equation models have 
been applied by Adams, Stevens and Wills (1985); Agthe, Billings, Dobra and 
Raffiee (1986); and Chicoine, Deller and Ramamurthy (1986). Most empirical 
studies indicate that alternative estimation techniques (instrumental variable 
approach and simultaneous equation models), do not differ significantly from 
OLS results (Jones and Morris, 1984; Adams, Stevens and Wills, 1985; 
Chicoine, Deller and Ramamurthy, 1986; and Deller, Chicoine and 
Ramamurthy, 1986). 
The issues associated with locational preference are concerned with the 
interrelationships between rural residence location and water demand behavior 
of rural households. 
Rural areas may generate gross locational income in the form of lower cost 
of living or higher psychic earnings from a perceived improved environment. 
However, rural areas also incur locational costs such as commuting from 
residence to work place, higher insurance costs, unpaved access roads, lower 
police and fire protection, and higher water connection cost. Net locational 
income would be equal to gross locational income less locational costs. If rural 
households behave rationally they would prefer a rural location only if net 
locational income is positive, ceteris paribus. A positive net locational income 
may influence water demand behavior of rural households similar to household 
income. When gross locational income and other locational costs are assumed 
constant across different rural locations, water demand is influenced by water 
cost and commuting cost since net locational income is dependent upon these 
factors. 
Water costs can be divided between daily water usage cost which is billed 
to rural households monthly and water access or connection cost. Daily water 
usage cost is reflected as a price variable in water demand. Water access or 
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connection cost may explain, in part, locational demand behavior of rural 
households. This water access or connection cost also may be capitalized in 
property values since it is paid only once when rural households are connected 
to the water system. 
Some households settle in rural areas specifically for the purpose of 
exploiting net locational income. They have locational preference for rural 
living (Dellenbarger, 1985). This group of rural households may show different 
water demand behavior due to net locational income or locational demand. 
The interrelationships between rural residence location and rural household 
water demand need to be tested since policy makers may want to know if the 
public is subsidizing locational preference or water usage. 
Previous Studies of Rural Water Demand in Oklahoma 
There have been several studies on rural community water demand in 
Oklahoma. Slogett and Badger (1974) estimated monthly water use of rural 
customers within 57 rural water systems in Oklahoma. Goodwin, Doeksen, and 
Nelson (1979) estimated monthly and annual water use with information 
obtained from state and county FmHA offices and from system managers. 
However, these studies were not intended to identify the systematic relationship 
between quantity of water consumed and factors such as price of water, price of 
alternative goods and services, and income. Dellenbarger, Myoung, and 
Schreiner (1984) estimated rural water demand with two different sets of 
aggregate data, one from secondary data covering 203 systems for the year 
1977, and the other from survey data covering 69 systems collected by the 
Oklahoma Water Resources Board for the year 1981. They used average price 
for price specification with other socio-economic variables, and OLS was used 
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for demand estimation. Functional forms were linear and log-linear. Estimation 
of seasonal and regional water demand were included in the study. The 
estimated demand function was for the aggregate water system. 
Similar attempts have been made by Doeksen, Goodwin, and Oehrtman 
(1984) to estimate rural water demand. They used marginal cost for each 
customer as a price variable (probably marginal price) with other socio-
economic variables. OLS was used as an estimation technique. Unlike the 
study of Dellenbarger, Myoung, and Schreiner, this study used cross-sectional 
household data. 
A more recent study (Dellenbarger, Kang, and Schreiner, 1986) used 
household survey data and included Nordin's marginal price and difference 
variables under decreasing block rate schedules. A quadratic functional form 
was used with OLS estimation. Seasonality of rural water demand was 
examined using the Bonferroni inequality test. However, it was not tested 
whether rural consumer response is better explained with average price or with 
Nordin's specification. 
None of the above studies included analysis of locational preference in 
estimating demand for rural water. 
Rural Water Demand Estimation 
Although Nordin's specification of water demand is considered 
theoretically reasonable it is also accepted in this study that the price variable 
specification may depend on empirical data. It is based on the argument that 
consumers :nay be "well informed" or "uninformed" on complicated rate 
schedules and rate premiums. Thus, Opaluch's test is used in determining the 
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price variable to which consumers respond. Water demand is further specified 
for different consumer characteristics and different seasons. 
Test for Appropriate Price Variable 
The general model used in testing for the appropriate price variable is the 
following: 
Oit = Bo + B1 MPit + B2 DPit + Ba YDit + B4 FAMSi 
where: 
Oit 
+ Bs NRSi + Bs MILEi + Sit (4-4) 
= the quantity of water (1 ,000 gal.) consumed by household i in 
month t. 
MPit = marginal price ($) per 1 ,000 gallons for household i in month t. 
DPit = Opaluch's decomposed price variable for household i in 
month t and is obtained from Nordin's difference variable 
divided by the quantity consumed. 
YDit = monthly income ($1 ,000) of household i in month t and is equal 
to annual household income divided by 12 less Nordin's 
difference variable or rate premium in month t. 
FAMSi = family size (number of persons) in household i. 
NRSi = percentage (%) of nonhousehold water from alternative 
sources for household i. 
MILEi = distance (miles) from residence to work place for household i. 
MP, DP, and YD are used for the Opaluch test in determining the 
appropriate price variable. Since rural areas have access to alternative 
sources of water such as ponds and wells, NRS is used to test the importance of 
these water sources. Distance from residence to work place, MILE, is used as a 
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surrogate for commuting cost. Water access cost data are not available for this 
study. However, a locational preference variable is identified for a later water 
demand model. 
Data were obtained from a survey conducted in 1984 by the Department of 
Agricultural Economics at Oklahoma State University on Oklahoma rural water 
systems and households within the rural water systems. The survey procedure 
is explained in Dellenbarger (1985). A random sample of Oklahoma rural water 
systems was drawn and a ten percent random sample of households within 
each system was surveyed. Actual 1983 monthly water consumption and water 
billings data were obtained from water system records and a mail questionnaire 
was sent to each household in the ten percent sample to obtain data on family 
income, family size, alternative sources of water, and other household 
characteristics. A total of 347 households responded representing 14 different 
rural water systems. Of these, a total of 571 usable monthly observations 
representing 11 systems resulted. Lack of information on household income 
and distance to place of work accounted for the major reduction in usable 
observations. 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression was used as estimation 
technique. The two sets of hypotheses as proposed by Opaluch are: 
Test 1 Test 2 
Ho : B1 = 0 Ho : B1 = B2 
HA : B1 :t:. 0 HA : B1 :t:. B2 
The estimated water demand function is the following: 
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0= 5.583-1.416 MP -1.760 DP + 1.386 YO+ 1.513 FAMS 
(4. 77) (-3.44) (-1 0.01) (7.25) (8.17) 
-0.011 NRS- 0.054 MILE (4-5) 
(-1.96) (-2.44) "R2 = 0.40 
The signs of all variables are as expected. The t values as shown in 
parentheses below the coefficients are significant at the five percent level. 
These results show the null hypothesis of test 1 is rejected, that is, B1 # 0. For 
Test 2 the F statistic is 0.56 and is not significant at the 5 percent probability 
level. Therefore, the null hypothesis B1 = B2 is not rejected. Results of the 
hypothesis testing indicate that consumers more likely respond to "average 
price". Thus, the appropriate water demand model is specified as: 
Q =f(AP, S) (4-6) 
where AP is average price and S is a vector of other socio-economic variables. 
Empirical Water Demand Models and Results 
Evaluation of STRWS in this study requires estimation of rural water 
demand by (1) season and (2) season, income level, and locational preference 
as shown in Figure 14. The models specified for water demand estimation are 
the following: 
Modell 
Oit = Bo + B1 APit + B2 FAMSi + B3 YDit + B4 NRSi 
+ Bs MILEi + Bs DM1 + B7APD + Sit 
Model II 
Oit = Bo + B1 APit + B2 FAMSi + B3 YDit + B4 NRSi 
+ Bs MILEi + Bs DM1 + B7 INDP + Ba INDM + B9 LPD 
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Oit = the quantity of water (1 ,000 gal.) consumption by household i 
in month t. 
APit = average price ($) per 1,000 gallons of water for household i in 
month t. 
FAMSi = family size (number of persons) in household i. 
YDit = monthly income ($1 ,000} of household i in month t and is equal 
to annual household income divided by 12 less Nordin's 
difference variable or rate premium in month t. 
NASi = percentage (%) of nonhousehold water from alternative 
sources for household i. 
MILEi = distance (miles} from residence to work place in household i. 
DM1 = dummy variable for season where 
DM1 = 1 if (January-June, October-December} 
DM1 = 0 if (July-September) 
INDP = dummy variable for poverty family household income group 
INDP = 1 if annual household income is less than or equal to 
$7,938. 
INDP = 0 if other. 
JNDM = dummy variable for median family household income group 
INDM = 1 if annual household income is greater than $7,938 
but less than or equal to $25,701. 
INDM = 0 if other. 
LPD = dummy variable for locational preference. 
LPD = 1 if the residents express locational preference. 
LPD = 0 otherwise. 
APD = AP * DM1 
APYP = AP * INDP 
APYM = AP * INDM 
APL = AP * LPD 
91 
Seasonality identification on rural water demand in Oklahoma was 
obtained from Dellenbarger, Kang, and Schreiner (1986). Data on locational 
preference were obtained by asking rural households about their settlement 
motivation (desire for rural living). Locational preference is thus expressed by a 
dummy variable. Dummy variables were also used to distinguish water 
demand behavior of different household income groups; poverty income level 
(less than $7,938), median income level (greater than $7,938 but less than 
$25,701 ), and high income level (greater than $25,701) for the year 1983. The 
poverty income level is reported by the U.S. Department of Commerce and is 
based on Social Security Administration poverty index of 1964 and revised by 
Federal Interagency Committee in 1969 and 1980 (U.S. Department of 
Commerce, 1984). 
The two estimated water demand equations using OLS are shown in Table 
I. In Model I, the coefficients for all variables are significant at the 5% probability 
level and signs of all variables are as expected. The negative sign of MILE 
indicates that demand for water decreases as distance from residence to work 
place increases thus reducing net locational income. Adjusted R2 is 0.46. This 
equation gives two seasonal water demands as presented in Table II. 
Structural stability test for the equivalence of intercept and slope for the two 
seasons gives F statistic of 30.09 which is significant at the 5 percent probability 
level, indicating difference between the two seasons in intercept and slope. 
Price elasticities for the two seasons are calculated for Modell and presented in 
Table Ill. Because these are linear demand functions, the point 
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TABLE I 
ESTIMATED WATER DEMAND FOR RURAL COMMUNITIES 





Variable Mean Values and t Values Mean Values 
Regression 
Coefficient 






































































aMean of dependent variable Q was 7,394 gallons for Model I and 7,579 
gallons for Model II. 
bThe difference in sample size is due to missing data on locational 
preference. 
TABLE II 
ESTIMATED MONTHLY WATER DEMAND BY SEASON AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC GROUP FOR RURAL 
COMMUNITIES IN OKLAHOMA, 1983 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Variable Intercept AP FAMS YD NRS MILE 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MODEL I 
Off-Peak Season (OPS) 3.261 -1.172 1.587 1.468 -0.010 -0.057 




Poverty Income (OLP) 0.725 -0.316 1.166 1.852 0.003 -0.065 
Middle Income (OLM) 1.746 -0.626 1.166 1.852 0.003 -0.065 
High Income (OLH) 7.589 -3.015 1.166 1.852 0.003 -0.065 
Non-Locational Preference 
Poverty Income (ONP) 5.617 -1.672 1.166 1.852 0.003 -0.065 
Middle Income (ONM) 6.638 -1.982 1.166 1.852 0.003 -0.065 
High Income (ONH) 12.481 -4.371 1.166 1.852 0.003 -0.065 
Peak Season 
Locational Preference 
Poverty Income (PLP) 7.573 -1.599 1.166 1.852 0.003 -0.065 
Middle Income (PLM) 8.594 -1.909 1.166 1.852 0.003 -0.065 
High Income (PLH) 14.437 -4.298 1.166 1.852 0.003 -0.065 
Non-Locational Preference 
Poverty Income (PNP) 12.465 -2.955 1.166 1.852 0.003 -0.065 
Middle Income (PNM) 13.486 -3.265 1.166 1.852 0 003 -0.065 
High Income (PNH) 19.329 -5.564 1.166 1.852 0.003 -0.065 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SOURCE: Based on Table I. <.0 w 
TABLE III 
PRICE ELASTICITIES OF WATER DEMAND BY SEASON AND HOUSEHOLD GROUP FOR RURAL COMMUNITIES 
IN OKLAHOMA, 1983a 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mean Mean Mean Mean Quantity 
Quantity for All Price for All Quantity for Each and Mean Price 
Households Households Season for for Each Season 
and All Seasons and All Seasons All Households and Each Group 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MODEL I 
Off-Peak Season (OPS) -0.47 -0.74 -0.78 -0.78 
(6,767) (3.605) (5,587) (5,587) 
Peak Season (PS) -1.56 -1.24 -0.91 -0.91 




Poverty Income (OLP) b -0.38 b -0.26 
(6,767) (3.605) (5,587) (3,311) 
Middle Income (OLM) -0.06 -0.46 -0.28 -0.35 
(6,767) (3.605) (5,587) (5,311) 
High Income (OLH) -1.54 -1.72 -2.08 -1.87 
(6,767) (3.605) (5,587) (5,988) 
Non-Locational Preference 
Poverty Income (ONP) -0.31 -2.12 -0.59 -0.73 
(6,767) (3.605) (5,587) (5, 142) 
Middle Income (ONM) -0.92 -1.22 -1.32 -1.25 
(6,767) (3.605) (5,587) (5,784) 
High Income (ONH) -2.27 -2.47 -2.96 -1.48 
(6,767) (3.605) (5,587) (8,938) c.o .p. 
Off-Peak Season 
Locational Preference 
Poverty Income (PLP) 
Middle Income (PLM) 
High Income (PLH) 
Non-Locational Preference 
Poverty Income (PNP) 
Middle Income (PNM) 
High Income (PNH) 
TABLE III (Continued) 
Mean 
Quantity for All 
Households 
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aNumbers in the parenthesis indicate the points where elasticities are measured. 
Mean Quantity 
and Mean Price 
for Each Season 

















elasticities vary depending on quantity of water demanded (see Figure 15). The 
elasticity in off-peak season as estimated at the overall monthly mean of water 
consumption for all households is -0.47 versus -1.56 in peak season. The 
elasticities at overall average price is -0.74 in off-peak season and -1.24 in peak 
season. However, when calculated at the mean seasonal quantity and price 
the elasticities are -0.78 for off-peak season and -0.91 for peak season. 
In Model II (Table I) coefficients of all variables are significant at the 5 
percent probability level except NRS and signs of all variables other than NRS 
are as expected. Adjusted R2 is 0.50. Seasonal water demands by household 
income level and locational preference are presented in Table II. Price 
elasticities by the household group are presented in Table Ill. Structural 
stability test for the equivalence of intercept and slope across household groups 
gives F statistic of 2.04 which is significant at the 5 percent probability level, 
indicating difference in intercept and slope between household groups. 
Elasticities are calculated for the following quantities and prices: mean monthly 
water consumption for all households, mean price for all households and all 
seasons, mean monthy water consumption by season for all households, and 
mean monthly water consumption and mean price for each group. 
Although price elasticities vary depending on quantity of water demanded, 
in general, low income groups are less price elastic than high income groups. 
This is consistent with low income groups being at water consumption levels 
closer to the basic requirement. Groups with locational preference are less 
price elastic than groups with no locational preference. The reasoning is that 
groups with locational preference are compensated by net locational income for 
the loss due to a change in price. Peak season water demand is more price 
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Figure 15. Water Demand by Season and Computed Price Elasticities 
for Rural Communities in Oklahoma, 1983. 
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such as rainfall and temperature on water demand for the 1983 period in 
Oklahoma may be different from that for other years. 
Computed elasticities for some groups in Table Ill should be interpreted 
with care since the implied quantity and price data may extend beyond the 
observed data for such groups. 
Summary 
This Chapter discussed water demand for rural communities in Oklahoma. 
Major theoretical issues influencing water demand and water demand 
estimation were reviewed. Average price was selected as the appropriate price 
variable using Opaluch's test. 
Water demand functions by season, income level, and locational 
preference were estimated. These demand functions are used for cost-benefit 
analysis in Chapter V. 
CHAPTERV 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS OF PUBLIC SUBSIDY 
TO RURAL WATER SYSTEMS IN OKLAHOMA 
This Chapter discusses empirical results of the analysis of public subsidies 
to rural water systems in Oklahoma. The cost of public subsidies are calculated 
on an annual basis per thousand gallons of water supply and per household 
served. Marginal Social Benefit-Cost Ratios (MSBCR) of public subsidy to rural 
water systems (STRWS) are calculated under the conventional and non-
conventional approaches and under conditions of seasonality of water demand, 
income level of rural households, and settlement motivation. Subsidy 
distribution among income groups of rural households are analyzed. 
Sample Description of Rural Water Systems in Oklahoma 
Sample Survey Data 
The Department of Agricultural Economics at Oklahoma State University in 
1984 carried out a random sample of rural water systems in Oklahoma and of 
rural households within those systems. Those data were used in Chapter IV to 
estimate rural community water demand. A complementary survey of 11 
systems used in the demand estimation was conducted in 1987 to collect data 
on subsidies received by the rural water systems through the Farmers Home 
Administration (FmHA) or other public agencies. The 11 systems represent all 
of the FmHA district offices except district 2 (see Appendix A). Data on 
subsidies (grants and low interest loans) administered by the FmHA were 
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collected from the permanent records of the district offices. Data on subsidies 
provided by agencies other than the FmHA were collected from the individual 
rural water system. Survey questionnaires and cover letters are shown in the 
Appendix. 
Characteristics of the Sample of Rural Water Systems 
The sample of rural water systems were mostly incorporated from 1950 to 
1970 (Table IV). The oldest rural water system was incorporated in 1924 and 
the latest was incorporated in 1974. The number of connections varied widely. 
The smallest had 110 connections and the largest had 2,938. The miles of 
distribution lines varied from 5 to 380 with two systems not reporting. Water 
supplied (amount billed to household customers) on an annual basis ranged 
from 6,055 thousand gallons to 275,338 thousand gallons. All systems priced 
water using a decreasing block rate schedule. 
Grants and Loans Received by System 
Public subsidies to the sample of rural water systems included grants and 
long-term low interest loans (Table V). All of the systems surveyed received low 
interest long-term loans and all but four received grants. 
Grants were provided in lump sum payment and were used for initial 
construction of facilities, capacity expansion, and/or renovation of existing 
system. The major source of grants was FmHA although DECA (Department of 
Economic and Community Affairs) and RedArk (RedArk Development Authority) 
each made one grant. Six systems received more than one grant. 
Loans were provided for the same purposes as were the grants. All of the 
loans were exclusively supplied from FmHA. Nine systems received more than 




CHARACTERISTIC DATA OF SAMPLE OF RURAL 
WATER SYSTEMS IN OKLAHOMA 
Year Number of Miles of 
Incorporated Connectionsa Linesb 
101 
Water 
(1 ,000 Gai.)C 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
A 1969 110 5 13,929 
8 1958 183 (1985) 16 6,055 (1985) 
c 1924 190 25 14,226 (1985) 
D 1966 132 12 6,660 (1985) 
E 1965 2,938 (1984) 275,338 
F 1969 788 93,410 
G 1959 1,219 24 84,269 
H 1970 1,041 380 87,000 
I 1966 242 8 16,654 
J 1962 275 10 62,750 
K 1974 370 76 29,800 
AVERAGE 680 61 62,735 
aoata are for 1983 to correspond with earlier survey unless otherwise 
noted. 
bTwo systems were unable to estimate the miles of distribution lines. 
CAmount of water billed to rural households in 1983 unless otherwise 
noted. 
TABLE V 
GRANTS AND LOANS PROVIDED SAMPLE OF RURAL WATER SYSTEMS IN OKLAHOMA 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Interest Long-term 
System Year Grant (G) Amount Rate Treasury 
Code Granted or Loan (L) ($) Purposea Source of Loan Bond Rate 
(%) (%) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
A 1969 L 110,000 1 FmHA 5.000 6.10 
B 1967 L 40,000 1 FmHA 4.000 4.85 
1980 L 190,000 2 FmHA 5.000 10.81 
c 1968 G 29,930 3 DECA - 5.26 
1968 L 100,000 3 FmHA 4.125 5.26 
1983 L 100,000 3 FmHA 5.000 11.18 
1983 G 83,222 2 DECA - 11.18 
D 1967 G 37,280 1 FmHA - 4.85 
1971 G 60,000 2 FmHA - 6.12 
1979 G 23,700 2 FmHA - 9.29 
1967 L 83,720 1 FmHA 3.750 4.85 
1971 L 15,000 2 FmHA 5.000 6.12 
1979 L 23,700 2 FmHA 5.000 9.29 
E 1965 L 833,840 1 FmHA 3.950 4.21 
1972 L 155,000 2 FmHA 5.000 6.01 
1982 L 5,500,000 2 FmHA 5.000 12.76 
F 1975 G 100,000 2 and3 FmHA " 8.19 
1978 G 68,500 2 FmHA " 8.49 
1971 L 870,000 1 and 2 FmHA 5.000 6.12 
1974 L 156,000 2 FmHA 5.000 8.05 
1978 L 71,500 2 FmHA 5.000 8.49 
G 1979 G 29,400 3 FmHA " 9.29 
1974 L 215,000 3 FmHA 5.000 8.05 
1979 L 29,400 3 FmHA 5.000 9.29 










































TABLE V (Continued) 
Amount 







































































a1: Initial construction of system facilities. 
2: Capacity expansion. 





of 5 percent per year. A five percent rate was dominant for the subsidized 
loans. Subsidized rate is compared with the long-term U.S. Treasury bond rate 
at the time of each loan. The latter interest rate can be presumed closer to the 
opportunity cost or social discount rate. Loans provided in the 1980s were 
more heavily subsidized than loans provided in the 1960s and the 1970s. 
Repayment period was 40 years for all loans. 
Average amount of grant per system for the 11 systems was $100,248. 
The largest grant was $309,300 and the smallest grant was $29,930, at current 
prices. As indicated earlier, four systems did not receive any grants. 
Average amount of loans per syste·m for the 11 systems was $946,696 at 
current prices. The largest amount of loans received by a system was 
$6,488,840, and the smallest amount was $67,000. 
Annualized Cost of STRWS at Opportunity Cost 
Annualized cost of public subsidy to rural water systems in Oklahoma is 
calculated in this section based on the opportunity costs of resource use. The 
annualized cost is on the basis of 1 ,000 gallons of water supplied for the year 
1983 to correspond with estimated water demand for the same year. 
Opportunity Cost of Subsidy Through Grants (SG} 
The social opportunity cost of public subsidies through grants is the 
economic sacrifice of those resources in the best alternative use. Then the 
annualized subsidy in grants provided in year y for a rural water system w 
(ASGwy} is obtained from the following: 
ASGwy = Bwy (LSGwy} (5-1) 
where 
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ASGwy= annualized cost of public subsidy in grant provide in year y to 
rural water system w, 
Bwy= 
LSGwy = 
capital recovery factor for n years with discount rate i, and 
lump sum grant provided to rural water system win year y. 
The capital recovery factor is the following: 
where 
- i(1 +i)" 
B-(1+i)"-1 (5-2) 
i = interest rate or social discount rate and is assumed equal to the long-term 
U.S. Treasury bond rate at the time of the grant, and 
n = number of years of expected life of the asset purchased with the grant and 
is assumed equal to 40, the repayment period of FmHA loans. 
The average annualized cost of public subsidy provided through grants 
per thousand gallons of water supplied for the sample of 11 rural water systems 
(MASG) is the following: 
11 
L Bwy * LSGwy 




where Ow = the water supplied by rural water system w in 1983 and is taken as 
the amount of water actually billed to rural household customers. 
The average annualized cost of public subsidy through grants per 
household of the sample of rural water systems (HASG) is the following: 
11 







where Nw =the number of households within rural water system w. 
The annualized cost of public subsidy through grants is shown in Table VI. 
The average amount of grants provided to the sample of 11 rural water systems 
was $1 00,248 at current prices, including the systems not receiving grants. The 
largest amount of grants received by a sample system was $309,300. The 
average amount of annualized grant subsidies was $9,948 with the largest 
amount for a single system of $40,123. The average amount of grant subsidy 
per 1 000 gallons was $0.16 with the largest grant subsidy per thousand gallons 
of $1.27 for a single system. The average amount of annual grant subvsidy per 
household was $14.61. The highest grant subsidy per rural household was 
$63.96. 
Opportunity Cost of Subsidy Through 
Low Interest Loans (SL) 
The social opportunity cost of public subsidy through low interest loans 
(SL) is the difference between the actual loan rate and the return from the best 
alternative use (social opportunity cost) of the same loan. Thus the annualized 
SL was calculated as the difference between annual repayment with social 
discount rate (assumed equal to long-term U.S. Treasury bond rate) and annual 
repayment with actual interest rate for the loan. 
The capital recovery factor with actual interest rate is the following: 
(5-5) 
where 
r =actual loan interest rate and 
n = number of years in repayment period and equal to 40. 




ANNUALIZED COST OF PUBLIC SUBSIDIES THROUGH GRANTS FOR 
SAMPLE OF RURAL WATER SYSTEMS IN OKLAHOMA 
Water 
Grant Social Capital Annual Supplied 
Year Amount Discount Recovery Subsidy Per . in 1983 
Granted ($) Rate Factor (B) Grant($) (1 ,000 gal.) 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
A - - - - - 13,929 
B - - - - - 6,055 
c 1968 29,930. 0.0526 0.0604 1,806.79 14,226 
1983 83,222 0.1118 0.1134 9,440.34 
D 1967 37,280 0.0485 0.0571 2,128.17 6,660 
1971 60,000 0.0612 0.0675 4,048.16 
1979 23,700 0.0929 0.0956 2,266.62 
E - - - - - 275,338 
F 1975 100,000 0.0819 0.0856 8,557.15 93,410 
1978 68,500 0.0849 0.0883 6,047.93 
G 1979 29,400 0.0929 0.0956 2,811.75 84,269 
1973 150,000 0.0712 0.0761 11,408.46 
H 1981 309,300 0.1287 0.1297 40,123.32 87,000 
I - - - - - 16,654 
J 1972 22,400 0.0601 0.0665 1,490.62 62,750 
1977 34,000 0.0775 0.0816 2,775.15 
K 1979 105,000 0.0929 0.0956 10,041.98 29,800 
1981 50,000 0.1287 0.1297 6,486.15 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total 1,102,732 109,432.58 690,091 




TABLE VI (Continued) 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Annual Total Total Annual 
Subsidy Annual Annual Subsidy 
Per1000 Number of Subsidy Per Subsidy Per1000 
System Year Gal. Per Households Household Per Gal. ($) 
Code Granted Grant($) in 1983 ($) System($) Per System 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
A - - 110 
B - - 183 
c 1968 0.13 190 59.20 11,247.13 0.79 
1983 0.66 
D 1967 0.32 132 63.96 8,442.94 1.27 
1971 0.61 
1979 0.34 
E - - 2,938 
F 1975 0.09 788 18.53 14,605.08 0.16 
1978 0.06 
G 1979 0.03 1,219 11.67 14,220.21 0.17 
1973 0.14 
H 1981 0.46 1,041 38.54 40,123.32 0.46 
I - - 242 
J 1972 0.02 275 15.51 4,265.77 0.07 
1977 0.04 
K 1979 0.34 370 44.67 16,528.13 0.55 
1981 0.22 
Total 7,488 109,432.58 









where LSLwy is lump sum loan provided to rural water system w in year y and 
other notations are as previously specified. 
Then the average annualized SL per thousand gallons of water supplied 
for the sample of rural water systems (MASL) is 
11 
L ( Bwy- CJ.wy)* LSLwy 
MASL = .;.;.w-=1;...._--1-1------ * 1 ,000 gallons 
:LOw 
W=1 
where Ow is the water supplied by system w in 1983. 
(5-7) 
Similarly, the average annualized SL per rural household for the sample 
(HASG) is: 
11 
L (Bwy- Lwy) * LSLwy 




where Nw is the number of households in system w for year 1983. The 
calculated subsidies are as shown in Table VII. 
The average amount of loan provided the sample of rural water systems 
was $946,696 at current prices. The largest loan was for $5,500,000 and the 
smallest loan was $15,000 at current prices. However, the largest amount of 
total loans to a system was $6,488,840 and the smallest amount of total loans to 
a system was $67,000. The average annual subsidy per loan was $17,852 with 
the largest subsidy equal to $387,072 and the smallest subsidy equal to $138. 
The total average annual subsidy per system was $42,196 with the largest 
TABLE VII 
ANNUALIZED COST OF PUBLIC SUBSIDIES THROUGH LOANS FOR SAMPLE OF 
RURAL WATER SYSTEMS IN OKLAHOMA 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Loan Capital Social Capital Water Supplied 
System Year Loan Interest Recovery Discount Recovery in 1983 
Code Obtained Amount($) Rate Factor (a) Rate Factor (B) (1 ,000 gal.) 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
A 1969 110,000 0.05000 0.0583 0.0610 0.0673 13,929 
B 1967 40,000 0.04000 0.0505 0.0485 0.0571 6,055 
1980 190,000 0.05000 0.0583 0.1081 0.1099 
c 1968 102,000 0.04125 0.0515 0.0526 0.0604 14,226 
1983 100,000 0.05000 0.0583 0.1118 0.1134 
D 1967 83,720 0.03750 0.0487 0.0485 0.0571 6,660 
1971 15,000 0.05000 0.0583 0.0612 0.0675 
1979 23,700 0.05000 11 0.0583 0.0929 0.0956 
E 1965 833,840 0.03950 0.0501 0.0421 0.0521 275,338 
1972 155,000 0.05000 0.0583 0.0601 0.0665 
1982 5,500,000 0.05000 0.0583 0.1276 0.1287 
F 1971 870,000 0.05000 0.0583 0.0612 0.0675 93,410 
1974 156,000 0.05000 0.0583 0.0805 0.0843 
1978 71,500 0.05000 0.0583 0.0849 0.0883 
G 1974 215,000 0.05000 0.0583 0.0805 0.0843 84,269 
1979 29,400 0.05000 0.0583 0.0929 0.0956 
H 1971 1,092,000 0.05000 0.0583 0.0612 0.0675 87,000 
1975 86,000 0.05000 0.0583 0.0819 0.0856 
1981 115,200 0.05000 0.0583 0.1287 0.1297 
I 1966 67,000 0.03750 0.0487 0.0466 0.0556 16,654 
J 1967 238,000 0.03750 0.0487 0.0485 0.0571 62,750 
1972 22,400 0.05000 0.0583 0.0601 0.0665 
1976 33,900 0.05000 0.0583 0.0786 0.0826 
K 1975 120,000 0.05000 0.0583 0.0819 0.0856 29,800 
1979 106,000 0.05000 0.0583 0.0929 0.0956 
1981 38,000 0.05000 0.0583 0.1287 0.1297 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total 10,413,660 690,091 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- __.. 
Average 400,525 0.0474 0.0563 0.0778 0.0827 62,736 __.. 
0 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------




Annual Per 1,000 Number of Total Annual Total Annual Subsidy Per 
System Year Subsidy Per Gal. Per Households Subsidy Per Subsidy Per 1,000 gal. ($) 
Code Obtained Loan($) Loan($) in 1983 Household ($) System($) Per System 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
A 1969 992.51 0.071 110 9.02 992.51 0.071 
B 1967 262.50 0.043 183 55.04 10,072.71 1.664 
1980 9,810.21 1.620 
c 1968 907.81 0.064 190 33.81 6,423.56 0.452 
1983 5,515.75 0.388 
D 1967 705.47 0.106 132 13.10 1,728.76 0.260 
1971 137.87 0.021 
1979 885.43 0.133 
E 1965 1,638.49 0.006 2,938 132.74 389,992.13 1.416 
1972 1,281.41 0.005 
1982 387,072.23 1.406 
F 1971 7,996.26 0.086 788 18.02 14,203.09 0.152 
1974 4,060.91 0.043 
1978 2,145.92 0.023 
G 1974 5,596.77 0.066 1,218 5.50 6,695.15 0.079 
1979 1,098.38 0.013 
H 1971 10,036.68 0.115 1,041 19.80 20,614.35 0.237 
1975 2,347.23 0.027 
1981 8,230.45 0.095 
I 1966 464.36 0.028 242 1.92 464.36 0.028 
J 1967 2,005.52 0.032 275 10.97 3,015.38 0.048 
1972 185.18 0.003 
1976 824.68 0.013 
K 1975 3,275.20 0.110 370 26.89 9,950.23 0.334 
1979 2,960.13 0.133 
1981 2,714.90 0.091 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total 464,152.23 7,487 326.81 464,152.23 





equal to $389,992 and the smallest equal to $464. The average annual 
subsidy per thousand gallons of water supplied by the sample of systems was 
$0.67 with the highest subsidy amount equal to $1.66 per thousand gallons and 
the lowest subsidy amount equal to $0.03 per thousand gallons. The average 
annual subsidy per household from low interest loans was $61.99 per 
household with the highest subsidy equal to $132.74 and the lowest subsidy 
equal to $1.92. 
Total Annual Subsidy from STBWS 
Total annual public subsidy provided to rural water system w is the sum of 
ASGw and ASLw. Results for the sample of systems are shown in Table VIII. 
The total average annual subsidy provided to sample of rural water 
systems was $52,144 with the highest subsidy equal to $389,992 and the 
lowest subsidy equal to $464. Total average subsidy per thousand gallons of 
water supplied for the sample of the systems was $0.83 with the highest subsidy 
equal to $1.66 and the lowest subsidy equal to $0.03. Total average annual 
subsidy per household for the sample was $76.61 with the highest annual 
subsidy equal to $132.74 and the lowest annual subsidy equal to $1.92. 
MSBCR Under Conventional Approach 
Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) under the conventional approach ignores 
distributional effects of new policies or policy changes and simply measures all 
gains and losses to society regardless of to whom they accrue. This approach 
has been justified by the use of the potential compensation test as a welfare 
criterion (Chapter Ill). 
Marginal social benefit-cost ratio (MSBCR) in general measures additional 
benefits to additional costs resulting at the margin from government policies or 
TABLE VIII 
TOTAL ANNUALIZED COST OF PUBLIC SUBSIDIES FOR SAMPLE OF RURAL WATER SYSTEMS IN OKLAHOMA 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Water Total Total 
Annual Annual Total Supplied Number of Annual Annual 
System Grant Loan Annual in 1983 Households Subsidy Per Subsidy Per 
Code Subsidy ($) Subsidy ($) Subsidies ($) (1,000 Gal.) in 1983 1,000 Gal. ($) Household ($) 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
A - 992.51 992.51 13,929 110 0.07 9.02 
B - 10,072.71 10,072.71 6,055 183 1.66 55.04 
c 11,247.13 6,423.56 17,670.69 14,226 190 1.24. 93.00 
D 8,442.94 1,728.76 10,171.70 6,660 132 1.53 77.06 
E - 389,992.13 38,992.13 275,338 2,938 1.42 132.74 
F 14,605.08 14,203.09 28,808.17 93,410 788 0.31 36.56 
G 14,220.21 6,695.15 20,915.36 84,269 1,218 0.25 17.17 
H 40,123.32 20,614.35 60,737.67 87,000 1,041 0.70 58.35 
I - 464.36 464.36 16,654 242 0.03 1.92 
J 4,265.77 3,015.38 7,281.15 62,750 275 0.12 26.48 
K 16,528.13 9,950.23 26,478.36 29,800 370 0.89 71.56 
Total 109,432.58 464,152.23 573,584.81 690,091 7,487 





program. MSBCR in this study measures additional social benefits to additional 
social costs resulting from public subsidy to rural households through rural 
water systems (STRWS). The MSBCR is measured on the basis of average 
public subsidy provided rural households per thousand gallons of water 
supplied. Following the discussion presented in Chapter Ill on the analytical 
framework, social welfare analysis with the use of MSBCR is considered by 
season and by household socio-economic characteristics. 
The two seasons as defined in Chapter IV are off-peak season (OPS) and 
peak season (PS) in water demand. Households are classifed into 12 groups 
according to socio-economic characteristics. Household groups are: (1) 
poverty income level with locational preference in off-peak season (OLP), (2) 
middle income level with locational preference in off-peak season (OLM), (3) 
high income level with locational preference in off-peak season (OLH), (4) 
poverty income level with non-locational preference in off-peak season (ONP), 
(5) middle income level with noiJ_-Iocational preference in off-peak season 
(ONM), (6) high income level with non-locational preference in off-peak season 
(OHN), (7) poverty income level with locational preference in peak season 
(PLP), (8) middle income level with locational preference in peak season (PLM), 
(9) high income level with locational preference in peak season (PLH), (1 0) 
poverty income level with non-locational preference in peak season (PNP), (11) 
middle income level with non-locational preference in peak season (PNM), and 
(12) high income level with non-locational preference in peak season (PNH). 
Poverty income level is published in the National Statistical Abstract, U.S. 
Department of Commerce (1984), and includes those rural households whose 
income in 1983 is less than $7,938 annually. Middle income level includes 
those rural households with income more than $7,938 but less than $25,701 
annually. High income level includes those rural households with income more 
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than $25,701 annually. Whether a household has a locational preference or 
not was determined on the basis of the answers made by households in the 
administered survey questionnaire. Off-peak season includes January to June 
and October to December. Peak season includes July to September. The 
seasonality information was obtained from a previous study by Dellenbarger, 
Kang, and Schreiner (1986). 
Following the theoretical framework in Chapter 3, MSBCRs for seasonal 
water demand is the following: 
qj2 
0 5 (p)dQ 
qs1 
MSBCRs = ( q _ q ) p 
s2 s1 s1 
(5-9) 
where 
MSBCR5 = marginal social benefit cost ratio for subsidy to rural households in 
seasons. 
D5 (p) =monthly water demand function for rural households in seasons. 
q51 = monthly quantity of household water demand without STRWS. 
q52 = monthly quantity of household water demand with STRWS. 
Ps1 = price of water per 1 000 gallons at quantity q51. 
MSBCRs for water demand by socio-economic group is the following: 
(5-1 0) 
where 
MSBCRsi = marginal social benefit-cost ratio for subsidy to rural household 
belonging to group i in season s. 
Dsi (p) = 
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monthly water demand function for household group i in season s 
and other notations are the same as with MSBCR. 
Following the analytical framework in Chapter Ill the calculated social 
benefits and costs, and MSBCRs for different seasons and household groups 
are shown in Table IX. 
In the seasonal analysis, without public subsidy rural household off~peak 
season (OPS) monthly average water demand was 4,612 gallons and average 
price was $4.54 per thousand gallons. With public subsidy of $0.83 per 
thousand gallons, average price decreased to $3.71 and monthly water 
demand increased by 975 gallons to 5,587 gallons. Additional social benefits 
generated and additional social costs incurred to society from STRWS were 
$4.02 and $4.42, respectively, which gives a MSBCR for OPS of 0.91. Net 
additional private benefits generated was $0.40 which was obtained by 
subtracting additional private costs from additional private benefits which is the 
same with additional social benef_it_jn this analysis (see Chapter Ill). Additional 
social costs consist of $3.61 of additional private costs and $0.81 of additional 
public costs. For $0.40 of net additional private benefits $0.81 of additional 
public costs are required. Additional net social benefits generated are $-0.40 
which is the difference between additional social benefits and additional social 
costs. An average size rural water system with 680 household connections 
generates additional monthly benefits of $2,734 ($4.02*680) to society and 
incurs additional monthly costs of $3,006 ($4.42*680) to society with STRWS. 
A public subsidy of $0.83 per thousand gallons of water supplied accounts 
for 18.3 percent of average price in off-peak season and 20.8 percent of 
average price in peak season paid by rural households with public subsidy : 
Without public subsidy, rural household peak season (PS) monthly 
average water demand was 6,874 gallons and average price was $3.99 per 
TABLE IX 
SOCIAL BENEFITS AND COSTS OF PUBLIC SUBSIDY TO RURAL WATER SYSTEMS (STRWS) 
IN OKLAHOMA WITHOUT DISTRIBUTION EFFECTS 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
- - - - Marginal 
PWith QWith Total Annual P Without 0 Without ChC![Ige Marginal 
Households STRWS SRTWS Subsidy Per STRWS STRWS inO Social 
Groups ($/1,000 Gal.) (GaL/Month) 1,000 Gal. ($) ($/1,000 Gal.) (GaL/Month) (GaL/Month) Benefit($) 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Off-Peak Season (OPS) 3.71 5,587 0.83 4.54 4,612 975 4.02 
Peak Season (PS) 3.16 9,084 0.83 3.99 6,874 2,210 7.89 
Off-Peak Season 
Locational Preference 
Poverty Income (OLP) 2.88 3,311 0.83 3.71 3,049 262 0.86 
Middle Income (OLM) 3.10 5,311 0.83 3.93 4,790 521 1.83 
High Income (OLH) 3.59 5,989 0.83 4.42 4,034 1,954 7.8281 
Non-Locational Preference 
Poverty Income (ONP) 2.23 5,142 0.83 3.06 3,754 1,388 3.68 
Middle Income (ONM) 3.68 5,785 0.83 4.51 4,146 1,639 6.72 
High Income (ONH) 3.03 9,938 0.83 3.86 5,320 3,618 12.48 
Peak Season 
Locational Preference 
Poverty Income (PLP) 2.53 7,145 0.83 3.36 5,814 1,331 3.92 
Middle Income (PLM) 3.13 8,171 0.83 3.96 6,589 1,582 5.61 
High Income (PLH) 3.02 11,066 0.83 3.85 7,515 3,551 12.20 
Non-Locational Preference 
Poverty Income (PNP) 2.41 8,665 0.83 3.24 6,201 2,464 6.96 
Middle Income (PNM) 3.53 8,343 0.83 4.36 5,625 2,718 10.72 






Off-Peak Season (OPS) 
Peak Season (PS) 
Off-Peak Season 
Locational Preference 
Poverty Income (OLP) 
Middle Income (OLM) 
High Income (OLH) 
Non-Locational Preference 
Poverty Income (ONP) 
Middle Income (ONM) 
High Income (ONH) 
Peak Season 
Locational Preference 
Poverty Income (PLP) 
Middle Income (PLM) 
High Income (PLH) 
Non-Locational Preference 
Poverty Income (PNP) 
Middle Income (PNM) 
High Income (PNH) 
TABLE IX (Continued) 
Marginal Costs 
·-- ----
Private Public Social 
Cost ($) Cost ($) Cost ($) 
3.61 0.81 4.42 
6.98 1.83 8.81 
0.75 0.22 0.97 
1.62 0.43 '• 2.05 
7.01 1.62 8.63 
3.10 1.15 4.25 
6.04 1.36 7.40 
10.98 3.00 13.98 
3.37 1.11 4.48 
4.96 1.31 6.27 
10.73 2.95 13.68 
5.94 2.04 7.99 
9.59 2.26 11.85 
























































thousand gallons. With public subsidy of $0.83 per thousand gallons, average 
price decreased to $3.16 and monthly water demand increased by 2,210 
gallons to 9,084 gallons. Additional benefits generated and additional costs 
incurred to society from STRWS were $7.89 and $8.81, respectively, which 
gives a MSBCR for PS of 0.90. Net additional private benefits generated was 
$0.92. Additional social cost consists of $6.98 of additional private cost and 
$1.83 of additional public cost. For $0.92 of net additional private benefits 
$1.83 of public cost was required. Additional net social benefits generated was 
$-0.92. An average size rural water system with 680 household connections 
generates additional monthly benefits of $5,365 ($7.89*680) to society and 
incurs additional monthly costs of $5,991 (7.89*680) to society with STRWS. 
STRWS is inefficient under conventional CBA since the MSBCR is less 
than one. That is, additional costs incurred to society is more than additional 
benefits generated to society with STRWS. This result, however, was expected 
as discussed in Chapter Ill. Under__STRWS society puts too many resources in 
rural water systems. 
MSBCRs by rural household income level differ only marginally. For 
poverty income groups (OLP, ONP, PLP, and PNP) MSBCRs ranged from 0.89 
to 0.91 and for high income groups MSBCRs ranged from 0.87 to 0.91. 
However, it is noted that the groups paying higher price per thousand gallons 
showed higher MSBCRs than the groups paying lower price per thousand 
gallons. This is due to relative smallness of marginal net social benefits over 
private costs. This result indicates that since low income groups generally 
demand lower levels of water consumption and average water price is higher at 
lower water demand in decreasing block rate schedules, subsidizing lower 
income groups would be more efficient. 
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Additional public costs are higher for higher income groups than lower 
income groups. Those additional public costs for poverty income groups (OLP, 
ONP, PLP, and PNP) ranged from $0.22 to $2.04 per month. Those costs for 
middle income groups (OLM, ONM, PLM, and PNM) ranged from $0.43 to 
$2.26. The same costs for high income groups (OLH, ONH, PLH, and PNH) 
ranged from $1.62 to $3.89. STRWS pays much higher additional public costs 
for higher income groups than lower income groups. 
STRWS provides higher additional net private benefits for higher income 
groups than lower income groups. Poverty income groups obtain additional net 
monthly private benefits from a low of $0.11 (OLP) to a high of $1.02 (PNP). 
Middle income groups obtain additional net monthly private benefits from a low 
of $0.21 (OLM) to high of $1.13 (PNM). High income groups obtain additional 
net benefits from a low of $0.81 (OLH) to a high of $1.94 (PNH). 
Net social loss (additional net social benefits) was smaller for lower 
income groups than with higher Lncome groups under STRWS because of 
lower water demand. 
MSBCRs for locational preference groups are marginally different from 
MSBCRs for non-locational preference groups. Additional public costs are 
higher for non-locational preference groups than for locational preference. 
However, it is noted that substantial public costs are incurred for those groups 
with locational preference. Additional net private benefits are also higher for 
non-locational preference groups than for locational preference groups. 
Whether locational preference groups need to be subsidized at all depends on 
decision-makers. 
STRWS is inefficient as a whole under conventional CBA. The 
Cr 
conventional CBA above does not consider decision-makers objetives to be 
achieved with STRWS. 
----
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MSBCR Under Non-Conventional Approach 
CBA in non-conventional approach considers distribution of benefits 
generated from a government policy or program. In this approach a social 
objective is pursued by public decision-makers. The objective is social since it 
affects society as a whole. When decision-makers are selected by way of a 
socially approved political process they are considered to formulate objectives 
for society. Thus, the objectives duly chosen by decision-makers are 
considered consistent with Pareto improvement criterion. 
In this study the objectives of decision-makers are to reduce water 
consumption cost for low income rural households as implied in grant and loan 
instructions of the FmHA. Benefit distribution results are evaluated using 
income and consumption weights. 
MSBCR With Income Distribution Weights 
Income weights have been derived from the ratio of median household 
family income in the U.S. to the mean family income of the sample of Oklahoma 
rural household groups in 1983. That is, Wi = Y/Yi where Wi is the income 
distributional weight for a household belonging to socio-economic group i, Y is 
the national median family income of $25,707 in 1983, and Yi is the mean 
income level of the average household belonging to socio-economic group i. 
Then the weighted benefits for the average household belonging to socio-
economic group i, BYWi, becomes Wi*Bi or (Y Ni)*Bi where Bi is the unweighted 
benefits of the average household bel.onging to socio-economic group i with 
STRWS. The value judgement assumed with this weighting system is that 
decision-makers give equal weight to preferences of all household customers. 
This weighting adjusts benefits to the values consumers would place on water if 
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they had mean income and devoted the same proportion of their income to 
water consumption. 
The marginal social benefit-cost ratio from subsidizing a rural household 
belonging to group i with income weighting is expressed as: 
qi1 
Wj f Di (p)dQ 
MSBCRi = -:--....;.q.:.::i2 ...... --:----
(qi2 - qi1) Pi1 
(5-11) 
where Wi denotes income distributional weight for the average household 
belonging to socio-economic group i, Di (p) is water demand function for 
household group i, and other notations are the same as specified in the 
conventional CBA approach. 
The weighted benefits and MSBCRs for the sample of Oklahoma rural 
households by season and for different socio-economic groups are presented 
in Table X. MSBCRs weighted by income were 1.001 for the off-peak season 
and 0.985 for the peak season. Thus STRWS is marginally efficient in OPS and 
marginally inefficient in PS when income weights are used under non-
conventional CBA. An important result is that STRWS is less efficient during 
peak season when there is more discretionary water demand and more efficient 
during off-peak season when water demand is more related to basic 
requirements. 
MSBCRs were higher for lower income groups than higher income groups. 
MSBCRs for poverty level income groups ranged from 3.41 to 3.45. MSBCRs 
for middle income level groups ranged from 1.12 to 1.33. Subsidizing rural 
households belonging to these income groups under income weighting is 
efficient, especially the poverty income groups. Subsidizing high income level 
groups is quite inefficient with MSBCRs ranging from 0.49 and 0.53. 
TABLE X 
SOCIAL BENEFITS AND COSTS OF PUBLIC SUBSIDY TO RURAL WATER SYSTEMS (STRWS) 
IN OKLAHOMA USING INCOME DISTRIBUTION WEIGHTS 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Household Weighted 
Unweighted Mean Social MSBCR 
Social Social Unweighted Income Income Benefits Weighted 
Household Group Benefit ($) Cost($) MSBCR ($) Weight ($) by Income 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Off-Peak Season (OPS) 4.02 4.42 0.9095 22,452 1.1002 4.42 1.0006 
Peak Season (PS) 7.89 8.81 0.8956 22,452 1.1002 8.68 0.9853 
Off-Peak Season 
Locational Preference 
Poverty Income (OLP) 0.86 0.97 0.8866 6,346 3.8924 3.35 3.4510 
Middle Income (OLM) 1.83 2.05 0.8927 16,565 1.4912 2.73 1.3311 
High Income (OLH) 7.82 8.63 0.9061 45,416 0.5439 4.25 0.4928 
Non-Locational Preference 
Poverty Income (ONP) 3.68 4.25 0.8659 6,250 3.9522 14.54 3.4221 
Middle Income (ONM) 6.72 7.40 0.9081 20,000 1.2351 8.30 1.1216 
High Income (ONH) 12.48 13.98 0.8927 41,944 0.5889 7.35 0.5257 
Peak Season 
Locational Preference 
Poverty Income ( PLP) 3.92 4.48 0.8750 6,346 3.8924 15.26 3.4058 
Middle Income (PLM) 5.61 6.27 0.8947 16,565 1.4912 8.37 1.3342 
High Income (PLH) 12.20 13.68 0.8918 45,416 0.5439 6.64 0.4850 
Non-Locational Preference 
Poverty Income (PNP) 6.96 7.99 0.8711 6,250 3.9522 27.51 3.4427 
Middle Income (PNM) 10.72 11.85 0.9046 20,000 1.2351 13.24 1.1173 
High Income (PNH) 13.10 15.05 0.8704 41,944 0.5889 7.71 0.5126 ....... ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 1\.) 
w 
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MSBCRs for locational preference are only marginally different from 
MSBCRs for non-locational preference. Poverty income group OLP has a 
marginally higher MSBCR than ONP which may indicate more justification for 
subsidy to poverty income groups if they choose rural location on the basis of 
lower cost of living. For locational preference high income groups' (OLH and 
PLH) MSBCRs are marginally lower than for non-locational preference high 
income groups (ONH and PNH). This would further indicate less of a need to 
subsidize high income groups if they choose rural location on the basis of 
psychic income. 
Little difference occurs between MSBCRs of different socio-economic 
groups for peak and off-peak seasons. However, in general, the off-peak 
season has marginally higher MSBCRs indicating less of a need to subsidize 
discretionary water consumption during the peak season. 
In general, weighted marginal social benefits for lower income groups 
were substantially higher than '!"~ighted marginal social benefits for higher 
income groups. The exceptions are OLP and OLM for which the weighted 
marginal social benefits are very low relative to that of OLH. The highest 
income weighted marginal social benefit was for group PNP and equalled 
$27.51. The lowest income weighted marginal social benefit was for group 
OLM and equalled $2. 73. In general, income weighted benefits were higher for 
lower income groups than for higher income groups, and they were higher for 
with non-locational preference groups. 
In summary, the MSBCR weighted by income was greater than1.0 for OPS 
but less than 1.0 for PS. For rural household groups, the poverty income and 
middle income groups had MSBCRs greater than 1.0 but the high income 
groups had MSBCRs less than 1.0 and about 0.5. Under income weighting, 
subsidizing lower income groups is socially more efficient than subsidizing 
125 
higher income groups. Similarly, subsidizing off-peak seasonal demand and 
locational preference for poverty and middle income groups is more socially 
efficient than subsidizing peak seasonal demand and locational preference for 
high income groups. 
MSBCR with Consumption Distribution Weights 
This weighting system is based on the assumption that the marginal utility 
of consumption to a consumer decreases as the level of consumption 
increases. As discussed in Chapter Ill consumption distribution weight is 
expressed as Si = (C/Ci)r where Si is consumption weight, C is a reference level 
of water consumption, Ci is the level of water consumption for rural household 
group i and r is a parameter of the utility function. This is based on the 
assumption that the marginal utility of water consumption to a consumer 
decreases as the level of water consumption increases over a reference level 
that may be associated with a basic requirements consumption level. The 
weight Si changes both with different value of r and with different water 
consumption level of a household Ci. 
The national average monthly water consumption of rural households in 
1978 was reported at 6,518 gallons for a three person household (Francis, 
1983). It was estimated at 6,636 gallons in 1980 (Solley, Chase, and Mann, 
1983). The sample survey completed by the Department of Agricultural 
Economics at Oklahoma State University in 1984 gave the monthly water 
consumption at 6, 767 gallons for 1983. It was 5,587 gallons in off-peak season 
and 9,084 gallons in peak season. 
The parameter of the utility function, r, was used parametically. When r is 
zero additional water consumption is considered equally valuable regardless of 
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the existing level of water consumption. As r is increased the household with 
lower rate consumption level is weighted more heavily than the household with 
higher water consumption level. For most policy makers, r ranges from 0 to 2, 
centering around 1 (Squire and Van der Tak, 1984). 
Social benefits weighted by consumption becomes Si*Bi or (C/C)r * Bi 
where Bi is the unweighted marginal social benefits from STRWS for the 
average household belonging to socio-economic group i. The marginal social 
benefit-cost ratio for household group i with consumption weighting is: 
qi1 
ei f Dj{p)dQ 
MSBCRi = -:---q~i2=-----::-­
(qi2 - qi1) Pi1 
(5-12) 
where Si denotes consumption distribution weight for the average household 
belonging to socio-economic group i, Di (p) is water demand function for the 
average household belonging to socio-economic group i, and other notations 
are the same as specified in the conventional CBA. The weighted benefits and 
MSBCRs by season and for the different household groups are presented in 
Table XI. 
MSBCRs of OPS and PS remain the same as in unweighted MSBCRs 
since average water consumption for the sample of Oklahoma households does 
not differ significantly from the U.S. average. When r is 0.5, subsidizing water 
only of group OLP is efficient with a MSBCR of 1.15. Subsidizing all other 
household groups is inefficient with group PNH giving the lowest MSBCR of 
0.67. With r increased to 1, subsidizing OLP and PLP is efficient. As r increases 
further to 1.5, subsidizing PLM and PNM also becomes efficient. When r is 2.0 
subsidizing ONP becomes efficient and OLM has a MSBCR close to 1. 
TABLE XI 
SOCIAL BENEFITS AND COSTS OF PUBLIC SUBSIDY TO RURAL WATER SYSTEMS (STRWS) 
IN OKLAHOMA USING CONSUMPTION DISTRIBUTION WEIGHTS 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Weighted Weighted 
Unweighted Household Marginal Marginal 
Marginal Marginal Mean Social Social 
Household Social Social Unweighted Consumption Benefits Benefits 
Groups Benefit($) Cost($) MSBCR (Gai./Month) (r=0.5) (r=1.0) 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Off-Peak Season (OPS) 4.02 4.42 0.9095 5,587 4.02 4.02 
Peak Season (PS) 7.89 8.81 0.8956 9,084 7.89 7.89 
Off-Peak Season 
Locational Preference 
Poverty Income (OLP) 0.86 0.97 0.8866 3,311 1.12 1.45 
Middle Income (OLM) 1.83 2.05 0.8927 5,311 1.88 1.93 
High Income (OLH) 7.82 8.63 0.9061 5,988 7.55 7.30 
Non-Locational Preference 
Poverty Income (ONP) 3.68 4.25 0.8659 5,142 3.84 4.00 
Middle Income (ONM) 6.72 7.40 0.9081 5,785 6.60 6.49 
High Income (ONH) 12.48 13.98 0.8927 8,938 9.87 7.80 
Peak Season 
Locational Preference 
Poverty Income (PLP) 3.92 4.48 0.8750 7,145 4.42 4.98 
Middle Income (PLM) 5.61 6.27 0.8947 8,171 5.92 6.24 
High Income (PLH) 12.20 13.68 0.8918 11,066 11.05 10.01 
Non-Locational Preference 
Poverty Income (PNP) 6.96 7.99 0.8711 8,665 7.13 7.30 
Middle Income (PNM) 10.72 11.85 0.9046 8,343 11.19 11.67 




TABLE XI (Continued) 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Weighted Weighted 
Marginal Marginal MSBCR MSBCR MSBCR MSBCR 
Social Social Weighted by Weighted by Weighted by Weighted by 
Household Benefits Benefits Consumption Consumption Consumption Consumption 
Groups (r=1.5) (r=2.0) (r=.05) (r=1.0) (r=1.5) (r=2.0) 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Off-Peak Season (OPS) 4.02 4.02 0.90956 0.9095 0.9095 0.9095 
Peak Season (PS) 7.89 7.89 0.8956 0.8956 0.8956 0.8956 
Off-Peak Season 
Locational Preference 
Poverty Income (OLP) 1.89 2.45 '• 1.1517 1.4961 1.9434 2.5244 
Middle Income (OLM) 1.97 2.03 0.9156 0.9391 0.9632 0.9879 
High Income (OLH) 7.05 6.81 0.8753 0.8455 0.8167 0.7888 
Non-Locational Preference 
Poverty Income (ONP) 4.17 4.34 0.9026 0.9408 0.9807 1.0222 
Middle Income (ONM) 6.38 6.27 0.8924 0.8770 0.8619 0.8470 
High Income (ONH) 6.17 4.88 0.7058 0.5580 0.4412 0.3488 
Peak Season 
Locational Preference 
Poverty Income (PLP) 5.62 6.34 0.9866 1.1125 1.2544 1.4144 
Middle Income (PLM) 6.58 6.93 0.9434 0.9947 1.0488 1.1059 
High Income (PLH) 9.07 8.22 0.8080 0.7321 0.6633 0.6010 
Non-Locational Preference 
Poverty Income (PNP) 7.47 7.65 0.8919 0.9132 0.9350 0.9574 
Middle Income (PNM) 12.18 12.71 0.9449 0.9850 1.0278 1.0725 





However, subsidizing ONH and PNH is very inefficient and gives MSBCRs of 
0.35 and 0.31. 
In general, regardless of the size of r, subsidizing the lower income groups 
gives higher MSBCRs than subsidizing higher income groups and subsidizing 
groups with locational preference gives higher MSBCR than subsidizing groups 
with non-locational preference. However, the absolute magnitude of social 
benefits generated with STRWS was larger when subsidizing the groups with 
non-locational preference than subsidizing the groups with locational 
preference. These results are due to lower water consumption levels by groups 
with locational preference than by groups with non-locational preference. 
In summary, when r is 1 which is generally considered reasonable by 
government policy makers, only subsidizing OLP and PLP is efficient. However, 
MSBCRs for PLM and PNM are close to 1, and those for OLM, ONP and PNP 
are above 0.9. Finally, MSBCRs for ONH and PNH are low and only around 
0.5. 
Subsidy Distribution by Socio-Economic Group 
This approach is based on the assumption that decision makers wish to 
have information on how subsidies are currently distributed to target groups so 
that policy may be used to improve efficiency in use of the subsidy program in 
attaining policy objectives. Policy objectives of STRWS were identified in 
Chapter I as to reduce water use cost of low income rural households which are 
considered as target groups. Target groups are identified by income level and 
settlement motivation or preference for location as discussed in Chapter IV. 
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Following the analytical framework of Chapter Ill using average price 
rather than block rate, and assuming a linear demand function the amount of 
subsidy paid to a rural household belongoing to socio-economic group i is the : 
Si = qi1 * (p i1 - Pi2) + 0.5 * (qi2 - qi1) * (Pi1 - Pi2) (5-13) 
where 
Si = total amount of subsidy paid to a rural household belonging to group i. 
qi1 = quantity of water demand without subsidy for a rural household 
belonging to group i. 
qi2 = quantity of water demand with subsidy for a rural household belonging to 
group i. 
p i1 = price of water per thousand gallons at consumption level qi1· 
Pi2 = price of water per thousand gallons with subsidy and results in 
consumption qi2· 
The subsidy distributions by rural household groups are presented in 
Table XII. In off-peak season average monthly subsidy per househjold is $4.23 
and in peak season average monthly subsidy per household is $6.62 for an 
annual subidy of $57.93. Among the different household groups OLP received 
the lowest monthly subsidy of $2.64 and PNH received the highest monthly 
subsidy of $10.76. Subsidy amounts were higher in peak season than in off-
peak season and were higher for non-locational preference than for locational 
preference except in the case of middle rncome groups. 
Subsidy cost is greater than equation (5-13) by the amount 0.5*(qi2- qi1) * 
(Pi1 - Pi2) since this represents welfare loss from STRWS. Monthly subsidy cost 
per rural household in off-peak season is $4.64 and in peak season is $7.54 for 
a total annual cost of $64.38. The lowest montly subsidy cost is $2.75 for OLP 
and the highest monthly subsidy cost is $12.71 for PNH. 
TABLE XII 
SUBSIDY DISTRIBUTION AMONG RURAL HOUSEHOLD GROUPS IN OKLAHOMA 
- - - Subsidy Subsidy 
Q W~h PWith P Without Q Without Distribution Cost Per 
Household STRWS SRTWS Subsidy Per STRWS STRWS Per Household Household 
Group (GaL/Month) ($/1 ,000 Gal.) 1 ,000 Gal. ($) ($/1 ,000 Gal.) (GaL/Month) ($) ($) 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Off-Peak Season (OPS) 5,587 3.71 0.83 4.54 4,612 4.23 4.64 
Peak Season (PS) 9,084 3.16 0.83 3.99 6,874 6.62 7.54 
Off-Peak Season 
Locational Preference 
Poverty Income (OLP) 3,311 2.88 0.83. 3.71 3,049 2.64 2.75 
Middle Income (OLM) 5,311 3.10 ., 0.83 3.93 4,790 4.19 4.41 
High Income (OLH) 5,988 3.59 0.83 4.42 4,034 4.16 4.97 
Non-Locational Preference 
Poverty Income (ONP) 5,142 2.23 0.83 3.06 3,754 3.69 4.27 
Middle Income (ONM) 5,785 3.68 0.83 4.51 4,146 4.12 4.80 
High Income (OLH) 8,938 3.03 0.83 3.86 5,320 5.92 7.42 
Peak Season 
Locational Preference 
Poverty Income (PLP) 7,145 2.53 0.83 3.36 5,814 5.38 5.93 
Middle Income (PLM) 8,171 3.13 0.83 3.96 6,589 6.13 6.78 
High Income (PLH) 11,066 3.02 0.83 3.85 7,515 7.71 9.18 
Non-Locational Preference 
Poverty Income (PNP) 8,665 2.41 0.83 3.24 6,201 6.17 7.19 
Middle Income (PNM) 8,343 3.53 0.83 4.36 5,625 5.80 6.92 





In general, public subsidies in absolute amount are more heavily 
distributed to higher income groups and groups with non-locational preference. 
Summary 
In this Chapter social welfare implications of public subsidies to rural water 
systems (STRWS) in Oklahoma have been analyzed with the use of marginal 
social cost benefit analysis and subsidy distribution among different rural 
household groups. 
Public subsidy for a sample of 11 rural systems in Oklahoma in 1983 
averaged $0.83 per thousand gallons of water supplied which accounts for 18.3 
percent of average price in off-peak season and 20.8 percent of average price 
in peak season paid by rural households with public subsidy. Total average 
annual subsidy per household was $76.61. 
Under conventional CBA, STRWS turned out to be inefficient. MSBCRs 
were less than 1.0 for all socio-economic household groups. MSBCRs were 
higher for the groups paying higher prices for water regardless of locational 
preference and income level. However, the differences in magnitude of 
MSBCRs were negligible. With public subsidy of $0.83 per thousand gallons, 
additional social benefits generated and additional costs incurred to society 
were $4.02 and $4.42 in off-peak season, and were $7.89 and $8.84 in peak 
season, respectively. Net additional private benefits generated was $0.40 
which required $0.81 of additional public costs in off-peak season, and was 
$0.92 which required $1.83 of additional public costs in peak season. An 
average size rural water system with 680 household connections generates 
additional monthly benefits of $2,734 with additional monthly costs of $3,006 to 
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society in off-peak season, and additional monthly benefits of $5,365 with 
additional monthly costs of $5,991 to society in peak season. 
Under non-conventional CBA, MSBCRs with income distribution weights 
are greater than 1.0 for the poverty and middle income groups, and MSBCRs 
were around 0.5 for the higher income groups; MSBCRs were higher for lower 
income level groups than for the middle income groups. MSBCRs for the 
poverty and middle income level groups with locational preference were higher 
for the groups with non-locational preference. However, the opposite was true 
for the higher income groups. 
MSBCRs with consumption distribution weights were greater than 1.0 for 
the poverty income group with locational preference in off-peak season (OLP) 
when the parameter of utility function, r, was 0.5. However, MSBCRs were 
greater than 1.0 for OLP and PLP, and MSBCRs were close to 1.0 for PLM and 
PNM when r was 1.0 which is the value frequently chosen by government policy 
makers. MSBCRs were higher for the groups with lower income, and higher 
with non-locational preference. 
In subsidy distribution monthly average subsidy paid households in off-
peak season was $4.23 and in peak season was $6.62. Higher income groups 
received higher subsidies than lower income groups, and the groups with non-
locational preference received higher subsidies than the groups with locational 
preference. However, groups with locational preference, meaning they have 
chosen to live in rural areas, received substantial subsidies for their locational 
preference choice. The high income group with non-locational preference 
received a monthly subsidy of $5.92 in off-peak season had $10.76 in peak 
season, for an annual subsidy of $85.56. 
CHAPTER VI 
ECONOMIC STRATEGIES FOR IMPROVEMENT IN PUBLIC 
SUBSIDY PROGRAMS FOR RURAL WATER SYSTEMS 
This Chapter concerns economic strategies for improvement in public 
subsidy programs for rural water systems in Oklahoma. First, efficiency criterion 
in public policy is briefly described. Second, economic strategies are discussed 
to improve efficiency of public subsidy programs. Finally, a summary of the 
Chapter is provided. 
Efficiency Criterion in Public Programs 
Efficiency in economics -is usually ~efined in terms of optimality 
conditions of resource use under norms of perfect competition (Pasour, 1981 ). 
If marginal rates of substitution between outputs or factors are the same under 
norms of perfect competition there is efficiency. However, it may be 
meaningless to define efficiency without considering goals of economic policy. 
Efficiency has meaning only when such goals have been set (Russel and 
Young, 1983). Thus, efficiency is defined as the combination of resource use 
that maximizes individual or social goals (Doll and Orazm, 1984). In this 
context, efficiency measurements require a comparison of an observed situation 
with a defined efficiency norm that is consistent with stated policy goals. 
Efficiency in public policy or programs is generally defined in terms of 
Pareto optimality as discussed in Chapter Ill. If new policy is consistent with 
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Pareto optimality the policy is considered efficient. Efficiency measurement in 
public policy is based on the comparison between social benefits generated 
and social costs incurred from the policy. If social benefits are greater than 
social costs the policy is considered efficient. CBA frequently serves as a tool 
for making comparisons. The CBA may include decision makers' value 
judgements (non-conventional approach} or may include only potential 
economic gains over costs (conventional approach}. 
Three economic strategies are discussed for efficiency improvement of 
subsidy programs: (1} productive efficiency strategy, (2} water system size 
strategy, and (3} water rate strategy. These strategies are based on the fact that 
public subsidies are transfer payments and conditional on desired results or 
actions of the recipients. That is, rural water systems and their members may be 
required to complete certain actions for the taking of public subsidy. 
Productive Efficiency Strategy 
Productive efficiency is due to allocative and technical efficiency. When 
firms equate the marginal value products of all factors to their marginal costs 
then resources are said to be used with allocative efficiency. When firms 
produce maximum possible output from a given set of inputs then resources are 
said to be used with technical efficiency. The definitions and computational 
framework for both allocative and technical efficiency were first proposed by 
Farrel (1957}. 
Fox and Hofler (1986} have measured the allocative and technical 
efficiency for rural water systems in the United States. Their findings indicate 
that 15.7 percent of actual cost is ascribed to technical inefficiency, and 27.8 
percent of actual cost is ascribed to allocative inefficiency for the average water 
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system. Thus, 43.5 percent of actual cost on average is ascribed to productive 
inefficiency in rural water system operation. Although inefficiency was not 
measured in a dynamic environment, results shed light on the extent of potential 
productive inefficiency in rural water system operation. 
Improvement of productive efficiency in rural water systems would 
improve efficiency of public subsidy programs for rural water systems as 
illustrated in the following. 
Consider a rural water system facing rural household water demand D in 
Figure 16. Suppose Ps is price of water at water consumption quantity q5 in 
current productive efficiency level with STRWS, and Pn is price of water at water 
consumption level of qn without STRWS. Suppose price is lowered by r to P1 
due to water supply cost reduction through improvement of productive efficiency 
and thus increasing water consumption to q1. 
MSBCR with STRWS before improved productive efficiency, MSBCRb, is 
measured as NSq5qn/NKq5qn. Sin)ilarly, MSBCR with STRWS after improved 
productive efficiency, MSBCRa, is measured as ASq5q1/ALq5q1. Since NSq5qn 
is equal to NAq1qn + ASq5q1 and NKq5qn is equal to NKLAq1qn + Alq5q1 with 
NKLA positive, MSBCRa is greater than MSBCRb. Thus, efficiency of STRWS 
is increased after improved productive efficiency. Also, the improved productive 
efficiency reduces subsidy requirements. 
Sources of productive inefficiency need to be identified. Guidelines on 
how to correct these sources of inefficiencies should be provided rural water 





Figure 16. The Impact of Improved Productive Efficiency 
on Social Benefits and Costs. 
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System Size Strategy 
Rural water systems show significant economies of scale (Sauerlender 
1974; Myoung, 1982; Myoung and Shreiner, 1984; Fox and Hofler, 1986). 
Average cost in operation of rural water systems falls as the size of system 
increases. Rural water systems are also characterized as natural monopoly. 
Water demand in a given market is not large enough to bring about the most 
efficient size system. 
These characteristics of rural water systems are illustrated in Figure 17. 
Suppose a rural water system faces long-run marginal cost (LMC), long-run 
average cost (LAC), and aggregate demand 01. LAC decreases as system size 
increases through all economically feasible water supply ranges. 01 meets 
LMC at the quantity level where LAC is greater than LMC. For the rural water 
system charging marginal cost price, revenue loss or negative cash flow is 
experienced equal to the amount of A1JKM1. This revenue loss may be 
compensated by public subsidy and/or by adoption of block rate schedule. As 
01 shifts upward to 02 the revenue loss per unit of water supplied decreases 
from A10- M10 to A20- M20 and compensation requirement with public subsidy 
is reduced. When 01 shifts to 03, LMC meets LAC at quantity q3 where LAC is 
at its minimum. Subsidy requirement to compensate revenue loss for rural 
water systems charging marginal cost price disappears at q3. At this demand 
level, block rate schedule is not necessary and all rural households face the 
same marginal price regardless of the amount of water they consume. Thus, 
the subsidy policy that conditions rural water systems to take actions for shifting 
01 would increase efficiency of subsidy program by reducing subsidy 





long run marginal cost 
(LMC) 
long run average cost 
(LAC) 
Quantity 
Figure 17. Economies of Size for Rural Water Systems 
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The major factors that cause shifts of rural water demand are rural 
population, household income, and existence or attraction of large volume 
water consuming industries. Changes in these factors occur over time and 
generally are beyond the control of decision makers providing public subsidy. 
One alternative to waiting for demand shifts through normal population 
and income growth is the regionalization or consolidation of rural water 
systems. Regionalization or consolidation implies combining two or more rural 
water systems into one centralized regional unit. A few case studies show 
substantial cost decrease through regionalization (Sauerlender, 1974) or 
consolidation (Goodwin and Doeksen, 1984). 
Cost decreases from consolidation occur mainly through (1) more 
efficient management (physical maintenance, financial operations, billing 
procedures), (2) elimination of duplicate services and office facilities, and (3) 
more efficient utilization of existing equipment (Goodwin and Doeksen, 1984}. 
For example, per customer opera~i~_n cost for one rural water system decreased 
by 50 percent after consolidation in the Goodwin and Doeksen study. 
The reduction of water supply cost through consolidation or 
regionalization in rural water systems would enable government to reduce 
subsidy cost or enable rural households to obtain more benefits given current 
level of public subsidy. Thus, priority in public subsidy should be considered for 
augmenting system size and perhaps through system regionalization and 
consolidation. However, potential conflicts, if any, between rural water systems 
or communities may need to be resolved. 
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Water Rate Strategy 
One policy objective in providing public subsidy to rural water systems is 
to assist target groups (low income households and rural fixed location 
residents) by reducing water use cost as implied in the FmHA grant and loan 
instructions. Thus, water rate schedules should incorporate strategies for 
improving efficiency of the subsidy program including the policy objective. 
Water rate schedule determination in rural water systems is generally 
subject to three common criteria: financial, economic, and social. Financial 
criteria emphasize revenue requirements or cost recovery. Economic criteria 
emphasize economic efficiency in resource use and social criteria emphasize 
allocation of water service benefits and costs. The social criteria include the 
policy makers' objective concerning the distribution of subsidy costs and 
benefits since rural water systems are subsidized by the public. Marginal cost 
pricing is the starting point to meet all the criteria. 
Consider a rural water system characterized with long-run marginal cost 
(LMC) and long-run average cost (LAC), and facing aggregate water demand 
(DA) in Figure 18(c). Suppose the water system serves two households with 
water demands, DL (low income) and DH (high income) in Figure 18(a) and 
18(b). Marginal cost pricing establishes water price Pm for the water system. 
Household L consumes q1 and household H consumes q2 at Pm, respectively. 
If pricing is other than Pm there will be underuse or overuse of resources and 
the economic efficiency criteria are not met. Each household faces the same 
marginal price (cost) for incremental capacity. However, under economically 
efficient marginal cost pricing, total revenue does not cover total cost for the 
rural water system characterized by decreasing unit costs. The rural water 
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(a) (b) (c) 
Figure 18. Efficient Water Pricing With Full Subsidy for Revenue Loss. 
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system experiences negative cash flow equal to the area PaJKPm and does not 
meet the financial criteria. 
Two approaches may be considered to meet revenue requirement. The 
first approach is to make up all revenue loss, PaJKPm in Figure 18(c), out of 
public subsidy. In this case the financial and economic criteria are met but the 
policy objective (social) criteria may not be met since high income households 
with higher water consumption are subsidized more than low income 
households with lower water consumption and since public subsidy may come 
from taxpayers with lower income than the higher income households who are 
recipients of subsidized water. 
The second approach is to use block rate schedules. This approach is 
used even when public subsidy is not large enough to cover all revenue loss. 
The most common schedule is a decreasing block rate. The block rate may be 
set with price discrimination or without price discrimination. These two block 
rates are illustrated in Figure 19. __ _ 
Suppose DA is aggregate water demand for a rural water system 
characterized with long-run average cost (LAC) and long-run marginal cost 
(LMC) in Figure 19(b). In Figure 19(a), DL is the average water demand for low 
income households and DH is the average water demand for high income 
households within the rural water system. Suppose the system sets a 
nondiscriminatory water rate schedule such as abcef so that the two household 
groups face the same marginal price (cost) MCo and the initial block rate is 
designed to meet revenue shortage at marginal cost pricing. At marginal cost 
price PM, low income households demand qL and high income households 
demand qH. This rate schedule is economically efficient since pricing is 
marginal cost and is equitable since each household group pays the same 





Figure 19. Block Rate Schedule With Price Discrimination and 




surplus through the higher initial block rate. However, low income households 
pay higher average price which is not consistent with the public subsidy policy 
objective of reducing water use cost for low income households. Furthermore, if 
households respond to average price as hypothesized for water demand 
estimation in Chapter IV, low income households will consume less because of 
higher average price. A monthly subsidy rebate (perhaps through a lower fixed 
monthly service charge, i.e. lower initial block rate) will lower average price to 
low income households, increase their water demand, and lower water use cost 
which is consistent with the policy objectives of FmHA. 
Next consider the price discriminatory rate schedule abdef which is a 
schedule all too frequently encountered with rural water systems. The financial 
objective is to encourage water consumption because of decreasing unit costs 
but to capture sufficient consumers surplus to equate total revenue with total 
cost. With this discriminatory· rate schedule, water demand for low income 
households is ql. and water deman_d for high income households is qH. Water 
system demand is ql. + qH and system marginal cost is MC1. Under this rate 
schedule low income households pay higher marginal price, PL, which is equal 
to system marginal cost MC2, and high income households pay lower marginal 
price, PM, which is equal to system marginal cost MCo. This rate schedule 
causes underuse of resources, that is, marginal benefits in the aggregate are 
less than marginal costs and there is a loss in economic efficiency measured as 
the shaded area in Figure 19(b). Of course, this loss in the aggregate could be 
removed by lowering the marginal price to high income households so their 
consumption is equal to qH + (qL- ql_). Price discriminatory block rate is not 
consistent with marginal cost pricing, and is not equitable since each household 
group pays a different marginal price. It is not consistent with decision makers' 
146 
objective for STRWS since low income households pay an even higher 
average price than under nondiscriminatory water rate schedule. 
Thus, to achieve economic efficiency, meet financial requirements, and 
obtain equitable distribution of STRWS, rural water systems should be 
encouraged to set nondiscriminatory water rate schedules. Rebate systems 
should be encouraged to more closely target subsidies to low income groups. If 
households respond to average price, monthly rebates will decrease average 
price and increase water demand. If households are assumed to respond to 
marginal price, an annual rebate based on income is preferable and will not 
influence monthly water consumption. In this case, the rebate becomes more a 
transfer payment rather than a subsidy. 
Results of estimated water demand given in Chapter V show that socio-
economic groups having locational preference are also substantially 
subsidized. Whether subsidy for low income groups with locational preference 
is removed or not depends upon pq_licy objectives. One possibility to remove at 
least part of the subsidy for these groups may be to impose an extra monthly 
locational charge for those people working in the region but outside the rural 
water system boundary. However, whether this extra charge is socially feasible 
or not may need to be determined. 
Summary 
Three economic strategies were discussed for the improvement of public 
subsidy program for rural water systems. The strategies were productive 
efficiency strategy, system size strategy, and water rate strategy. Application of 
all strategies should lead to increased MSBCRs from STRWS. The strategies 
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however, may require further research before they can be practically 
implemented. 
CHAPTER VII 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Summary 
The Consolidated Farm and Rural Development Act1 authorizes FmHA to 
provide grants and long-term, low interest loans for the installation, repair, 
improvement, or expansion of rural water system facilities. The FmHA provides 
grant and loan funding up to 75 percent of an eligible project's cost. Through 
September, 1986 the FmHA and its predecessor agencies have nationally 
provided rural water systems $2,896 million in grant funds and $9,132 million in 
subsidized loans. 
The goal of decision makers- in the public subsidy program for rural water 
systems (STRWS) is implicitly stated in FmHA grant and loan instructions as to 
reduce water user cost for low income households in rural communities. 
However, implementation of STRWS has resulted in subsidies provided to 
household groups with high income, and to household groups exploiting 
locational benefits. The concern is whether all rural households should be 
subsidized since many households have higher income than the typical 
taxpayer providing such subsidies, and many households benefiting from 
subsidy are motivated to settle in rural areas for purposes of exploiting 
locational preference. Thus, policy makers need information on the distribution 




of STRWS benefits and costs to establish strategies for improved efficiency of 
STRWS. 
The major objectives in this study were to: (1) evaluate social benefits and 
costs of the subsidy program, (2) measure the distribution of public subsidy 
among major socio-economic groups within rural water systems, and (3) 
provide economic strategies for bringing about improved efficiency in the use of 
such public subsidies. 
Social welfare criteria were used with cost-benefit analysis (CBA) as the 
analytical procedure. Conventional CBA was extended to non-conventioanl 
CBA by applying policy weights to the distribution of net benefits from STRWS. 
Economic Rationale for Public Subsidy 
A resource allocation is said to be Pareto optimal when resources are 
allocated such that production and consumption cannot be reorganized to 
increase utility of some individu_a!-s without decreasing the utility of others. 
Resource allocation in competitive markets is consistent with Pareto optimality 
and serves as the basis for much of welfare analysis. However, perfectly 
competitive markets rarely exist in reality. In the event of market failure, 
government frequently intervenes to improve the performance of the market 
system. Intervention may be intended to achieve efficiency of resource 
allocation judged ultimately by the Pareto optimality principle but with reference 
to social preference for distribution of net benefits. Intervention may take place 
in several forms such as taxation, regulation, government direct production, and 
subsidization through government expenditure. 
Potential for market failure with rural household water markets stems 
mainly from the characteristic of a natural monopoly and from decreasing unit 
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cost. Rural household water markets are intervened through government 
regulation, tax exemption, direct water supply, and subsidization. This study 
concerns welfare evaluation of government intervention in rural household 
water markets through public subsidy. 
Cost-Benefit Analysis in Evaluation of Public Subsidy 
CBA is an analytical technique based on welfare economics to aid policy 
makers in decision making for public policy. Since the technique is used to 
analyze social benefits and costs, it may incorporate implicit and explicit social 
objectives. 
Welfare economics involves two major issues: (1) identification of social 
objectives or preferences to be satisfied by government policy or program, and 
(2) measurement of social welfare change due to the policy or program. 
Social preferences or objectives are identified by three approaches: (1) 
potential Pareto improvement,_ t2) Pareto improvement incorporating a 
distributional weighting system, and (3) social welfare function. Conventional 
CBA adopts potential Pareto improvement. Non-conventional CBA adopts 
Pareto improvement incorporating a distributional weighting system. Social 
welfare function approach is theoretically accepted but is infrequently used in 
practice. 
Theoretically correct measurements of social welfare change are the 
Hicksian compensating and equivalent variations. However, complex 
calculations and the lack of an operational algorithm have limited their use in 
most practical applications. Marshalian consumer surplus is another alternative 
for measurements of social welfare change. Although consumer surplus has 
some limitations such as path dependence, uniqueness conditions, and 
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assumption of constancy of marginal utility of income, Willig (1976) validated 
the use of consumer surplus in welfare measurements as a good approximation 
of compensating and equivalent variations under certain conditions. 
This study used both conventional and non-conventional CBA and used 
consumer surplus in measurement of social welfare change due to public 
subsidy for rural water systems. 
Calculation of Social Benefits and Costs 
The benefits to society of STRWS are in the two major forms, direct 
benefits and indirect benefits. The direct benefits are a reduction in water bill 
and an increase in water consumption by rural households. These benefits are 
summarized in the change in consumer surplus. The indirect benefits may be 
through a reduction in public health risks due to increased safe water 
consumption by rural households. Some altruistic or paternalistic taxpayers 
may obtain psychic satisfaction or __ positive utility by providing subsidy to rural 
households. Indirect benefits are frequently unobservable. 
The costs to society of STRWS are also in the two major forms, direct costs 
and indirect costs. The direct costs include government subsidy and rural 
household recipient costs. The government subsidy costs consist of lump sum 
grants, long-term low interest loans, and administrative costs. The rural 
household recipient costs are increased water bills due to higher water 
consumption encouraged by lower water prices. Indirect costs may include 
negative externality in the form of displeasure to some taxpayers who may not 
agree with the subsidy program, plausibly low income people. Negative 
externalities may also be associated with increased urban sprawl and 
increased traffic on rural roads. 
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This study included analysis only of observable direct benefits and costs 
since unobservable benefits and costs were considered either technically 
infeasible to measure or of minor significance. Administrative costs of 
government were not included since these costs were presumed minor 
compared to total public subsidy and because of expected difficulties in 
obtaining data. 
The government subsidy costs were computed on the basis of opportunity 
cost of resource use and equal to U.S. Treasury cost of lump sum grants and 
discount rates equal to U.S. Treasury long-term bond rates. All costs were 
calculated on an annual basis and then converted to cost per thousand gallons 
of water supplied. 
Rural Community Water Demand in Oklahoma 
Water demand estimation is required to measure welfare change due to 
public subsidy for rural water systems. The major problem in modelling rural 
- --
water demand lies in the fact that rural households do not face a single price but 
a multipart price schedule set by rural water systems. This problem is 
associated with two major issues: (1) specification of the appropriate price 
variable and (2) appropriate estimation technique. A further issue for rural 
water demand is associated with locational preference. 
The Department of Agricultural Economics at Oklahoma State University in 
1984 carried out a random sample survey of rural water systems in Oklahoma 
and of rural households within those systems. Those data were used in 
Chapter IV to estimate rural community water demand. 
Average price was selected as the appropriate price variable through use 
of the Opaluch test. OLS was used for the estimation technique since most 
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empirical studies indicate OLS gives reasonable results based on statistical 
criteria. To incorporate locational preference of rural households in water 
demand, a dummy variable was used. Income measurements in water demand 
were also handled by dummy variables. 
A total of 14 water demand equations were estimated by: (1) season, and 
(2) season, income group, and locational preference. Price elasticities of water 
demand for different groups were measured at different mean water 
consumption and price levels. Because water demand functions were linear, 
the point elasticities varied depending on quantity of water demanded. The 
elasticity in off-peak season as estimated at the overall monthly mean of water 
consumption for all households was -0.47 versus -1.56 in peak season. The 
elasticities at overall average price was -0.74 in off-peak season and -1.24 in 
peak season. However, when calculated at the mean seasonal quantity and 
price the elasticities were -0.78 for off-peak season and -0.91 for peak season. 
Public Subsidy to Rural Water Systems in Oklahoma 
A complementary survey of 11 systems used in the demand estimation 
was conducted in 1987 to collect data on subsidies received by the rural water 
systems through the Farmers Home Administration (FmHA) or other public 
agencies. Most of the systems were incorporated from 1950 to 1970. The 
number of household connections varied widely. The smallest had 110 
connections and the largest had 2,938. The miles of distribution lines varied 
from 5 to 380 with two systems not reporting. Water supplied (amount billed to 
household customers) on an annual basis ranged from 6,055 thousand gallons 
to 275,338 thousand gallons. All systems priced water using a decreasing 
block rate schedule. 
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Public subsidies to the sample of rural water systems included grants and 
long-term low interest loans. The grants and loans were used for initial 
construction of facilities, capacity expansion, and/or renovation of existing 
system. The major source of grants and loans was FmHA. Interest rates for 
loans ranged from a low of 3. 75 percent to a high of 5 percent per year and 
repayment period was 40 years for all loans. Average amount of grants per 
system for the sample was $100,248. The largest grant was $309,300 and the 
smallest was $29,930. Average amount of total loans per system for the sample 
was $946,696. The largest amount of loans received by a system was 
$6,488,840 and the smallest amount was $67,000. 
The social opportunity cost of public subsidy through grants is the 
economic sacrifice of those resources in the best alternative use. It is assumed 
these funds would be available for other public programs and at a cost of U.S. 
Treasury long-term bond rates. The annualized average cost (40 year life) of 
public subsidy through grants per sample system was $9,948 with the largest 
amount for a single system equal to $40,123. The average amount of grant 
subsidy per thousand gallons was $0.16 with the largest grant subsidy of $1.27. 
The average amount of annual grant subsidy per household was $14.61. The 
highest annual grant subsidy per rural household was $63.96. 
The social opportunity cost of public subsidy through low interest loans is 
the difference between the actual loan rate and the U.S. Treasury long-term 
bond rate. The annualized average cost (40 year life) of public subsidy through 
loans was $42,196 with the largest equal to $389,992 and the smallest equal to 
$464. The average amount of loan subsidy per thousand gallons was $0.67 
with the highest subsidy amount equal to $1.66 and the lowest subsidy amount 
equal to $0.03. The average annual loan subsidy per household was $61.99 
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with the largest subsidy equal to $132.74 and the lowest subsidy equal to 
$1.92. 
Total social opportunity cost of public subsidy is the sum of grant subsidy 
and loan subsidy. Total average annual subsidy provided to the sample of rural 
water systems was $52,144 with the highest subsidy equal to $389,992 and the 
lowest subsidy equal to $464. Total average subsidy per thousand gallons of 
water supplied was $0.83 with the highest subsidy equal to $1.66 and the 
lowest subsidy equal to $0.03. Total average annual subsidy per household for 
the sample was $76.61 with the highest annual subsidy equal to $132.74 and 
the lowest subsidy equal to $1.92. 
Under conventional CBA, public subsidy to rural water systems (STRWS) 
is always inefficient with marginal social benefit-cost ratios (MSBCRs) less than 
1.0. This is because subsidies are used to decrease costs to recipients and 
thus extend resources to rural water systems beyond the point where marginal 
social benefits equal marginal social costs. Because benefits under 
conventional CBA are weighted equally, net benefits to recipients of additional 
rural water will be less than net social cost of public subsidy plus welfare loss of 
too many resources allocated to rural water systems. MSBCRs were higher for 
the groups paying higher prices for water regardless of locational preference 
and income level. However, the difference in magnitude of MSBCRs were 
negligible. 
With public subsidy of $0.83 per thousand gallons, average monthly water 
demand in off-peak season increased by 975 gallons from 4,612 gallons to 
5,587 gallons. Additional monthly social benefits generated and additional 
monthly social costs incurred to society were $4.02 and $4.42, respectively. Net 
additional monthly private benefits generated was $0.40 and which required 
$0.81 of additional public costs. An average size rural water system with 680 
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household connections generates additional monthly benefits of about $2,734 
to society and incurs additional monthly costs of about $3,006 to society with 
STRWS during off-peak season. 
With public subsidy of $0.83 per thousand gallons, average monthly water 
demand in peak season increased by 2,210 from 6,874 to 9,084 gallons. 
Additional monthly social benefits generated and additional monthly social 
costs incurred to society were $7.89 and $8.81, respectively. Net additional 
private benefits generated was $0.92 which required $1.83 of additional public 
costs. An average size rural water system with 680 household connections 
generates additional monthly benefits of about $5,365 to society and incurs 
additional monthly costs of about $5,991 to society. 
A public subsidy of $0.83 per thousand gallons of water supplied accounts 
for about 18.3 percent of average price in off-peak season and about 20.8 
percent of average price in peak season paid by rural households. 
Under non-conventional CBA, MSBCRs with income distribution weights 
were greater than 1.0 for the poverty and middle income groups, and MSBCRs 
were around 0.5 for the higher income groups. MSBCRs were higher for 
poverty income level groups than for the middle income level groups. MSBCRs 
for the poverty and middle income level groups with locational preference were 
higher than for the groups with non-locational preference. However, the 
opposite was true for the higher income groups. 
MSBCR with consumption distribution weights was greater than 1.0 for the 
poverty income group with locational preference in off-peak season when the 
parameter of utility function, r, was 0.5. When r was increased to 2.0, MSBCRs 
were greater than 1.0 for poverty income groups in off-peak season, poverty 
and middle income groups in peak season with locational preference, and 
middle income groups in peak season with non-locational preference. When r 
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is equal to 1.0, a value consistent with most policy makers, only poverty income 
groups with locational preference had MSBCRs greater than one. In general, 
MSBCRs with consumption weights were higher for groups with lower incomes 
than tor groups with higher incomes, and were higher for groups with non-
locational preference than for groups with locational preference. 
In subsidy distribution, monthly average subsidy paid households in off-
peak season was $4.23 and in peak season was $6.62. Higher income groups 
received higher subsidies than lower income groups, and the groups with non-
locational preference received higher subsidies than the groups with locational 
preference. However, groups with locational preference, meaning they have 
chosen to live in rural areas, received substantial subsidies for their locational 
choice. The higher income group with non-locational preference received a 
monthly subsidy of $5.92 in oft-peak season and $10.76 in peak season. 
Strategies for Improved Efficiencies in STRWS 
Three economic stragegies are proposed for the possible efficiency 
improvement of STRWS; productive efficiency strategy, system size strategy, 
and water rate strategy. Productive efficiency and system size strategy improve 
efficiency of STRWS through reducing unit water supply cost and also reducing 
subsidy requirements. Water rate strategy improves efficiency of STRWS 
through incorporating decision maker's objectives and efficiency water pricing. 
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Conclusions and Policy Implications 
Conclusions drawn from the social cost-benefit analysis are summarized 
as follows: 
1. public subsidy program for rural water systems (STRWS) is inefficient 
as a whole under conventional cost-benefit analysis; 
2. a dollar of public cost is required to transfer $0.50 net private benefits 
from STRWS to rural households; 
3. under non-conventional cost-benefit analysis, STRWS is efficient for 
low income and low consumption groups; 
4. MSBCRs for non-locational preference groups differ slightly from 
MSBCRs for locational preference groups; 
5. subsidy distribution was higher for high income groups, and lower for 
low income groups; and 
6. substantial amounts of public subsidy are paid for locational 
preference. 
Based upon analytical and empirical results of this study of STRWS, 
several policy implications are discussed. First, the inefficiency of public 
subsidy program under conventional CBA does not necessarily mean that 
STRWS should be eliminated. This study has provided policy makers 
additional information on the distribution of net benefits from STRWS. Results 
from this study should be compared with results of other subsidy programs 
including subsidy to urban dwellers for water consumption. Furthermore, non-
convnetional CBA which incorporates net benefit distribution weights 
demonstrates that subsidizing low income and low consumption groups are 
efficient. A reorientation of subsidy to lower income groups would improve the 
overall efficiency of the subsidy program. This may be achieved through 
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carefully designed water rate schedules. Rebate systems for target groups on 
monthly or annual basis and life line rates or target group rates may be possible 
alternatives. 
Second, if rural water systems are encouraged to take measures to reduce 
water supply costs, efficiency of subsidy program would increase. This may be 
achieved thorugh productive efficiency improvement, and capturing more of the 
economies of size through consolidation or regionalization. 
Third, existing subsidy program results may not be consistent with policy 
maker's objectives to reduce water use cost for low income groups since the 
program subsidizes higher income groups more than for lower income groups. 
Policy makers may want to solve this inconsistency through providing direct 
subsidy to target gorups and not to water systems for general reduction in water 
cost. 
Fourth, subsidizing locational preference may not be consistent with policy 
maker's objectives since the gener:,_al public may not want to subsidize groups 
who prefer rural living for psychic satisfaction or for increasing net locational 
income. 
Finally, subsidizing discretionary water consumption in peak season may 
not be consistent with policy maker's objectives. Increased consumption 
through subsidy in peak season increases needed system capacity and 
reduces the overall efficiency of the system and efficiency of the subsidy. 
For improved efficiency in public subsidy programs to rural water systems, 
three major policy recommendations are suggested. First, rural water systems 
need to implement marginal cost pricing without price discrimination among 
rural household groups. To achieve policy goals life line rate or rebate systems 
should be incorporated in the water rate structure. This could be achieved 
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through imposing regulatory conditions when providing public subsidy. Target 
groups in rural water systems could be determined from income tax statements. 
Second, receiving of public subsidy by rural water systems should be 
conditional upon removing identified sources of productive inefficiency. This 
will require further investigation and analysis of management procedures to 
identify sources of potential productive inefficiency. 
Finally, higher priority of public subsidy should be given to consolidation of 
water systems so that more of the economies of size are captured. 
Limitations and Need for Further Research 
Several limitations of this study may influence the derived results and 
conclusions. 
First, change in cost structures of the sample of rural water systems due to 
scale economies was not considered in the analysis because of the lack of 
necessary cost information. The inclusion of scale economies may increase 
MSBCRs of public subsidy program for rural water systems. 
Second, this research considered static analysis of the subsidy program. 
Efficiency of the program in dynamic analysis may be different. Dynamic 
analysis would need to incorporate excess system capacity, costs and benefits 
for existing versus future household customers, etc. 
Third, there were missing data for observations of monthly water 
consumption and some variables such as household income, distance to work-
place, and locational preference. These missing data may influence results of 
water demand estimation which may in turn give different MSBCRs among 
different household groups. 
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Fourth, this research considered only direct social costs and benefits. 
Inclusion of indirect social costs and benefits such as urban sprawls, spill-over 
effects, etc. may influence the results of welfare analysis in this research. 
Further research is needed to analyze the identified limitations of this 
research. Other areas for further research are suggested as follows: 
First, this research was concerned with only the results of government 
intervention in rural household water markets through public subsidy. Other 
types of government intervention such as regulation and taxation may influence 
the efficiency of public subsidy program. 
Second, more information on productive efficiency and sources of 
inefficiency in rural water supply is needed. Public subsidy could be used as 
the enticement to encourage improved rural water system management and 
thus improvement of productive efficiency. 
Third, most literature on water rate schedules emphasizes revenue 
requirements and allocation of wat~r service cost among household customers. 
Water rate schedules should be analyzed for purpose of increasing economic 
efficiency (marginal cost pricing) and obtaining decision-maker's objectives 
through subsidy program. 
Fourth, more information on net locational income is needed to assist 
decision makers in determining how public subsidy should be selectively 
provided to different socio-economic household groups for attaining social 
preferences. 
Additional research in these areas would be useful to find more effective 
strategies in improving efficiency of public subsidy program for rural water 
systems. 
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The Department of Agricultural Economics at Oklahoma State University 
has conducted continuing research on the benefits and costs of rural water 
systems in Oklahoma. In 1984 we administered a survey questionnaire for a 
sample of rural water systems that were members of the Oklahoma Rural Water 
Association and a sample of households within those rural water systems. We 
are currently trying to follow-up with the same sample of systems to obtain data 
on current operations and rural water issues. 
The sample of systems we are surveying includes the following from your 
district: 
Rural Water System A 
Rural Water System B 
Rural Water System C 
For those systems having FmHA activity (grants or loans) we are asking 
the District Offices of FmHA to provide us copies of the systems' Statement of 
Budget. Income and Eguity for the years 1981 through 1986. We are also 
requesting data on any FmHA grants and loans received by these systems 
since their inception and up to the _current date including information on size of 
grant and loan, date received, and terms, (interest rate, repayment period, 
purpose of grant or loan). You may use the enclosed table to present this 
information for each system in our sample. 
We are also enclosing a copy of the questionnaire being sent to the 
systems for your information. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate 
to contact me at (405) 624-6157 or Mr. Suki Kang who is administering the 
questionnaire at (405) 624-7075. Thank you for your assistance. 
Sincerely, 
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Name of System: 
Does this system have FmHA activity (grants or loans)? _Yes_ No 
Year Granted 
*Purpose 






*Purpose Repayment Interest 





Name of System: 
Does this system have FmHA activity (grants or loans)? _Yes_ No 
*Purpose 






*Purpose Repayment Interest 





*Purpose of grant or loan: (1) Initial construction of facilities, (2) Capacity 
expansion, (3) Purchase of water system, (4) Renovation of existing system, (5) Other 
(Please specify). · 
176 
APPENDIX C 
SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE FOR RURAL WATER SYSTEMS 
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Dear Sir/Madam: 
The Department of Agricultural Economics at Oklahoma State University is 
conducting research on improved strategies for operation and management of 
rural water systems in Oklahoma. In 1984 the Oklahoma Rural Water 
Association and the Farmers Home Administration (FmHA) assisted us in 
identifying a sample of rural water systems for purposes of obtaining 
management information. Your manager was kind enough to provide us 
questionnaire information on your system at that time. We are in the process of 
updating this information and kindly request your continuing support. Results of 
the survey questionnaire should prove helpful to agencies assisting water 
systems such as yours in improving efficiency of operation and management. 
Enclosed is a survey questionnaire we would like you to fill out and send 
back to us in the self-addressed stamped envelope. This information will be 
treated in a confidential manner and used only for purposes of completing our 
research analysis. Mr. Suki Kang will be calling you within 10 days to answer 
any questions you may have in filling out the survey. If you have any questions 
at this time please call me at (405J 624-6157 or Mr. Suki Kang at (405) 624-
7075. 
Thank you for your cooperation. 
Sincerely, 
Rural Water System Managers Survey Questionnaire 
Department of Agricultural Economics 
Oklahoma State University 
Stillwater, OK 74078 
1. Name of your rural water system? 
Name Addres_s ____________________________ _ 
County ____________________________ _ 
Tele. No. ---------------------------
2. When was your rural water system incorporated? 
Year: __________ _ 
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3. How many users (number of connections) did you have in 1981-1985? 
Year 1981 1982 1983 1984 19.85 1986 
(if available) 
Connections 
4. What were your connection (initiation) fees for a new customer for the following 
years? 
Year 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
(if available) 
Fees($) 
5. How many miles of water line did your system have in 1981·1985? 




6. What is your current water rate schedule? (You may wish to attach your rate 
schedule to this questionnaire.) 
7. When was the last time this rate schedule was changed? ____ year. 
8. What were the annual total gall.ons of water supplied (billed to your customers) 
from your system in 1981-1985? 
Year 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
(n available) 
Gallons 
9. What additional percentage of water could be supplied with your existing system 
over what was supplied in 1986? 





more than 50% ( 
10. Do you plan to increase water supply capacity of your system within the next 5 · 
years? If yes, what percentage? 





. more than 50% 
11. What were the amounts of water provided by your own source of water (wells, 
holding ponds, etc.) and purchased from other systems in 1981-1985? 






12. Did your system receive grants from any government agency other than Farmers 
Home Administration since inception (or last 20 years)? Yes No 
If yes, please list them below. 
Grants 
*Name of Agency **Purpose 




13. Did your system receive loans from any government agency other than Farmers 
Home Administration since inception (or last 20 years)? Yes No 
If yes, please list them below. 
Loans 
Terms 
**Purpose Repayment Interest 
*Name of Agency Year Obtained of Loan Amount Period Rate 




*Name of Agency 
or source: (1) Economic Development Administration, (2) Housing and 
Urban Development, (3) Ozarks Regional Commission, (4) 
Water and Power Resources Service, (5) Environmental 
Protection Agency, (6) Oklahoma Water Resources Board, 
(7) Federal Revenue Sharing Funds (8) Other Agencies 
(Please specify). 
**Purpose: (1) Initial construction of facilities (2) Capacity expansion, (3) 
Purchase of water system(s), (4) Renovation of existing system, (5) 
Other (Please specify). 
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14. If your system received a grant or low interest loan how has this influenced your 
charges to customers? Please make multiple checks if appropriate (X). 
a. Ability to lower connection (initiation) fees ( ) 
b. Ability to lower the fixed monthly service charge ( ) 
c. Ability to lower overall water rate schedule ( ) 
d. Ability to lower water rate schedules for larger quantities of water 
consumed ( ) 
15. If there are no government grants or low interest loans available for future 
capacity additions or facility improvements of your system, how would this 
influence management decisions for your system? Please make multiple checks 
if appropriate (x). 
a. Limit number of new connections ( ) 
b. Encourage number of new connections ( ) 
c. Increase connection fees for new customers ( 
d. Increase fixed monthly service charge ( ) 
e. Increase overall water rate schedule ( ) 
f. Increase water rate schedule for larger quantities of water consumed ( 
g. Limit amount of water supplied per customer per month ( ) 




16. If government grants or low interest loans were available to your system for ~ 
income customers would you be willing to give such customers: 
a. An annual rebate based on level of family income? ( ) 
b. Lower connection (initiation) fees according to family income level? ( 
c. Reduce water rate schedule according to family income level? ( ) 
d. Provide the following amounts of water per month free of charge: 
first 1 000 gallons ( 
first 2000 gallons ( 
first 3000 gallons ( 
first 4000 gallons ( 
17. If government grants or low interest loans were available to your system for 
agricultural purooses, would your system be willing to give reduced rates for farm 
business and farm family use? 
Yes No 
182 
18. What are some of the major current management and operation decisions for 
your system? Please rank in order of importance beginning with 1 as highest 
importance, 2 as next highest, etc. 
a. Determining the appropriate rate schedule ( ) 
b. Properly maintaining physical facilities of water distribution system ( ) 
c. Planning capacity needs of the system to meet future growth of water 
demand ( ) 
d. Maintaining or improving water quality ( 
e. Maintaining positive cash flows ( ) 




19. What are your ultimate management objectives? Please rank objective 1 as the 
highest objective, 2 as next highest, etc. 
a. Maintain annual break-even cash flow ( ) 
b. Maintain (or increase) reserve fund for future additions to the system ( ) 
c. Increase capacity (number of users) of the system for purposes of decreasing 
costs per user ( ) 
d. Increase capacity (number of users) of the system for purposes of serving 
more rural people ( ) 
e. Accomodate service requests to existing customers (users) of the system ( 
f. Provide stable water supply (pressure) to all customers ( ) 




20. Are there training programs in areas of rural water system operation and 
management that you feel would be beneficial to you or your system? Please 
check any of the following areas you feel are important or list your own needs: 
a. Financial management ( ) 
b. Personnel management ( ) 
c. Determining water rate schedules ( ) 
d. Maintaining good customer relations ( ) 
e. Use of microcomputers in operations such as correspondence using word 
processor, customer billings, management of resources, or inventory of 
equipment and supplies ( ) 






What is your fiscal year? 
January to December ( ) 
to ( ) 
Your Name: 
Phone Number: 




SUMMARY OF THE SAMPLE RURAL WATER SYSTEMS 




CONNECTION (INITIATION) FEES FOR A NEW CUSTOMER 
System Code Amount($) Remarks 





F 150 (500) (membership fee) 
G 50 (1 0) deposit for home owner (for rent) 
H 250 
I 200 
J 25 deposit 
K 183 
TABLE XIV 
THE LAST TIME CURRENT RATE SCHEDULE WAS CHANGED 














WHAT ADDITIONAL PERCENTAGE OF WATER COULD BE SUPPLIED WITH 
YOUR EXISTING SYSTEM OVER WHAT WAS SUPPLIED IN 1986? 
Classification 
None 





More than 50% 
TABLE XVI 








DO YOU PLAN TO INCREASE WATER SUPPLY CAPACITY OF YOUR 
SYSTEM WITHIN'"THE NEXT FIVE YEARS? 
Classification 
None 





More than 50% 
No response 


















IF YOUR SYSTEM RECEIVED A GRANT OR LOW INTEREST LOAN, HOW HAS 
THIS INFLUENCED YOUR CHARGES TO CUSTOMERS? 
Influence 
Ability to lower connection (initiation) fees 
Ability to lower the fixed monthly service charge 
Ability to lower overall water rate schedule 
Ability to lower water rate schedules for larger 
quantities of water consumed 
No influence 
No response 





IF THERE ARE NO GOVERNMENT GRANTS OR LOW INTEREST LOANS 
AVAILABLE FOR FUTURE CAPACITY ADDITIONS OR FACILITY 
IMPROVEMENTS OF YOUR SYSTEM, HOW WOULD THIS 
INFLUENCE MANAGEMENT DECISIONS FOR YOUR 
SYSTEM (MULTIPLE CHECK)? 
Influence 
Limit number of new connections 
Encourage number of new connections 
Increase connection fees for new customers 
Increase fixed monthly service charge 
Increase overall water rate schedule 
Increase water rate schedule for larger quantities 
of water consumed 
Limit amount of water supplied per customer 
per month 
Limit replacement of old lines 
Close system 
No response 











IF GOVERNMENT GRANTS OR LOW INTEREST LOANS WERE AVAILABLE 
TO YOUR SYSTEM FOR LOW INCOME CUSTOMERS, WOULD 
YOU BE WILL,ING TO GIVE SUCH CUSTOMERS 
(MULTIPLE CHECK): 
Willingness Number of Systems 
An annual rebate based on level of family income 2 
Lower connection (initiation) fees according to 
family income level 2 
Reduce water rate schedule according to family 
income level 2 
Provide the following amounts of water per month 
free of charge: 
first 1 ,000 gallons 
first 2,000 gallons 
first 3,000 gallons 






IF GOVERNMENT GRANTS OR LOW INTEREST LOANS WERE AVAILABLE 
TO YOUR SYSTEM FOR AGRICULTURAL PURPOSES, 
WOULD YOUR SYSTEM BE WILLING TO GIVE 
REDUCED RATES FOR FARM BUSINESS 
AND FARM FAMILY USE? 
Yes No No Response 
0 5 6 
TABLE XXII 
, 
WHAT ARE SOME OF THE MAJOR CURRENT MANAGEMENT AND 
OPERATION DECISIONS FOR YOUR SYSTEM (TOP PRIORITY)? 
Major Decisions Number of Systems 
Determining the appropriate rate schedule 1 
Properly maintaining physical facilities of 
water distribution system 2 
Planning capacity needs of the system to meet 
future growth of water demand 0 
Maintaining or improving water quality 2 
Maintaining positive cash flows 1 
No response 5 
TABLE XXIII 
ULTIMATE MANAGEMENT OBJECTIVES (TOP PRIORITY) 
Objectives Number of Systems 
Maintain annual break-even cash flow 3 
Maintain (or increase) reserve fund for future 
additions to the system 1 
Increase capacity (number of users) of the 
system for purposes of decreasing costs per user 0 
Increase capacity (number of users) of the system 
for purposes of serving more rural water people 0 
Accomodate service requests to existing customers 
(users) of the system 0 
Provide stable water supply (pressure) to all 
customers 2 
Update and maintain existing facilities 1 
No response 4 
190 
TABLE XXIV 
NEEDED TRAINING PROGRAMS (MULTIPLE CHECK) 
Training Programs Number of Systems 
Financial management 3 
Personnel management 2 
Determining water rate schedules 4 
Maintaining good customer relations 5 
Use of microcomputers in operations such as 
correspondence using word processor, 
customer billings, management of resources, 
or inventory of equipment and supplies 2 
Management in accounting and laws 1 
No program necessary 1 
No response 3 
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APPENDIX E 
SAMPLE DATA BY OBSERVATION ON WATER DEMAND 
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TABLE XXV 
MONTHLY WATER CONSUMPTION (GALLONS) 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Observation Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 6,000 6,000 8,000 6,000 8,000 11,000 15,000 19,000 26,000 25,000 8,000 8,000 
2 7,000 5,000 6,000 4,000 6,000 8,000 8,000 7,000 7,000 7,000 6,000 7,000 
3 8,000 8,000 7,000 8,000 8,000 8,000 5,000 8,000 8,000 6,000. 6,000 5,000 
4 4,000 2,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 6,000 4,000 4,000 5,000 16,000 8,000 7,000 
5 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 9,000 10,000 14,000 11 ,000 4,000 6,000 5,000 
6 8,000 7,000 14,000 6,000 9,000 8,000 11,000 11,000 11,000 5,000 9,000 8,000 
7 4,000 7,000 9,000 8,000 14,000 28,000 51,000 60,000 38,000 9,000 8,000 7,000 
8 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 
9 3,000 5,000 5,000 7,000 6,000 6,000 13,000 12,000 7,000 5,000 5,000 6,000 
10 8,000 4,000 8,000 8,000. 14,000 13,000 42,000 46,000 38,000 17,000 13,000 10,000 
11 7,000 6,000 6,000 9,000 12,000 9,000 14,000 15,000 9,000 5,000 7,000 7,000 
12 33,000 26,000 30,000 34,000 42,000 
13 5,000 3,000 5,000 5,000 4,000 9,000 17,000 17,000 18,000 4,000 4,000 4,000 
14 7,000 4,000 7,000 5,000 5,000 6,000 4,000 6,000 6,000 5,000 6,000 5,000 
15 6,000 6,000 3,000 9,000 5,000 5,000 6,000 7,000 9,000 6,000 11 ,000 9,000 
16 3,000 2,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 5,000 3,000 4,000 4,000 
17 - - - 5,000 4,000 6,000 4,000 5,000 
18 - - - 23,000 24,000 15,000 12,000 14,000 
19 - - - 3,000 3,000 4,000 3,000 3,000 
20 - - - 2,000 2,000 4,000 7,000 5,000 
21 - - - 6,000 7,000 8,000 7,000 6,000 
22 3,672 2,989 - 4,409 10,706 7,934 28,734 34,226 
24 5,000 4,200 4,700 - - - - 5,600 17,000 13,800 10,360 6,000 
25 3,250 3,300 3,000 - - - - 5,050 18,250 4,400 3,400 3,800 
26 24,500 24,500 22,000 - - - - 8,000 23,500 19,200 10,900 
27 1,650 1,700 1,700 - - - 2,900 3,500 2,100 1,900 1,900 
28 - - - - - - 33,490 2,140 2,500 2,460 2,350 2,530 
29 - - - - 4,020 3,740 4,000 3,270 3,500 3,150 ...... 
30 6,000 4,000 3,500 5,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 4,000 6,000 5,000 4,000 5,000 CD (J.) 
31 - 2,000 3,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 2,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 2,000 
TABLE XXV (Continued) 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Observation Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
32 5,000 5,000 4,000 3,000 - 5,359 1,000 6,000 15,000 11,000 3,000 4,000 
33 - - - 8,810 6,310 6,840 12,710 20,330 15,950 8,620 14,180 3,930 
34 3,000 4,000 2,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 
35 7,000 8,000 6,000 7,000 8,000 15,000 11,000 21,000 17,000 10,000 6,000 6,000 
36 3,150 2,000 735 1,875 1,980 1,230 9,100 6,730 14,820 2,190 3,070 730 
37 2,800 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 4,000 6,000 3,000 6,850 1,150 4,000 
38 1,123 1,768 2,253 2,408 2,277 1,995 2,851 5,047 3,556 3,514 3,097 3,293 
39 6,000 4,000 2,100 4,916 4,000 4,000 2,400 3,000 2,000 1,500 1,500 1,000 
40 7,260 2,580 2,470 4,520 4,110 5,350 8,320 13,410 10,840 12,570 3,160 3,190 
41 5,660 4,271 4,607 5,061 6,.391 6,494 6,795 5,867 5,372 4,240 5,641 4,265 
42 6,000 4,000 22,000 14,000 14,000 25,000 30,000 22,000 11,000 25,000 12,000 7,000 
43 2,000 3,000 2,000 3,000 3,000 4,000 4,000 3,000 3,000 4,000 2,000 3,000 
44 4,000 6,000 5,000 4,000 4,000 4,000 4,000 14,000 5,000 5,000 4,000 16,000 
45 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 7,000 7,000 
46 11,564 4,106 1,424 - - 603 943 18,784 4,205 558 2,813 3,280 
47 5,505 2,283 5,588 8,280 5,895 5,334 5,499 9,504 8,635 7,359 6,723 5,210 
48 7,000 7,000 7,000 7,000 7,000 7,000 7,000 7,000 7,000 9,000 7,000 7,000 
49 2,000 4,000 1,000 2,000 2,000 3,000 2,000 3,000 1,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 
50 1,894 1,942 1,868 1,894 1,923 2,020 1,820 1,892 18,691 1,926 1,863 2,138 
51 - - - - - - - 21,000 14,000 12,000 11,000 4,000 
52 - - - - - - - 3,000 2,000 3,000 2,000 3,000 
53 - - - - - - - 4,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 
54 - - - - - - - 3,000 4,000 3,000 2,000 2,000 
55 - - - - - - - 19,000 20,000 17,000 1,000 7,000 
56 - - - - - - - 12,000 5,000 4,000 2,000 3,000 
57 - - - - - - - 6,000 7,000 7,000 1,000 1,000 
58 - - - - - - - 8,000 5,000 5,000 4,000 3,000 
59 - 1,000 45,000 4,970 3,950 5,160 10,960 10,960 7,560 
60 - 3,100 4,000 3,960 3,580 4,280 3,530 4,990 3,940 
61 - 5,100 8,000 6,820 7,050 9,670 11 '190 13,240 6,490 
62 6,100 12,990 10,260 10,419 15,030 16,650 33,250 18,310 - - - _.. <.0 
63 - 4,100 7,040 3,900 3,810 5,600 7,100 8,280 9,350 - - - .f:>. 
TABLE XXV (Continued) 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Observation Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
64 3,100 1,000 6,900 3,800 14,600 7,400 14,400 10,600 
65 - 3,400 8,400 9,890 6,710 9,800 7,800 12,400 11,200 
66 - 3,100 4,560 3,960 2,090 4,610 4,070 6,190 5,210 
67 - 9,400 12,200 10,300 10,600 13,100 6,800 23,000 15,200 
68 6,020 6,770 8,810 6,960 7,000 8,940 8,170 8,400 7,890 6,930 7,230 8,750 
69 2,070 2,050 1,840 1,950 2,220 2,360 3,260 3,230 3,470 2,990 2,480 4,000 
70 - 4,840 5,410 4,440 5,840. 5,740 5,830 5,120 5,090 5,850 6,310 5,300 
71 - 2,160 1,470 2,070 1,660 1,960 2,710 2,060 3,570 3,110 2,690 1,920 
72 6,620 4,820 5,230 5,740 4,820 4,840 3,320 3,400 5,610 3,650 3,860 3,570 
73 - 1,800 1,540 2,420 1•,690 2,030 1,940 3,690 8,170 6,620 4,150 2,730 
74 - 4,070 5,510 4,870 3,040 500 9,760 1 '170 12,540 5,180 1,550 2,330 
75 - 5,380 5,130 7,210 3,860 8,000 9,320 8,000 7,530 10,720 5,880 11,480 
76 - 4,620 5,690 4,840 5,190 4,980 5,460 4,500 4,130 4,650 4,600 5,410 
77 - 4,260 2,700 2,080 5,450 4,560 3,650 6,580 5,160 6,010 5,090 4,090 
78 - 7,150 4,820 6,460 7,060 6,390 6,690 6,700 4,010 6,350 3,510 9,930 
79 5,600 6,420 8,180 7,000 5,600 7,000 6,300 8,300 11,400 9,200 6,600 5,900 
80 - 4,800 5,580 5,480 5,740 5,640 4,710 4,890 4,520 7,990 4,060 4,710 
81 - 11,000 12,000 13,000 13,000 10,000 10,400 10,000 10,000 9,600 9,000 5,550 
82 - 2,550 2,580 1,680 2,840 3,030 3,160 2,850 2,700 2,870 3,150 2,880 
83 6,300 6,200 2,800 5,100 7,100 13,000 8,200 11,400 1,200 10,600 10,000 8,200 
84 - 2,360 2,170 1,660 3,080 2,610 3,480 2,820 2,920 4,350 3,310 2,430 






MONTHLY WATER BILL($) 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Observation Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 16.80 16.80 19.20 16.80 19.20 22.60 26.60 30.60 37.60 36.60 19.20 19.20 
2 18.00 15.60 16.80 14.00 16.80 19.20 19.20 18.00 18.00 18.00 16.80 18.00 
3 19.20 19.20 18.00 19.20 19.20 19.20 15.60 19.20 19.20 16.80 16.80 15.60 
4 14.00 10.00 12.40 12.40 12.40 16.80 14.00 14.00 15.60 27.60 19.20 18.00 
5 15.60 15.60 15.60 15.60 15.60 20.40 21.60 25.60 22.60 14.00 16.80 15.60 
6 19.20 18.00 25.60 16.80 20.40 19.20 22.60 22.60 22.60 15.60 20.40 19.20 
7 14.00 18.00 20.40 19.20 25.60 39.60 62.60 71.60 49.60 20.40 19.20 18.00 
8 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10~00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
9 12.40 15.60 15.60 18.00 16.80 16.80 24.60 23.60 18.00 15.60 15.60 16.80 
10 19.20 14.00 19.20 19.20 25.70 24;60 . 53.60 57.60 49.60 28.60 24.60 21.60 
11 18.00 16.80 16.80 20.40 23.60 . 20.40 25.6 26.60 20.40 15.60 18.00 18.00 
12 44.60 37.60 41.60 45.60 53.60 - - - - - - 37.60 
13 15.60 12.40 15.60 15.60 14.00 20.40 28.60 28.60 29.60 14.00 14.00 14.00 
14 18.00 14.00 18.00 15.60 15.60 16.80 14.00 16.80 16.80 15.60 16.80 15.00 
15 16.80 16.80 12.40 20.40 15.60 15.60 16.80 18.00 20.40 16.80 22.60 20.40 
16 12.40 10.00 12.40 12.40 12.40 12.40 12.40 12.40 15.60 12.40 14.00 14.00 
17 - - - 25.00 22.10 27.90 22.10 25.00 
18 - - - 79.81 53.85 56.74 48.08 53.85 
19 - - - 22.12 22.12 25.00 22.12 22.12 
20 - - - 16.35 16.35 25.00 33.66 27.89 
21 - - - 30.77 30.66 36.54 33.66 . 30.77 
22 9.60 9.60 - 9.60 12.50 11.54 21.54 24.04 
23 13.47 12.50 9.60 13.47 10.10 10.10 10.58 15.39 
24 10.61 8.86 9.20 - - - - 10.11 30.10 16.86 11.36 11.86 
25 8.25 8.37 7.98 - - - - 10.48 32.50 9.62 8.37 8.86 
26 45.50 45.50 41.20 - - - - 13.98 42.70 34.60 17.80 
27 6.24 6.36 6.36 - - - 7.61 8.50 6.99 6.60 6.60 
28 - - - - 14.49 13.14 13.50 13.46 13.35 13.53 _._ 
29 - - - - - 14.02 13.74 14.00 13.27 13.50 13.15 (0 
30 20.00 15.50 13.25 17.75 20.00 20.00 20.00 15.50 20.00 17.75 15.50 17.75 0> 
TABLE XXVI (Continued) 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Observation Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
31 - 11.00 13.25 11.00 11.00 11.00 11.00 11.00 11.00 11.00 11.00 11.00 
32 17.75 17.75 13.50 13.25 - 17.75 29.00 24.50 40.25 31.25 13.25 15.50 
33 - - - 21.75 20.00 22.25 35.75 51.50 42.50 26.75 38.00 15.50 
34 13.25 15.50 11.00 13.25 13.25 13.25 13.25 13.25 13.25 13.25 13.25 13.25 
35 22.25 24.50 20.00 22.25 24.50 40.25 31.25 53.75 44.74 29.00 20.00 20.00 
36 13.25 11.00 11.00 11.00 11.00 11.00 26.75 22.25 40.25 11.00 13.25 11.00 
37 13.25 13.25 13.25 13.25 13.25 13.25 15.50 20.00 13.25 22.25 11.00 15.50 
38 11.00 11.00 11.00 11.00 11.00 11.00 13.25 17.75 15.50 13.25 13.25 13.25 
39 20.05 15.50 11.00 17.75 15.50 15.50 11.00 13.25 11.00 11.00 11.00 11.00 
40 22.25 13.25 11.00 17.25 15.~0 17.75 24.50 35.75 31.25 33.50 13.25 13.25 
41 20.00 15.50 15.50 17.75 20.bO 20.00 22.25 20.00 17.75 15.50 20.00 15.50 
42 20.00 15.50 56.00 38.00 38.00 62.75 74.00 56.00 31.25 62.75 33.50 22.25 
43 11.00 13.25 11.00 13.25 13.25 15.50 15.50 13.25 13.25 15.50 11 ;QQ 13.25 
44 15.50 20.00 17.75 15.50 15.50 15.50 15.50 38.00 17.75 17.75 15.50 42.50 
45 11.00 11.00 11.00 11.00 11.00 17.75 17.75 17.75 17.75 17.75 22.25 22.25 
46 33.50 15.50 11.00 - - 11.00 11.00 49.25 15.50 11.00 ·13.25 13.25 
47 20.00 17.75 20.00 24.50 20.00 17.75 17.75 29.00 26.75 22.25 22.25 17.75 
48 22.25 22.25 22.25 22.25 22.25 22.25 22.25 22.25 22.25 22.25 22.25 22.25 
49 11.00 15.50 11.00 11.00 11.00 13.25 11.00 13.25 11.00 11.00 11.00 11.00 
50 11.00 11.00 11.00 11.00 11.00 11.00 11.00 11.00 49.25 11.00 11.00 11.00 
51 - - - - - - - 24.90 17.90 15.90 14.90 7.90 
52 - - - - - - - 6.90 6.90 6.90 6.90 6.90 
53 - - - - - - 7.90 6.90 6.90 6.90 6.90 
54 - - - - - - - 6.90 7.90 6.90 6.90 6.90 
55 - - - - - - - 22.90 23.90 20.90 6.90 10.90 
56 - - - - - - - 15.90 8.90 7.90 6.90 6.90 
57 - - - - - - 9.90 10.90 10.90 6.90 6.90 
58 - - - - - - - 11.90 8.90 8.90 7.90 6.90 
59 - 7.00 10.25 10.25 8.75 11.65 17.60 17.60 14.15 
60 - 8.75 10.25 8.75 8.75 10.25 8.75 10.25 8.75 
61 11.65 15.25 12.95 14.15 16.25 17.95 19.15 12.95 
...... - - - - <0 
........ 
TABLE XXVI (Continued) 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Observation Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
62 - 12.95 18.65 17.15 17.15 20.15 20.65 29.15 21.65 
63 - 10.25 14.15 8.75 8.75 11.65 14.15 15.25 16.25 
64 - 8.75 7.00 12.95 8.75 19.95 14.15 19.65 17.15 
65 - 8.25 15.25 16.25 12.95 16.25 14.15 17.95 18.65 
66 - 8.75 10.25 8.75 7.00 10.25 10.25 12.95 11.65 
67 - 16.25 18.65 17.15 17.15 19.15 12.95 24.15 20.15 
68 16.10 16.94 19.46 17.18 17.30 25.91 24.29 24.76 23.95 21.96 22.56 25.43 
69 9.80 9.80 9.44 9.62 10.16 12.36 14.34 14.34 14.93 13.86 12.34 16.00 
70 - 16.95 18.00 16.25 18.70 18.53 18.70 17.48 17.30 22.18 23.23 21.13 
71 - 11.73 10.81 11.50 10.~8 11.27 13.11 11.50 14.68 16.51 15.22 13.33 
72 19.80 16.95 17.65 18.53 16. 5 16.95 14.33 14.50 21.76 17.56 17.98 17.35 
73 - 11.40 10.35 12.42 10.58 11.50 22.80 14.85 21.68 23.86 18.61 15.49 
74 - 15.55 18.18 16.95 13.80 9.20 23.50 9.43 26.30 20.71 12.25 14.41 
75 - 17.83 17.48 20.55 15.20 21.55 23.10 21.55 21.93 29.02 22.18 30.34 
76 - 17.80 18.35 16.95 17.48 17.13 18.00 16.43 15.73 19.66 19.66 21.34 
77 - 16.60 13.10 11.50 18.00 16.43 14.85 19.68 17.48 22.60 20.50 18.40 
78 - 20.43 16.95 19.55 20.30 19.43 19.30 19.93 15.55 23.23 17.77 28.69 
79 15.35 19.55 21.68 20.30 18.35 20.30 19.43 21.93 25.20 27.92 23.86 22.39 
80 - 16.95 18.18 18.00 18.53 18.35 16.78 16.95 16.43 26.05 18.40 19.87 
81 - 24.80 25.80 26.80 26.80 23.80 24.20 23.80 23.80 28.36 27.70 21.55 
82 - 12.65 12.65 10.58 12.42 13.80 13.98 13.34 13.11 15.76 16.51 15.76 
83 19.43 19.30 13.34 17.48 20.43 26.80 21.80 25.20 9.66 29.46 28.80 26.50 
84 - 12.19 11.73 10.58 13.80 12.88 14.50 13.34 13.57 19.03 16.93 14.68 






FAMILY SIZE, INCOME, ALTERNATIVE SOURCE OF WATER, WORK DISTANCE, AND LOCATIONAL DUMMY 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Annual Alternative Distance Locational 
Income Source of to Work Preference 
Family Size ($1 ,000) Water(%) Place (Yes=1, No=O) 
Observation (FAMS) (INCOM) (NRS) (MILE) (LPD) 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 5 37.5 0 0 0 
2 3 22.5 0 7 1 
3 3 22.5 0 12 0 
4 2 47.5 lo 99 - 1 
5 2 27.5 0 10 0 
6 3 37.5 0 2 0 
7 4 57.5 0 0 0 
8 1 47.5 100 0 0 
9 2 42.5 0 5 0 
10 2 57.5 0 13 1 
11 3 57.5 0 30 1 
12 3 57.5 0 5 0 
13 2 57.5 0 5 1 
14 3 37.5 98 7 1 
15 3 57.5 60 4 1 
16 2 37.5 0 0 1 
17 2 12.5 100 - 0 
18 4 37.5 0 12 1 
19 1 7.5 100 - 1 
20 2 22.5 0 5 0 
21 3 52.5 100 - 1 ...... «> 
22 1 7.5 0 - 1 «> 
TABLE XXVII (Continued) 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Annual Alternative Distance Locational 
Income Source of to Work Preference 
Family Size ($1 ,000) Water(%) Place (Yes=1, No=O) 
Observation (FAMS) (INCOM) (NRS) (MILE) (LPD) 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
23 3 17.5 0 0 1 
24 3 5 0 0 0 
25 3 12.5 0 0 1 
26 5 17.5 40 0 0 
27 5 12.5 50 23 1 
28 2 5 0 0 1 
29 3 22.5 II 0 - 0 
30 2 22.5 100 
31 4 7.5 90 0 1 
32 4 22.5 95 50 1 
33 3 22.5 0 14 1 
34 2 22.5 100 - 0 
35 4 12.5 50 - 1 
36 2 5 98 
37 1 32.5 0 0 
38 3 22.5 100 0 0 
39 1 5 0 0 1 
40 3 5 100 - 1 
41 2 17.5 10 - 1 
42 8 12.5 80 0 1 
43 2 32.5 50 
44 4 12.5 0 5 1 
45 1 12.5 5 - 1 
46 2 11 25 - 1 1\.) 0 
47 4 37.5 0 - - 0 
TABLE XXVII (Continued) 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Annual Alternative Distance Locational 
Income Source of to Work Preference 
Family Size ($1 ,000) Water(%) Place (Yes=1, No=O) 
Observation (FAMS) (INCOM) (NRS) (MILE) (LPD) 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
48 3 27.5 100 8 0 
49 1 12.5 99 - 1 
50 2 27.5 90 7 1 
51 1 5 0 - 1 
52 2 27.5 0 - 1 
53 1 5 0 - 1 
54 3 22.5 II 0 - 1 
55 8 12.5 0 0 0 
56 2 7.5 0 0 1 
57 1 7.5 0 1 
58 2 22.5 0 - 1 
59 3 22.5 0 30 1 
60 2 12.5 0 0 1 
61 3 22.5 10 31 0 
62 4 17.5 0 20 0 
63 3 22.5 0 20 0 
64 2 7.5 0 0 0 
65 4 42.5 0 
66 2 7.5 0 0 0 
67 4 27.5 0 0 
68 3 32.5 100 20 
69 3 7.5 0 0 
70 3 12.5 0 2 
71 2 22.5 0 25 0 1\.) 0 
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